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ABSTRACT 
 
Unleashing the synergisms of animal ethics to advance animal protection 
Madelaine Leitsberger 
ORCID Number: 0000-0001-5529-3937 
Doctor of Philosophy 
March 2018 
The animal protection movement, like many social change movements, has become divided into 
moderate and more radical branches, leading to conflicts over the morally correct and strategically 
most effective approach to achieving their cause (i.e. the animal welfare versus rights debate). These 
substantial disagreements have supposedly harmed the movement, as they can lead to inefficient use 
of resources, and weaken the inner cohesion of a broad movement, while strengthening identities of 
fringe groups, causing alienation of animal advocates, the public and other stakeholders. This is a 
worrying development, given that the animal protection movement is the major driving force 
protecting animals, working to fulfil human values, such as avoidance of unnecessary suffering, and 
aiming to mitigate negative impacts of, for example, intensive farming on the environment and human 
rights. 
This thesis explores the disputes between animal welfare and rights through sociological enquiry, 
using fifteen semi-structured interviews with animal activists, that shed light on differences in 
opinions, motivations, and experiences. While the results might not be generalizable, they provide a 
deeper understanding of animal activists than current literature on the topic does. 
Based on the results, it then engages in a philosophical and practical discussion over how to best 
resolve disputes, so as to strengthen the animal protection movement. The thesis introduces the 
principle of proportionality, used to settle human rights conflicts, but which does not appear to have 
been applied to interspecies rights conflicts (conceptualised as moral tragedies in this thesis). This 
approach is developed as a non-ideal theory to allow for some anthropocentric concessions, 
acknowledging current economic, legal, social, and psychological barriers to fully ethical behaviour, 
which crucially affect the work of animal activists. Moreover, the approach forms a middle-ground 
between the various approaches as it is a deontological/rights approach at its core, but also contains 
consequentialist elements, allowing for some weighing with regards to conflicting rights, and 
because of its non-ideal character. 
Lastly, the thesis argues that, while individual campaigns might be called into question, a general 
dismissal of a wide array of approaches cannot be reasonably established. Even the consequent 
polarization caused by different groups is not necessarily harmful, while uniformity most likely would 
be. Hence, the movement should acknowledge its shared goal to protect animals and seek unity in its 
diversity.  
 
Keywords: animal welfare, animal rights, utilitarianism, animal advocacy, animal activism, principle 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, concerns for animal welfare have increased considerably; as has scholarly work 
on the topic of animal ethics and welfare; and the number, size and impact of animal protection 
organisations. Despite this upwards trend in interest in animals and their wellbeing, the abundance 
of welfare problems is rising as well. Farming is becoming increasingly industrialised (FAO 2006a:xx, 
15), meat production is expected to double by 2050 (compared to 2000) (FAO 2006a:xx), the fur 
trade is increasing globally (WeAreFur 2015), dog fighting is still an issue, despite the ban in the UK 
(Symonds 2016), as is pet overpopulation in many countries including the UK and US (ASPCA 2016) – 
and these examples name just a few of the issues. 
The animal protection movement is the major social force addressing these areas of concern. It 
advocates on behalf of animals, highlights their suffering, and challenges the lack of recognition of 
the animals’ moral status. Moreover, their work addresses not only the lives and wellbeing of 
animals, but has the potential to contribute also to human health, the environment, and human 
society (issues associated with for example animal production are described in Baroni et al. 2007; 
McMichael et al. 2007; JRC 2010; UNEP 2010; Foley et al. 2011; Sutton et al. 2011; Thornton et al. 
2011; Tukker et al. 2011; Bouwman et al. 2013; FAO 2014). However, the movement is not as 
successful as it would like to be. Various reasons have been put forward to explain its slow progress, 
one prominent reason being a lack of philosophical and strategic unity among animal advocates, and 
subsequent internal disputes (Hollands 1979:206; Garner 1993:48; Ryder 1998:41; Francione 1996; 
Regan 2004 [1983]; Phelps 2007:284-85; Armstrong and Botzler 2008:9; Donaldson and Kymlicka 
2011). This thesis focuses on those disputes with regard to the disagreements between animal 
welfare and animal rights, and in particular abolitionism. Each position accuses the allegedly 
opposing approach of dubious ethical commitments, and ineffective strategies and tactics; which in 
one way or another might negatively impact on the animal protection movement as a whole. This 
thesis seeks to explore, theorise about, and constructively contribute to these debates. Overall it 
seeks to highlight and find common ground through philosophical and sociological inquiry, and it 
aims to unite, rather than divide animal advocates.  
 
1.1 THE PROBLEM 
The debates centre around utilitarianism versus animal rights, and welfare versus animal rights. The 
most recent development saw a rise of abolitionism (e.g. Francione and Garner 2010) as a distinct 
philosophical and strategic approach for animal advocacy, versus more traditional positions. These 




This term implies two camps but does not nearly grasp the variety of philosophical viewpoints that 
influence it.1 The animal welfare versus rights debate, however, is not just a philosophical dispute 
but also encompasses discussions over strategies, tactics,2 effectiveness3 and end goals. For 
example, welfare reforms have been criticised for making people feel comfortable about the 
treatment of animals while the actual conditions for animals do not considerably improve (Phelps 
2007; Francione and Garner 2010). Animal rights activism4 is regularly viewed as too radical, 5 
extremist and even violent, which alienates the public, and therefore, is considered unable to create 
change (Jasper and Nelkin 1992:173; Garner 1993:211). In contrast, abolitionism promotes 
(grassroots) vegan education because of its supposed moral and strategic superiority (Francione 
1996; Francione and Garner 2010). Though these disagreements concern practical approaches, their 
origins can be traced back to underlying philosophical and ethical convictions. To give just one 
example: while some activists might believe in animal rights, they could also hold an ethical view 
that in a situation where suffering is inevitable, animal welfare improvements should be sought. 
Such an inevitable situation could – in these activists’ opinion – include intensive farming as they do 
not believe that it will be abolished anytime soon. 
Several authors suggest that the animal welfare versus rights debate has impeded the movement, or 
that one particular approach is harming it as a whole (Garner 1993:48; Francione 1996; Ryder 
1998:41). However, these are only suggestions lacking clear indicators and empirical evidence of the 
debate’s effect, or the effects particular groups and campaigns have on the movement. While 
scholarly engagement with animal ethics, especially utilitarianism and animal rights, has gained 
prominence since the 1960s, the debate in its entirety (i.e. including practical approaches) has 
received little academic attention (e.g. Cochrane 2013 is one of few examples). One prominent 
book, The Animal Rights Debate (Francione and Garner 2010), discusses only two viewpoints, and 
                                                                 
1 Hence, whenever the term ‘the animal welfare versus rights debate’ or ‘the debate’ is used, I am referring to 
not only the debate between welfare and rights approaches but the sum of disputes between different 
viewpoints within the animal advocacy movement.  
2 Strategies and tactics, although often used interchangeably, are not necessarily the same. Strategies are a 
general plan an organisation adopts, while tactics are specific techniques used by groups as part of a strategy 
(Munro 2005:77). In this thesis, references to either strategies or tactics should be understood as referring to 
both.  
3 Effectiveness is defined here as the capacity to reach a campaign’s goal and/or create actual change. 
4 Activism, for the purposes of this thesis, is defined as involving outreach work (such as education or lobbying) 
in order to affect change. Activists ‘work for social or political causes and […] encourage other people to 
support the cause’ (Curtin and McGarty 2016:228). 
5 To be called a ‘radical’ group or approach might be related to one or more of the following characteristics: 
demanding fundamental (economic, political, and/or social) change that would require people to dramatically 
alter their lives; using strategies and tactics quite different to mainstream ones (e.g. humiliation, terrorism, 
boycotts); blaming people and organisations (rather than behaviours and conditions); not adhering to the 
norms of society in their communication strategies, using ‘invectives, chants, and diatribe as instruments of 





presents rather stereotypical images of two opposing camps instead of acknowledging the 
movement’s diversity. Most importantly, most of the work has had little to no impact on creating a 
more united movement – a goal which received surprisingly little attention, given that the 
disagreements allegedly impede its success. 
Assuming, for now, that the debate is a hindrance to the movement’s progress, what is needed is a 
framework capable of uniting advocates. Given, however, that traditional approaches have not 
managed to provide such a framework (and in many cases probably never aimed to do so), new 
solutions are needed. This thesis aims at finding such.   
 
1.2 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to address the lack of unity, and in order to be able to provide a new approach, several 
things need to be considered. First of all, the animal rights versus welfare debate is more than just a 
scholarly exercise; it is as much a social as an ethical issue. The debate takes place not only between 
academics, but between animal protection organisations, or more accurately between activists who 
work in these organisations. Secondly and related to the previous point, purely philosophical works 
in animal ethics are often accused of arguing ‘from the philosopher’s armchair,’ thereby failing to 
include empirical evidence (or failing to include stakeholders) (Schmidt 2011:155). In comparison, 
MacIntyre (2007) argues that contemporary debates are irresolvable because they fail to 
acknowledge the historical, cultural and social context from which they originated, and in which they 
are negotiated today.6 Thirdly, the current representation of the debate within the literature is most 
likely an incomplete one. It does not acknowledge empirical evidence, the stakeholders, or the 
historical, cultural and social context of the movement.  
An interdisciplinary approach is needed; however, no thesis or research project, conducted by just 
one person, is capable of encompassing all of the historical, cultural and social aspects of any 
movement at once. Hence, this thesis focuses on the actors within the debate, and explores their 
opinions and attitudes through sociological research. Qualitative research in particular aims at a rich 
understanding of the individuals who form society (Ritchie and Lewis 2003:3). Understanding the 
debate entails understanding the people who fuel it, and is a prerequisite for subsequently 
transcending it. Once the social context of the debate is clarified, only then can a normatively 
guiding framework be developed. Based on these considerations, the following research question 
was established for the exploratory part of the thesis: 
                                                                 
6 MacIntyre’s argument has been acknowledged in this thesis by including empirical evidence and the voices of 
animal advocates. It is important to note though, that his argument proposes an approach more far-reaching 




1. Which aspects divide activists within the animal protection movement, and what common 
ground do they share? 
The exploratory part looked for agreements and differences with regards to ethical opinions, 
strategic convictions, but also structural and personal difficulties that contribute to disputes. The 
results emerging out of research question one informed two further research questions: 
2. How can those insights be integrated into a framework that bridges welfare and rights 
concerns, creating a space for ethical discussion and collaboration? 
3. Is it theoretically and practically possible and feasible to prescribe how animal activists ought 
to campaign, with respect to both purposes and methods? 
 
1.3 THE APPROACH 
The aim of this PhD thesis is to provide new insights into, and a framework capable of positively 
contributing to, the animal welfare versus rights debate. Therefore, it first examines the different 
positions through philosophical and sociological enquiry, and identifies differences and 
commonalities. This enquiry follows a constructivist epistemology and ontology. It aims to gain a 
deep understanding of opinions and experiences of animal activists about the debate, which 
subsequently results in a better understanding of the tensions and disputes. It is acknowledged that 
the debate constitutes a social construct, deeply embedded in the historic, cultural and societal 
context of the Western world; and this thesis itself also constitutes such a construct. The method 
consisted of fifteen semi-structured interviews with activists from various animal protection 
organisations in the UK.7 The interviews were analysed using thematic data analysis. Based on 
interview results, the thesis then develops a new framework for ethical deliberations concerning 
animals, which incorporates important insights from the various positions (stemming both from 
interview data and existing literature). Lastly, the claim, that a uniform approach (as proposed by 
abolitionists) is ethically and practically feasible and necessary in order to advance animal 
protection, is scrutinised and rejected. 
 
1.4 THE THESIS 
The thesis consists of ten chapters: the introduction, the literature review and the methodology 
(part I); a discussion of results (part II) comprising a chapter concerning ethical differences and 
commonalities, a chapter on opinions regarding campaigning approaches, and a chapter on 
                                                                 
7 The research focuses on the UK, as firstly, the animal protection movement originated in the United 
Kingdom. Secondly, the animal welfare versus rights debate is more prominent here than in other European 
countries; only the US faces similar disputes. Thirdly, a limitation to the UK was considered more feasible for 




interpersonal and identity differences; and part III including a chapter discussing the moral status of 
animals and the need for a non-ideal theory, a chapter proposing the proportionality approach as 
non-ideal theory for our deliberations concerning animal issues, a chapter that theorises animal 
activism ethically and strategically; and finally, the overall conclusion of the thesis.  
The literature review includes a summary and discussion of historical, philosophical, and sociological 
aspects of the animal welfare versus rights debate. The main focus lies on the variety of ethical 
theories that have been developed to conceptualize how we ought to treat animals. Differences in 
practical approaches to activism, and in sociological aspects (such as public image) are discussed 
towards the end of this chapter. 
The methodology introduces the reader to the research context including the rationale behind the 
research. It is based in a constructivist epistemology and ontology, and utilises fifteen semi-
structured interviews to explore the opinions, attitudes, and experiences of a variety of animal 
activists. This chapter elaborates on the design process of the purposive sampling technique, the 
topic guide, data collection and the thematic data analysis used. 
Part II consists of three chapters, discussing the differences and commonalities between the 
participants with regards to ethical opinions, opinions on strategic approaches, and social and 
interpersonal differences. The issue of suffering was identified as a shared concern across all 
interviewees, while opinions regarding the killing of animals and its necessity varied (chapter four). 
While most participants held views quite closely aligned to animal rights, their campaigning 
preferences differed more strongly. However, a consensus emerged that a variety of strategic and 
tactical approaches is needed to create wider social change for animals (chapter five). Overall, 
differences appeared to be based more strongly on personal characteristics and aspects concerning 
identity (e.g. idealism versus pragmatism), often being the root cause for conflict (chapter six).  
As addressing interpersonal conflicts was beyond the scope of this thesis, part III addresses ethical 
and strategic disputes. Chapter seven discusses the moral status of animals and concludes (as did 
most interviewees) that there is indeed no convincing argument at this point in time to consider the 
moral status of other animals as unequal to humans, at least with regard to (moderate to severe) 
suffering and death inflicted by moral agents on others. However, as some participants repeatedly 
pointed out, human-animal conflicts do occur and other non-ideal world constraints render ideal 
ethical theories difficult to apply to actual human-animal questions. Hence, this chapter further 
conceptualises human-animal conflicts as moral tragedies that need to be addressed through a non-
ideal theory, in order to acknowledge real (but not absolute) barriers caused by moral corruption.8 
                                                                 
8 Moral corruption refers to a tendency to rationalise our behaviour in a manner that suits our own (selfish) 




While ethical values and principles are nevertheless to be upheld in a non-ideal theory, it is 
acknowledged that moral corruption hinders their full realisation. Therefore, a non-ideal theory 
looks for the next best course of action that realises ethical principles to the greatest extent 
possible, and ideally moves society closer to the ideal state (Gardiner 2011:400; Garner 2013:12). 
Chapter eight introduces the principle of proportionality to guide deliberations concerning animal 
issues and the most just course of actions in a non-ideal world. It clearly differentiates those conflicts 
that concern fundamental rights versus any other claims (i.e. legitimacy), assesses whether a course 
of action is suitable and necessary to realise a particular fundamental right, and whether the 
realisation of one’s fundamental rights is in proportion to invading a crucial claim of another being. 
This essentially rights-based approach allows for weighing within a narrow framework, 
contextualises ethical problems, and takes into consideration the claims and concerns of all involved 
stakeholders. Hence, it incorporates elements from different approaches in animal advocacy, and 
offers a framework for discourse over animal issues. 
Chapter nine theorises animal activism, with a focus on whether it is theoretically and practically 
possible and feasible to prescribe how animal activists ought to campaign, with respect to both their 
purposes and methods (as the abolitionist position attempts to). This chapter partially rejects 
abolitionist assumptions, and argues that animal activism also constitutes a moral tragedy in which 
helping animals in one way necessarily means not helping them in others. Establishing moral 
superiority of any course of action is not straightforward, as either way some good occurs at the 
expense of not doing a different good. Knowledge on effectiveness and impact of campaigns on the 
wider movement could help to discuss such matters in a more decisive matter. However, the 
academic debate on effectiveness and impact tends to be theoretical and vague.  
Moreover, chapter nine argues that diversity, rather than uniformity, within the movement can be a 
strength. For a movement to be successful it needs to reach out to a variety of audiences, which 
cannot be addressed by one type of organisation, activist, or message alone. A variety of 
communication channels, which are potentially even contradictory, is needed. The resulting 
polarization can weaken the inner cohesion of a movement, but can also positively impact on it, if so 
called positive flank effects occur (Haines 1984:32; Jasper and Nelkin 1992:43; Derville 2005:530–31; 
Munro 2005:81; Goodwin and Jasper 2015:380; Hirsch 2015:106; Whittier 2015). Lastly, the chapter 
offers some considerations for future directions of the movement that potentially will increase its 
impact. Increasing the effectiveness of animal protection will hopefully positively impact on both 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following literature review offers both a summary and discussion of philosophical, as well as 
practical and sociological aspects of the animal welfare versus rights debate. As stated in the 
introduction, this thesis aims to acknowledge the social, cultural and historical background of this 
debate as far as possible and practical. Hence, the review introduces the reader to a short historical 
overview of the animal advocacy movement. The main part of the review will then focus on the 
academic debate between utilitarianism, welfarism, and the rights view, including a variety of 
viewpoints from important authors. Lastly, the practical and sociological aspects of the debate will 
be introduced, including the differences in approaches to activism and campaigning, and sociological 
aspects like public image. Moreover, the discussion focuses mostly on the United Kingdom and 
Anglophone literature, given the geographical limitation of the research study, and as continental 
writers had less impact on the current (Anglo-Saxon) debates in animal protection (Calarco and 
Atterton 2004:xii). 
 
2.1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW9 
The onset of modern animal ethics in the late 1960s/early 1970s is characterised by a fundamental 
change of views. The moral status of non-human animals received not just more attention but was 
considered (almost) equal to the moral status of humans by some scholars. Religious and secular 
moral traditions of Western societies rarely considered animals relevant in any other way than their 
instrumental purposes for humans (Midgley 1983:10), as they were supposedly lacking important 
traits, such as the possession of a soul, rationality, and so forth.  
Nowadays sentience10 is largely considered a necessary condition for moral consideration within 
animal ethics, dating back to 1789, when Bentham (1907 [1789]) put the emphasis of moral 
consideration on the shared capacity to suffer.11 The treatment of animals and animal welfare slowly 
                                                                 
9 This historical overview makes no attempts to completeness; it highlights important aspects of the historical 
development of animal ethics and the animal liberation movement in regard to animal welfare and animal 
rights organisations. For a more detailed overview see Armstrong and Botzler (2008:1–13). 
10 Sentience is a debated concept; it is more than just the ability to discriminate between different sensory 
qualities (Clark 2000). The recognition of internal and external stimuli needs to be integrated to generate a 
mental scene in order to direct behaviour (Chandroo et al. 2004). Aspects of sentience include consciousness, 
memory, and emotions or ‘motivational affective states’ (such as pain, fear, hunger, thirst and pleasure) 
(Broom 2014; Chandroo et al. 2004). However, their relation to sentience and thresholds to ascribe sentience 
remain contested. Broom (2014:5), for example, defines sentience as ‘some ability: (i) to evaluate the actions 
of others in relation to itself and third parties; (ii) to remember some of its own actions and their 
consequences; (iii) to assess risk and benefits; (iv) to have some feelings; and (v) to have some degree of 
awareness. Others use a narrower definition. 
11 In Bentham’s famous footnote (1907 [1789]), he states that moral consideration cannot be based on 




became considered as moral concerns worth working for. In 1824, the Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) was founded.12 It was the first of its kind but shortly afterwards similar 
societies were established in other European countries. However, those humane organisations for 
animals did not seek justice for animals in the same way as animal rights groups do today. The goal 
to promote better welfare and better treatment of animals did not challenge the fundamental 
premise that it was morally acceptable to use animals, which was eventually targeted by the rising 
antivivisection movement – the predecessor of today’s animal rights activism (Finsen and Finsen 
1994:38). 
Animal rights activism and animal liberation activities started in the 1960s, targeting justice for 
animals rather than humane treatment and welfare. In 1970, Ryder (1979:219) coined the term 
‘speciesism,’ describing our prejudices against other animals, based on their species membership, 
leading us to behave unjustly towards other animals. The argument against speciesism relies on the 
notion that intellectual or physical differences (i.e. species differences) cannot provide sound 
grounds to justify differences in moral consideration, just as they should not justify differences in 
considerations concerning humans (Ryder 1983:3). 
While the idea of rights for animals seemed too far ahead in 1970, as Singer states in the preface to 
Animals’ Rights – A Symposium (Ryder and Paterson 1979:xi), the idea rapidly moved forward since 
the mid-70s. Animal Liberation by Peter Singer (1995 [1975]) provided an ethical theory to be 
discussed within academia but also an ethical theory that inspired animal protection organisations 
and contributed to their growth (Garner 1993:63). 
Though there was already some division between animal rights organisations and the 
humane/welfare organisations in the 19th century (Garner 1993:49), this split likely grew bigger with 
the rise of capitalism. Animal rights groups were perceived as a subversive threat to capitalism 
(Ryder 1998:35) and acts of violence (e.g. by the Animal Liberation Front) also led to a backlash 
against these organisations (Finsen and Finsen 1994:101–2). In contrast, animal welfare groups were 
always (and increasingly are) reliant on animal welfare science, working within mainstream, and in a 
dialogue with the government and industry (Garner 1993:208). They are opposed to almost all forms 
of direct actions except the most benign ones (Garner 1993:221), as they fear being associated with 
more radical organisations and subsequent loss of credibility and contacts with government and 
industry. 
                                                                 
concludes that moral consideration should be based on the capacity to suffer: ‘the question is not, Can they 
reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?’ 
12 In 1840, Queen Victoria granted the Royal Prefix to the SPCA, renaming it the Royal Society for the 




This gap between the animal welfare approach and the rights approach led to an isolation of these 
organisations. Though their goals might be similar, theoretical and practical disagreements divided 
groups into what seem to be two camps which have difficulties working with each other. This gap 
between the organisations appears to be a crucial one and has been summarised in the question: 
‘should we work for larger cages or empty cages?’ (Regan 2004 [1983]:xiv; Armstrong and Botzler 
2008:10–11).13 Disputes, however, can be detrimental to the original goal of animal protection. 
Some of the movement’s energy in the United States has been sapped over this dispute according to 
Ryder (1998:41). Whether this split can be overcome or not, will be the focus of this thesis on a 
theoretical and practical level.  
 
2.2 ANIMAL ETHICS 
The theoretical aspect of this thesis deals with the moral theories. In animal ethics, utilitarianism and 
animal rights are considered to be two fundamentally opposing but also the most prominent 
theories.14 DeGrazia (1996:6) states that the first generation of scholars in animal ethics placed an 
extraordinary emphasis on the utility-versus-rights debate, while the second generation broadened 
the spectrum and argued for moral standing within other philosophical frameworks. The focus of 
this review will lie mostly on scholars concerned with utilitarianism, welfarism and animal rights.  
However, it should be noted that important contributions have been made also by others. For 
example, Midgley and the feminist ethics of care in general (e.g. Donovan 2006) argue for 
compassion and emotion as other relevant ethical sources for the treatment of non-human animals. 
Ideas from social contract theory meet animal ethics in Mark Rowlands’ book Animals Like Us (2002). 
In contrast, Nussbaum (2006) challenges social contract theory in her book Frontiers of Justice 
because the theory struggles to deal with issues of disability, nationality and species membership; 
and introduces a capability approach instead.15 The literature on animal ethics grew substantially 
within the past decades and the list of authors discussed is far from exhaustive (e.g. Rollin 1998; 
DeGrazia 1996; Sandøe and Christiansen 2008 have not been mentioned). Of course, there were also 
                                                                 
13 This question focuses on the main difference between animal welfare which is believed to condone the use 
of animals for our purposes (as long as proper welfare is ensured) versus animal rights which is said to 
condemn it.  
14 This literature review focuses on utilitarianism as a form of consequentialism and the animal rights view as a 
form of deontology. Virtue ethics is the third major approach in normative ethics which puts emphasis on 
moral virtues and questions about what kind of people we should be and how we should live (Hursthouse 
2013). However, given the focus of this thesis and the developed framework being essentially a rights-based 
theory, virtue ethics is not further discussed here.  
15 Social contract theories mostly rest on the assumption that individuals equal in power enter a contract in 
order to ensure mutual advantage. Nussbaum criticises that individuals are not equal in power and that power 
should not be the basis for whether we are to be considered equal parties in the contract. Moreover, we all 
are to some extent always, and even more so in certain phases of our lives, dependent on others and their 




a few authors who argued against the moral standing of animals (e.g. Frey 1980; Carruther 1992; 
Cohen 2008). However, their arguments are less relevant for the aim of this thesis (although some 
will resurface in chapter seven). It is widely agreed today that sentient animals have moral 
standing.16 The question rather is how much do their interests count? And are they weighable 
against human interests? Utilitarianism would answer in the affirmative. 
 
2.2.1 UTILITARIANISM 
Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism (and teleology) which assesses the moral value of an 
action based on its consequences (or outcomes). Varner (2012:3) describes utilitarianism as a family 
of theories which hold that ‘at least ultimately, the right thing to do is whatever will maximize 
aggregate happiness.’ This principle is summed up in the famous quote: ‘the greatest happiness for 
the greatest number’ (Hutcheson 1969 [1725]:283-284). However, happiness does not necessarily 
encompass all utilitarian theories. Hence, it is better described as family of theories that seek to 
maximise some sort of good for the greatest number; such good is often defined as happiness, 
pleasure, fulfilment of interests, or satisfaction of preferences. 
Furthermore, the utilitarian family can be roughly classified regarding its level and its measure of 
utility (to produce some sort of good).  Act- and rule-utilitarianism are a division of level; classical- 
and preference utilitarianism are divided based on their measures of utility.17 For act-utilitarians, 
every moral decision must be rationally evaluated in terms of its consequences and with the goal to 
maximize some sort of good. However, it seems to be a difficult task to calculate the utility of each 
and every action. Hence, rule-utilitarianism provides basic rules to guide our actions which should 
bring about the greatest utility. Hare (1981) developed a theory that combines act- and rule-
utilitarianism into a two level utilitarianism,18 which Varner (2012) applied to animal ethics, showing 
that Hare’s theory combines utilitarian as well as animal rights considerations. This approach will be 
discussed later on. 
Jeremy Bentham is often considered the father of classical utilitarianism. His stance is purely 
hedonistic as for Bentham the consequences matter only in terms of pleasure and pain (and pain is 
the opposite of pleasure). He is also known for his egalitarian approach, summed up in a quote 
attributed to Bentham by Mill (1879): ‘everyone to count for one, nobody for more than one.’ 
                                                                 
16 As mentioned earlier, sentience became a basic criterion for moral consideration. Not necessarily all species 
belonging to the animal kingdom are sentient. Therefore, whenever I use the term ‘animals,’ this refers to 
sentient animals if not explicitly stated otherwise. 
17 This division of the utilitarian theories is based on literature relevant to animal ethics and does not, for 
example, include benefit utilitarianism.  
18 Hare’s theory assumes that our everyday decision making is based on rule-utilitarianism. However, in new 





Bentham’s strict egalitarian approach, however, caused a lot of criticism as certain pleasures were 
considered ‘lower’ than others. This led Mill to his perfectionist view that indeed certain pleasures, 
like those of a high intellect, are more valuable, as it would be ‘better to be a human being 
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied’ (Mill 1879).  
Classical utilitarianism poses a problem though: in order for one to experience pleasure, one’s 
desires need to be fulfilled, and not everyone desires the same things in the same way. Some people 
might not desire to deal with complex philosophical issues like Socrates and might prefer to watch a 
soap opera on TV. Some desires can be detrimental (e.g. drug abuse), other desires might be 
uninformed, irrational or distorted; and we might desire things that do not produce more pleasure 
per se.  
 
PREFERENCE UTILITARIANISM (SINGER’S APPROACH) 
Singer (1993:14), too, argues that the best consequences cannot only be addressed in terms of 
pleasure and pain. For instance, if among all people gathering fruits, everyone received the same 
amount eventually (regardless of how much they individually collected), it could result in an overall 
lesser amount of fruit, as some might collect less, anticipating a higher reward regardless. Hence, the 
better solution would be not to give everyone the same amount of fruit, according to Singer. His 
form of utilitarianism is based on interests in terms of preferences of all those who are involved. 
Singer (1995 [1975]) does adhere to the basic principle of equality and equal consideration of 
interests (but this does not necessarily entail equal treatment). As differences in gender (i.e. sexism), 
racial origin (i.e. racism) or other abilities should not determine how much interests count, nor 
should species differences (i.e. speciesism) (Singer 1995 [1975]:5).  
In order to find a characteristic which provides moral standing to humans, one should look for a 
shared characteristic ‘pitched so low that no human lacks it’ (Singer 1995 [1975]:237). This lowest 
denominator and the basis for equal consideration is then defined as sentience, as a prerequisite for 
interests, which is not only possessed by humans, according to Singer (1995 [1975]:7).19 Hence, all 
the interests of all sentient beings involved in a decision should be equally considered. If the 
utilitarian calculation shows that some beings need to suffer (e.g. in an invasive experiment) in order 
to bring about the greater good for the greater number, then this suffering would be justified. Yet, if 
such an experiment is conducted for example on chimpanzees, while a brain-dead person could have 
been used,20 this would constitute speciesism. The interests of the chimpanzees (which have a 
greater degree of sentience than the brain-dead person) would not have been considered equally.  
                                                                 
19 While sentience is certainly not only possessed by humans, there are also human beings who are probably 
not sentient (for instance brain-dead persons). Hence, Singer does not give equal moral status to all humans. 




While Singer argues in favour of equal consideration of interests, especially the interest in avoiding 
suffering because humans and other animals are sentient beings, he takes a different stance when it 
comes to the question of taking life. The value of life, according to Singer (1995 [1975]:20), depends 
on the ‘capacity to think ahead and have hopes and aspirations for the future, the capacity for 
meaningful relations with others and so on.’ Death involves the loss of these kinds of characteristics 
(Singer 1995 [1975]:21) and therefore the death of humans would be more serious than the death of 
animals without these characteristics. He even goes so far to say:  
In general it does seem that the more highly developed the conscious life of the being, the 
greater the degree of self-awareness and rationality and the broader the range of possible 
experiences, the more one would prefer that kind of life, if one were choosing between it 
and being at a lower level of awareness (Singer 1995 [1975]:107).  
Though Singer might prefer his human existence and awareness over any other existence, it seems 
questionable that it can be assumed that a non-human animal would choose a human existence over 
a non-human existence. After all, we cannot fully understand what kind and range of experiences 
animals have and even less so how they subjectively experience them (cf. Nagel 1974). Moreover, 
there are certain sensations humans do not have, for example echolocation. A dolphin might choose 
a dolphin existence and awareness over a human existence based on the capacity of echolocation.21 
Karlsson (2012:714) similarly criticises Singer for using the anthropocentric idea that more complex 
(human) minds are more valuable, as a criterion to judge the moral status of other animals.22 
 
PAINISM (RYDER’S APPROACH) 
The question on the value of life will be set aside for now and I will turn back to utilitarianism and 
Ryder’s approach. Ryder (1999, 2001, 2010) develops a slightly different theory and coins another 
new term: painism. Bad things are characterised by causing suffering and pain, and moral problems 
such as injustice and inequality are bad only in so far as they cause suffering. Hence, in the painism 
approach an individual’s capacity to suffer is the criterion for moral standing (Leuven and Visak 
2013:411). Ryder’s theory aims at endorsing certain aspects of Singer’s utilitarianism while at the 
same time seeking to protect individual interests, by arguing that consciousness and the capacity to 
feel pain are inherently individual. Thus, suffering cannot be calculated and compared to other 
individuals (Leuven and Visak 2013:414). By arguing in this way, he tries to protect individual 
interests by excluding the aggregative aspects of utilitarianism. This, however, bears some counter-
                                                                 
21 Francione provides a similar critique of Singer’s approach (Francione and Garner 2010:18). 
22 Anthropomorphism is usually defined as the attribution of human characteristics (including mental states) to 
non-human entities. Karlsson (2012) argues that the transfer of criteria with which human lives are judged, to 





intuitive implications as it cannot give guidance whether one ought to save ten people instead of 
one person from a burning house when one has to choose (Leuven and Visak 2013:416). 
 
TWO-LEVEL UTILITARIANISM (VARNER’S APPROACH) 
Varner’s approach (2012) incorporates animal ethics into Hare’s two-level utilitarianism, arguing that 
this theory combines aspects of animal welfare and rights views. It is utilitarian (hence, including 
welfare aspects) as Varner states that moral reasoning would inevitably force us to use the principle 
of utility because: 
if you had to live through everyone’s experiences in turn, rather than just your own, you 
would choose to maximize aggregate happiness, since you would have to enjoy or suffer all 
of the benefits and costs in some order or other (Varner 2012:13). 
Yet, following Hare’s two-level utilitarianism, such moral reasoning would only occur in new 
situations or when intuitions are in conflict. In everyday situations, humans would be guided by rules 
(such as respecting rights and hence, including a rights perspective), which are, however, given 
through explicitly utilitarian thinking. 
Furthermore, Varner (2012:3) divides beings into three categories: persons, near-persons and 
merely sentient. Persons are those individuals ‘who deserve special treatment or respect in virtue of 
having certain cognitive capacities,’ such as rationality and self-consciousness, being a moral agent,23 
being autonomous,24 and being an individual with a ‘biographical sense of self.’ Individuals who are 
near-persons do not possess the same biographical sense as persons but nevertheless ‘have a 
robust, conscious sense of their own past, present, and future’ (Varner 2012:21). The merely 
sentient are beings who ‘live entirely in the present’, even though he admits this could be a 
hypothetical construct (Varner 2012:22). 
Like Singer, Varner (2012:24) puts emphasis on cognitive abilities. Therefore, the lives of near-
persons have greater moral significance than the lives of the merely sentient (Varner 2012:23). In 
contrast to near-persons, slaughter of the merely sentient would be permissible as long as it is done 
humanely in line with welfare principles. Varner, however, does not provide an evaluation of which 




                                                                 
23 Being a moral agent means possessing the ability to think about right and wrong, and to adjust one’s 
behaviour accordingly. 
24 The author refers to being autonomous in the sense of having second-order desires. First-order desires are 
desires for ordinary things, like having the desire to eat chocolate. Second-order desires are desires about our 




SUMMING UP UTILITARIANISM 
Utilitarianism seeks to ‘maximize the expected satisfaction of interests, equally considered,’ 
according to Matheny (2006:14). It is usually considered universalist, welfarist, consequentialist and 
aggregative. Universalist because it considers all interests; welfarist because the individual welfare is 
usually what matters; consequentialist because the moral value depends on the consequences of an 
action; and aggregative because it adds up all the interests regarding suffering and enjoyment 
(Matheny 2006:14–15).25 
The utilitarian theory seems to be a simple, intuitive framework at first glance as it offers just one 
principle for each and every decision. It supports many of our moral intuitions and due to its 
aggregative properties it manages to address questions other frameworks cannot address (Matheny 
2006:16). It is based on rationality and according to Matheny (2006:15) it seems to enjoy greater 
empirical objectivity as it makes ‘full use of information about the world.’ However, specifying what 
the principle implies in practice, is a more complex issue as Varner (2012:4) points out.  
Is utility really the only value that we should take into consideration when it comes to moral 
decisions? Something that does not contribute to utility could still have some other sort of value (for 
example, aesthetic value). Even if we accept the basic assumption of assessing utility, should it be 
assessed in terms of happiness? Certain things might create a lot of happiness now but cause 
suffering in the future or future generations. Would it be moral to destroy the environment and 
make it uninhabitable for future generations if it generates a lot of happiness now? Moreover, 
happiness and good welfare are not necessarily the same things. The classical hedonistic view only 
accounts for pleasure, but something that gives me pleasure could be detrimental to my health and 
hence, for my welfare. Therefore, pleasure has been widely substituted by welfare in animal ethics. 
Yet, something that is beneficial for my welfare does not necessarily make me happy or fulfil my 
interests. How should we weigh the happiness or interests of an individual against something that is 
in its interest?26  
How should we weigh different interests of different individuals against each other? It is easy to 
compare equal interests, for example, my interest in avoiding suffering and the interest in avoiding 
suffering of the individual next to me. However, some interests are crucially distinct from each 
other, making them potentially incommensurable. Not many people would agree that the interest a 
human has in his/her life is commensurable to the pleasure others would get by killing a human. Yet, 
following utilitarianism we could come to the conclusion that killing a human, or reinforcement of 
                                                                 
25 For example, Bentham’s utilitarianism aggregates the value of pleasure and pain regarding the number of 
beings involved, their intensity, duration, certainty (or uncertainty), their propinquity (or remoteness), their 
fecundity and their purity (Bentham 1907 [1789]:IV.7).  
26 For instance, it is not in the interest of a diabetic person to eat sweets but the person can nevertheless have 




sexism or racism, could be permissible if enough people would profit from it (Regan 2004 
[1983]:137). The possible sanctioning of inequitable distributions of harms and benefits is one of the 
most frequent criticisms on utilitarianism (Regan 2004 [1983]:211) and in such cases utilitarianism is 
not intuitive either.  
However, Leuven and Visak (2013:417) point out that some examples, which supposedly 
demonstrate that utilitarianism sanctions immoral conclusions, do not consider that we are rarely 
confronted with either/or choices. A standard example is about an amphitheatre in which individuals 
have to participate in cruel games causing severe suffering. Utilitarianism would sanction these 
games if enough people enjoyed them. The public’s pleasure could outweigh the suffering of the 
individuals but only if there were no alternatives available to create public pleasure (Leuven and 
Visak 2013:415, 417). Hence, other activities which generate as much pleasure without causing 
suffering would be the preferable activities to engage in from a utilitarian point of view. 
Another objection to utilitarianism is the demands it makes on us. Since there are poor and suffering 
individuals in the world, utilitarianism would require us to dedicate our efforts to increase their 
happiness (or some sort of good) even at the expense of our own welfare (Hills 2010:225). 
Utilitarianism makes no difference between the immorality of doing harm, allowing it to happen 
(Hills 2010:228), or not taking chances to increase happiness (or some sort of good). 
Lastly, the claimed empirical objectivity hardly comes into practice. For example, Schedler (2005) 
criticises that Singer’s argument against killing is not utilitarian. Indeed, Singer only weighs our 
palate taste against the animal’s interest into avoiding suffering. However, he does not provide a 
fully utilitarian calculus for or against eating meat which would have to also take into account the 
suffering of animals during the harvesting of vegetables. Also the cost-benefit weighing in animal 
experimentation sometimes lacks a profound discussion of the actual benefits of the experiment, as 
well as the actual consequences if the experiment was not conducted (e.g. Smith 2002 is an example 
for a lack of an actual analysis).27 Moreover, the question remains whether utility can be quantified 
at all. 
According to Regan (2004 [1983]:205), the current form of utilitarian animal ethics, as promoted by 
Singer, perceives moral agents and patients as ‘mere receptacles of what has positive or negative 
value but they have no value on their own.’28 Besides all the other problematic issues of 
                                                                 
27 In contrast, Knight’s book (2011) is dedicated to a more thorough analysis.   
28 This criticism seems incorrect in so far as Singer gives value to sentient individuals. Having an individual 
welfare entitles beings to moral standing and hence, equal moral consideration. On the other hand, the 
utilitarian calculation seems to detach their welfare from individuals because of its aggregative features. 
Utilitarianism, for instance, could allow making some people deliriously happy by treating others badly. These 
counter-intuitive accounts make utilitarianism appear as if utility in itself has value while the individuals do 




utilitarianism, this lack of value of individuals themselves is seen as the most important failure of 
utilitarianism from an animal rights point of view (Regan 2004 [1983]:350). 
 
2.2.2 WELFARISM 
The welfare approach as a philosophical framework is difficult to define.29 It is usually associated 
with utilitarianism, pragmatism, zoocentrism (only and all sentient beings), pathocentrism (focused 
on suffering), and a hierarchical approach (human interests count more) (Schmidt 2011:157). 
Welfarism is often associated with Singer’s utilitarianism, while animal rights theories are associated 
with the kind of theory Regan proposed. This, however, is not necessarily the case (Cochrane 
2012:204). Schmidt (2011:160) explains that welfare theories are frequently associated with an 
utilitarian approach because utilitarianism always embraces ‘some sort of welfare concept.’ 
However, all major animal ethics theories (including rights approaches) embrace some sort of 
welfare concept as Schmidt (2011) demonstrates. It is the implications these theories draw from 
welfare concepts which differ. Also, a welfare approach does not necessarily need to rely on 
utilitarianism (Francione and Garner 2010:108). Indeed, many welfare organisations frame their 
concerns in terms of care, compassion, or humane treatment which are indicative of a virtue ethics 
approach rather than a utilitarian approach.  
A hierarchical welfare view is advocated, for example, by Garner who argues that species specific 
characteristics are decisive factors for moral consideration (Francione and Garner 2010). Important 
characteristics include, for example, cognitive abilities (i.e. high rationality) and autonomy, which 
humans (even the least intelligent humans) possess to a greater degree than animals (Francione and 
Garner 2010:189–92). His view is also pragmatic as he argues in favour of moral pluralism, and 
respect for individual choices and preferences (of humans) (Francione and Garner 2010:148); instead 
of (non-pragmatically) advocating inviolable rights for animals which cannot be trumped by 
individual preferences. Some authors portray such hierarchical welfare philosophies as giving 
outright approval to animal exploitation (cf. McCausland 2014:649):  
The animal welfare philosophy holds that humans are qualitatively superior to animals in 
ways that entitle us to enslave and murder them for our own benefit, but that our own 
moral superiority calls us to inflict upon them as little suffering as we are able without overly 
inconveniencing ourselves (Phelps 2007:xvi). 
                                                                 
29 The welfare approach as a strategy for animal protection is defined as focusing on welfare advancements 
which does not necessarily imply a welfare philosophy. However, some authors (e.g. Francione) argue that 
campaigns advancing animal welfare necessarily contradict animal rights values. The relationship between 




Francione (Francione and Garner 2010:5–6) also shares the view that welfare philosophies assume 
that animals are less morally significant than humans. He, too, argues that utilitarianism is 
associated with welfare as early utilitarians built the foundation for a hierarchy of interests.30  
Additionally, the welfare view is said to believe that animals have no interest in continuing to live 
which is why killing an animal is not considered a moral issue (Francione and Garner 2010:9). Based 
on these premises, welfare would grant humans free rein over the treatment of animals while trying 
to minimise suffering as far as possible. Here welfare does not equal modern animal ethics 
utilitarianism, as interests are not given equal consideration in welfare (Francione and Garner 
2010:182–83). Garner uses the term ‘moral orthodoxy’ to describe what is often considered the 
‘typical’ animal welfare view (later on in this thesis referred to as conservative welfare position). This 
position holds that animals can be used in various ways, even if that means inflicting suffering and 
death, but that there should be a clear necessity to inflict that suffering, and that we ought to keep it 
to a minimum as far as possible (e.g. Garner 2005b:4–5, 2013:83, 2015:217). For example, the Farm 
Animal Welfare Council adopts such an approach (Farm Animal Welfare Council 2009a), as one of 
their principles states: ‘any harm to an animal, even if not absolutely impermissible, nonetheless 
requires justification and must be outweighed by the good which is realistically sought in so treating 
it’ (Farm Animal Welfare Council 2009a:ii).  
While welfarism is assumed to equal a conservative welfare position or moral orthodoxy amongst 
some authors, people engaged in welfare activism do not necessarily hold this view. Indeed, some 
welfare organisations advocate abolishing certain practices because they are unable to meet high 
welfare standards, or because a practice is considered unnecessary, despite strong human interests. 
For example, Compassion in World Farming seeks to end intensive farming (or ‘factory farming’) 
(Compassion in World Farming 2017); the International Fund for Animal Welfare campaigns for the 
end of the seal hunt (International Fund for Animal Welfare 2016); and World Animal Protection 
would like to see an end to wild animals being taken out of the wild for tourist entertainment (World 
Animal Protection 2017). Also the Farm Animal Welfare Council (2009a:ii) states that certain kinds 
and degrees of harm ought to never be inflicted. Moreover, even the prevailing paradigm that killing 
itself is not an issue is challenged, as it might be unnecessary (for example in the case of the badger 
cull) or because death might constitute a welfare issue after all (see Yeates 2009).  
Hence, the view that welfarism is associated with utilitarianism, or that it ethically allows for 
anything that humans wish to do to animals is not only an overly simplified description, but a 
misleading one. Welfarism views the infliction of suffering, and unnecessary killing as wrong; but – 
unlike some rights views – not the use of animals for human purposes per se. Welfarism seems 
                                                                 




better described in Waldau’s words: ‘Animal welfare is the ethical responsibility of ensuring animal 
well-being. Animal well-being is the condition in which animals experience good health, are able to 
effectively cope with their environment, and are able to express a diversity of species-typical 
behaviours’ (Waldau 2011:206; American Veterinary Medical Association 2018). 
 
2.2.3 ANIMAL RIGHTS 
Animal rights theory is a form of deontology (Regan 2004 [1983]:144) which is usually considered 
the opposite of consequentialism (Regan 2004 [1983]:140; Sørensen 2008:69). Deontology does not 
judge moral value based on an action’s consequences. On the contrary – regardless of the 
consequences – deontology prescribes certain actions for certain types of situations (Broad 
1930:162). Following deontological rules or duties provides an a priori judgement about the action 
and its moral value. These duties are based on ethical principles, while utilitarianism can lead to 
conclusions which override ethical principles.  
Deontology is sometimes portrayed by utilitarians as a framework which prescribes duties without 
rationally considering their meaning (or consequences). For example, Sørensen (2008:89) gives this 
impression when he argues that Kant was not a deontologist in the strict sense as he wanted 
rationality to guide our actions in order to act out our duties meaningfully. While it is true that in 
Kant’s theory duties should originate out of rationality in accordance with the categorical 
imperative31 (Kant 1940 [1788]), the consequences of an action did not otherwise matter. Also Regan 
(2004 [1983]:144) claims that for Kant the consequences were completely irrelevant. If a certain 
action was considered wrong or if certain duties were identified as right, they would be right or 
wrong regardless of the consequences they would bring about.  
Turning back to animal ethics, Kant stipulated that direct duties are held only towards moral agents, 
while indirect duties are held towards an animal if a moral agent owned it or cared about it. In 
contrast, the animal rights view goes one step further than other deontological approaches. It states 
that one does not need to be a moral agent in order to be entitled to direct moral rights. Moral 
agents have moral rights and moral duties, while those who are moral patients cannot do what is 
moral or immoral, but still have moral rights (for a detailed discussion see Regan 2004 [1983]:150 et 
seq.). These rights are more important than utility and they can only be overridden if this was the 
only way to respect the rights of the many (Regan 2004 [1983]:144). One of the basic principles 
endorsed by the rights view is the principle of non-maleficence:  
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We believe that we have a prima facie direct duty not to cause moral patients to suffer or to 
cause them harm in other ways, and that the reason this is wrong is because of the harm 
done to these individuals, not because of how others (e.g. interested relatives of children, 
pet-owners) will feel about the harm done (Regan 2004 [1983]:187). 
Unlike Kant, Regan states that harm done to a moral patient is wrong regardless of how other moral 
agents feel about it.  
 
THEORY OF INHERENT VALUE (REGAN’S APPROACH) 
Regan’s theory postulates that all who possess inherent value, possess it equally and independently 
of their usefulness to others. Immoral actions are characterised by a failure to disrespect a being’s 
inherent value (Regan 1985:21). The main reason in favour of this postulate is its theoretical basis to 
avoid inegalitarian implications of perfectionist theories32 and counterintuitive implications of act-
utilitarianism (Regan 2004 [1983]:247). In contrast to utilitarianism, the individual is seen as a cup 
with valuable things (pleasurable experiences) which, however, do not determine the value of the 
cup itself: ‘the value of the cup (individual) is not the same as any one or any sum of the valuable 
things the cup contains’ (Regan 2004 [1983]:236). Intrinsic value, like pleasure, is distinct and 
incommensurable with inherent value (Regan 2004 [1983]:263). Hence, the best consequences for 
all would not justify any harm done to a moral agent.  
He proceeds by arguing that inherent value is not bound to having moral agency, as for example 
human moral patients also possess inherent value. If we attribute inherent value to human moral 
patients with similar capacities as some animals, we also have to attribute inherent value to some 
animals (i.e. the marginal case argument). Furthermore, Regan (2004 [1983]:243) defines being a 
subject-of-a-life as a criterion for having inherent value. Being a subject-of-a-life means to have:  
beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own 
future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preferences and 
welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a 
psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their 
experiential life fares well or ill for them (Regan 2004 [1983]:243). 
Though it is quite certainly a matter of degree (in general and during development) whether a 
species/individual can be considered a subject-of-a-life, Regan (2004 [1983]:77–78) believes that 
normally developed mammals from the age of one definitely fulfil the criteria mentioned above. 
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Regan also acknowledges that this does not mean that other animals do not qualify for being 
subjects-of-a-life, or that animals cannot be subjects-of-a-life to differing degrees. 
Regan uses the postulate of inherent value as basis to establish several other principles. This 
includes the principles to respect inherent value; to not harm other beings; to assist beings whose 
rights are violated; to minimise harm done to beings with inherent value; to override the rights of 
the few rather than the many (if some rights violation cannot be avoided); to override the rights of 
those who face less harm, if harms are comparable; and, if no special considerations apply and all 
individuals are treated with respect, to avoid being made worse-off, despite harm this may cause to 
the lesser interests of others (Regan 2004 [1983]:262–331). 
Regan’s principles are all based on strict egalitarian consideration of inherent value which entitles 
individuals to certain rights. However, when it comes to the question of taking life Regan perceives 
death as a greater harm to normal, adult humans than to other animals. He argues that if we had to 
sacrifice one individual in order to prevent a boat with four human adults and one dog from sinking, 
we ought to sacrifice the dog (also known as lifeboat case). Yet, also the death of a normal, adult 
animal constitutes a greater harm than the death of a less aware human with fewer desires. For 
Regan (2004 [1983]:314), ‘the magnitude of the harm that death is, is a function of the number and 
variety of opportunities for satisfaction it forecloses.’33  
Criticism of Regan’s theory concerns his incompletely defended postulate of inherent value. For 
example, DeGrazia (1996:5) criticises Regan’s postulate for not providing justification that all 
subjects-of-a-life ought to have equal inherent value (cf. Garner 2013:5).34 This strong egalitarian 
approach also appears inconsistent or incompletely defended with the more hierarchical argument 
that we ought to sacrifice an animal instead of a human being, according to DeGrazia (1996). This 
graduation of the value of different lives, however, only occurs in cases of conflicts of rights. Animal 
livestock production or animal experimentation do not constitute such cases of conflicts, but are 
violations of rights and the respect principle. The fundamental injustice inherent to such practices is 
not only the pain or the suffering of the animals, but the view that these animals have less value or 
only instrumental value (Regan 2004 [1983]:334). Regan endorses the abolition of animal use 
because their use means not acknowledging the status of animals as ends in themselves (i.e. as 
beings with inherent value).  
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has been argued earlier that it cannot be just assumed that human lives are more pleasurable than any other 
animal’s life.  
34 This is problematic because animals are probably subjects-of-a-life to a lesser or greater degree, and hence, 




ABOLITIONISM (FRANCIONE’S APPROACH) 
Francione (2004), a legal animal ethics scholar, shares this abolitionist approach. By analogy with 
human slavery, he states that in order to speak about the equal consideration of interests 
meaningfully, the pre-legal right to not be treated as property must be accepted. As long as a being 
is considered property, the interests of the owner easily override the being’s interests. Being 
considered property also means not being considered an end in oneself, implying that all our animal 
use is inherently wrong, according to Francione. In contrast, abolishing the property status of 
animals would protect individuals from being used exclusively as a resource for others and would 
acknowledge their moral status (Francione 2004).35 Thus, a right to not be treated as property would 
stop all animal use or keeping which would narrow ethical issues to encounters with wild and liminal 
animals.36 
 
KANTIAN ANIMAL ETHICS (KORSGAARD’S APPROACH) 
Similar to Francione and Regan, Korsgaard (2013) also talks about animals as ends in themselves. She 
argues in line with Kantian ethics but includes animals as beings towards which direct duties can be 
held. Korsgaard assumes that certain things (i.e. ends) are intrinsically good or bad for humans; and 
humans justify their behaviour based on such ends. However, things can be good or bad for animals 
as well (Korsgaard 2013:643).37 Korsgaard proceeds by stating that humans need to claim ownership 
of certain things in order to live a good life, such as land to plant wheat and vegetables. Property 
rights are therefore a legitimate claim (within the approval of the ‘general will’) (Korsgaard 
2013:644).38 As humans and animals are ‘thrown into the world,’ they have to use the land and its 
resources. This is used as grounds to say that humans, but also animals have a right to do so:  
Just as our claim that our ends are absolutely good is based on nothing more than the fact 
that they are good for us, so our claim that we have the right to use the resources of the 
earth is based on nothing more than the fact that we are here and need to use them. If that 
is right, it suggests the other animals should share our standing as among the rightful 
possessors of the earth (Korsgaard 2013:647).  
                                                                 
35 This kind of protection is limited though as it does not guarantee equal treatment in all respects. 
36  Liminal animals are wild/non-domesticated animals, living amongst humans (Kymlicka and Donaldson 
2014:203). 
37 Things can be good or bad for plants too and hence, plants could be considered as ends in themselves. 
However, I do believe that the decisive difference is that animals can consciously perceive things as good or 
bad for them. That poses the problem that something can be perceived as subjectively good while objectively 
not being good, for example when it is bad for one’s health. 





Korsgaard (2013:648) also states that this does not imply that non-human animals should have the 
same rights as humans. Nonetheless, it should inspire us to overcome the division of persons (i.e. 
humans) and things (including animals), and instead introduce a third fundamental normative 
category for our moral practices and the law. She does not elaborate on what these rights should 
look like, but focuses on the moral standing of the categories ‘things’ (which does not entail any 
moral consideration) and ‘persons’ (enjoying the greatest moral consideration and protection). 
Introducing a separate moral category for animals might be warranted, but it would include a vast 
range of species, although ‘animals, too, are not just “animals”’ (Midgley 1983:19).  
 
POLITICAL THEORY FOR ANIMALS (KYMLICKA AND DONALDSON’S APPROACH) 
In order to grasp some of these differences between species, Kymlicka and Donaldson (2014) apply 
political theory to animal rights (also see Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011). In their opinion, humans 
have different moral obligations to different animals. For examples, dogs unlike wolves, due to their 
domestication rely on us as social partners, and hence, different moral obligations apply to dogs 
than to wolves (Kymlicka and Donaldson 2014:202). Wild animals, in comparison, should be given 
sovereignty (i.e. rights to territories and autonomy); and liminal animals should be considered 
residents (i.e. denizenship) (Kymlicka and Donaldson 2014:203). Domesticated animals, however, 
were introduced into our society and are dependent on our care. Therefore, they should be granted 
citizenship, which is seen as a co-operative relationship requiring trust, communication, co-
operation and physical proximity. Citizenship would entail the right to an individual identity, rights of 
residency, rights to protection from harm (both human and natural threats), rights to health care, 
labour rights, disability and retirement benefits, and the right to have one’s interests taken into 
account in shaping governmental rules (Kymlicka and Donaldson 2014:204–6).  
However, it also includes certain duties. In this sense, Kymlicka and Donaldson (2014:206) state, for 
example, that it would be legitimate to socialize a dog or to use animals for work in a co-operative 
manner (e.g. for sheep herding39). Abolitionists, like Francione, view the socialisation and co-
operation of domesticated animals in order to be citizens as inherently oppressive, as it would 
restrict natural animal behaviour. Kymlicka and Donaldson (2014:206, 215), however, state that any 
co-operation (also within other social species) requires socialisation and that humans share pro-
social tendencies and a certain degree of moral nature with other animals.  
Another problematic concept, when applied to animals, is sovereignty. We usually cease to consider 
human communities sovereign if they fail to protect the basic rights of their members (Speetzen and 
                                                                 





Clipsham 2014:265), but animals are usually not considered moral agents who can do what is right 
or wrong.  
 
SUMMING UP THE RIGHTS VIEW 
The rights view is a deontological approach judging actions not on the basis of their consequences, 
but on whether moral principles were fulfilled or violated. When it comes to animals, the rights view 
acknowledges that certain moral principles apply to animals as well. For example, if it is wrong to 
harm a sentient being and animals are sentient, it is wrong to harm animals. In this sense, the rights 
view is intuitive as it rationalises already accepted moral principles. It is also simple as it gives us a 
clear guide how to behave. Like utilitarianism it is not based on egoism, but upon what is, or is 
supposed to be, good for everyone. However, unlike utilitarianism it puts a stronger emphasis on the 
individual and its rights which are fundamental and are (mostly) a trump card against the 
(conflicting) interests of others.  
DeGrazia (1996:5) criticises that causing minor non-consensual harm to one individual in order to 
prevent a major catastrophe would be wrong according to the rights view. However, Regan’s 
principle to minimize harm would allow causing harm to fewer individuals if it would prevent an 
even greater harm. Further critique focuses on questionable outcomes produced by Kantian ethics 
when adhering to certain duties despite their consequences. For example, conflict occurs in 
scenarios such as a murderer asking me where one of my friends was, making clear his murderous 
intentions. Assuming I knew about this friend’s whereabouts and that I had a duty not to lie, my 
friend would get killed if I answered truthfully. According to Kant (1889 [1785]:361 et seq.), it would 
be immoral to lie but it would not be immoral to let my friend die. Of course, it needs to be 
established first that there is a duty not to lie, and that this duty holds in all circumstances.  
Following Regan’s duty to assistance in cases of injustice, I might lie in order to prevent the violation 
of my friend’s right to live.  
Yet, it is not necessarily clear which duties and rights are preeminent in cases of conflicts. Is a 
graduation of rights and duties permissible and if so, on what grounds? Do I have a duty to save a 
child from being eaten by a lion? If I ought to save the child, do I have to save any juvenile animal 
from being eaten by adult predators? It sometimes seems that not everything can be decided based 
on deontological rules. Alternatively, we would need clear procedures for applying general rules to 
specific cases. Nonetheless in many circumstances we are more inclined to adhere to the 
deontological terms of rights than to utilitarian ideas of maximising utility, like in the previous 




Whatever ought to be done, in other words, cannot be determined independently of 
considering the rights of those involved, even though what ought to be done cannot be 
determined just by citing this or that right possessed by this or that individual. 
If we are to apply similar rights and concepts, such as inherent value or citizenship, to animals, these 
will need some crucial adaptation to the different kinds of species that exist. Still more questions will 
have to be answered about the differences in negative and positive duties humans have towards 
animals. Moreover, the implication of protecting and enforcing those moral rights through the law 
will need to be considered. If animals are granted a basic right to life, should someone who 
accidentally killed an animal be prosecuted for manslaughter? 
 
2.3 ANIMAL ACTIVISM 
This part of the literature review moves away from strictly philosophical discussion, to introducing 
the differences in practical approaches to activism between welfare and rights organisations.40 
Additionally, sociological aspects concerning how the two approaches are portrayed in academic and 
public debates are summarised.  
 
2.3.1 ANIMAL WELFARE ACTIVISM 
The welfarist approach often is framed in terms of care, compassion and love which are perceived as 
too arbitrary by many animal rights activists. In terms of their practical approach, welfarists seek 
regulation and gradual reformation of animal use but not necessarily the end of animal use itself 
(Schmidt 2011:154–55). They generally work within the system and with the government (instead of 
working against it) (Garner 1993:208), respect individual choices and preferences (moral pluralism) 
(Francione and Garner 2010:148), and aim for what they believe is politically and strategically 
achievable (Francione and Garner 2010:105).  
It is argued that this approach increases awareness and concern for animals (cf. Phelps 2007:192, 
286). On the other hand, this concern often is primarily focused on pets and strays (Garner 1993:53; 
Cooney 2011:28). Since the 1950s and 60s, newly formed groups but also some older ones expanded 
this traditional focus to include wildlife, vivisection and the treatment of farmed animals (Phelps 
2007:192). This shift might be partially related to an increase in members of welfare groups also 
being sympathetic to animal rights, and to increased understanding of animal welfare. Nevertheless, 
welfare groups usually refrain from seeking abolition or suggesting an equivalent moral status of 
animals (as compared to humans) (Jasper and Nelkin 1992:66). Furthermore, they do not encourage 
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direct political activism of members. Jasper and Nelkin (1992:66) suggest that this leads to a stodgy 
and rigid portrayal of welfare activist by rights campaigners. Other portrayals of welfarists (especially 
in contrast to animal right activists) depict them as reasonable, well-informed (Varner 2012:20), 
elitist, more cautious, relying more on expert opinions41 and as leaving campaigning to their own 
staff (Garner 1993:51).  
However, it has been criticised that welfare regulations were compromises, covering only a minimal 
standard for the animals, while barely affecting producers or actually increasing production 
efficiency (Francione and Garner 2010:46). Instead, welfare organisations would give praise to 
producers for good welfare, legitimising animal exploitation. In particular big animal welfare 
organisations have been accused of ‘colluding’ with the enemy, paying high salaries achieved 
through their many donations, but achieving little actual change (Jasper and Nelkin 1992:64, 154). 
Animal rights advocates assert that welfare regulations alone will not improve lives of animals but 
that the system needs to change fundamentally. Singer (1995 [1975]:213) also argues that we need 
not only to improve conditions for animals, but to challenge basic attitudes concerning animals in 
order to abolish exploitation. 
 
2.3.2 ANIMAL RIGHTS ACTIVISM 
In contrast to animal welfare activism, rights activism advocates animal rights on the basis of justice 
and respect, instead of compassion. It includes a wide range of organisations, groups and also 
grassroots organisations and activists, with the latter being said to be an indicator for radicalism 
(Garner 1993:51). Their work usually covers all kinds of species and animal issues, as focusing only 
on one particular species or problem would seem inconsistent if the latter are all to constitute a 
moral wrong (Garner 1993:50). Nonetheless, as there are constraints in terms of money, time and 
expertise, some organisations concentrate on particular issues (e.g. animal experimentation, 
hunting). 
Abolitionism, as suggested by Francione (2010), is another approach to animal rights activism, 
strictly rejecting incremental change and advocating only vegan education campaigns in order to 
stop animal use. Therefore, abolitionists theoretically also disapprove of animal rights organisations 
which make use of campaigns to improve welfare for animals in production systems, or which simply 
campaign for more than just veganism. 
Garner (1993:64) describes animal rights activism as appealing to youthful idealism which would be 
attractive because of its simple slogans. This seems especially true for abolitionism which does not 
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ask for incremental change but advocates a total and immediate cessation of all exploitative 
practices involving animals (Regan 2004 [1983]:xiv). Strong approaches, however, can impede 
dialogue and are characterised by independent work and non-pragmatism according to Garner. This 
is considered unprofitable in decision-making and in altering public opinion (Garner 1993:64). 
Welfarists, believing that animal rights approaches are unable to create sustainable change, then 
argue that it is morally preferable to reduce suffering through animal welfare measures compared to 
not creating change at all (Francione and Garner 2010:122).  
Moreover, welfarists often disagree that abolition ought to be the end goal; and that it is a realistic 
one. Unlike animal rights advocates, they do not believe that people would change if they only 
understood the issues and were converted morally. Change would be more likely to come about if 
animal interests were incorporated in specific social groupings, interests and ideological traditions 
(Francione and Garner 2010:155). 
However, those rights organisations which also pursue welfare goals and enter into a dialogue with 
producers and the government face the same critique as welfare organisations, in particular from 
aforementioned abolitionists. Francione (1996), for example, argues that rights organisations 
pursuing welfare goals send ambivalent messages. Consequently, the receiving public would be 
more likely to accept any message approving of animal exploitation, instead of accepting animal 
rights.  
Another issue regarding animal rights activism concerns certain grassroots activities and also 
intentional negative portrayal by the animal industry (Phelps 2007:281) which have led to the image 
of rights activism as being violent and threatening (Garner 1993:211; Regan 2008:616). In some 
instances, rights activists have been accused of terrorism. However, offensive/outrageous and 
shaming strategies (used, for example, by PETA to generate media attention (Dawn 2006:199)) have 
also led to negativity and are considered alienating towards the public (Garner 1993:211).  
The legitimacy of violent and certain other tactics in the name of animal liberation is a source of 
strong disagreements between animal rights advocates (Regan 2008:616). Most animal rights NGOs 
(non-governmental organisations) and activists disapprove of any tactics involving violence towards 
people. Nonetheless, animal rights organisations are often considered radical and extremist; words 
like ‘wacky’ and ‘misanthropic’ have been used to describe them (Dawn 2006:200). Another source 
refers to a portrayal of animal rights activists as irrational, poorly informed and in the grip of their 








Singer’s utilitarianism and Regan’s rights view42 both include having individual welfare as a criterion 
for moral standing. While in utilitarianism welfare (in the sense of having the capacity to suffer and 
enjoyment) is the only criterion for moral standing; in the rights view welfare is one amongst others 
(for example memory, a sense of the future, etc.). Utilitarianism, therefore, includes a greater range 
of different species than the rights view. Secondly, Singer and Regan mostly defend an egalitarian 
approach. For Singer, equality means equal consideration of interests but not necessarily equal 
treatment. Regan argues for equal treatment of all subjects-of-a-life and hence, makes stronger 
claims for some animals than utilitarianism. Yet in cases of conflict (like the lifeboat case) both 
philosophers turn to a hierarchical argument that human lives have greater value. 
It seems to be a strong advantage for both theories to provide a simple model based on one single 
principle43 which should guide all behaviour. Their simplicity and clarity were probably factors that 
promoted their predominance in animal ethics and within the animal protection movement. 
However, our social capacities, and our social and moral relationships, are far more complex than 
could be grasped by one single principle or model (Midgley 1983:19). Also Broad (1930:207–8) states 
that deontology and teleology are ideal-typical ethical theories. Most theories incorporate elements 
from both realms (as will the approach proposed in this thesis). 
Between the animal welfare and rights approach, Francione and Garner (2010:175–76) identify three 
major areas of disagreement. Firstly, contrary to the rights approach, welfarists are said to assume 
that animals do not have an interest or less of an interest in their own lives. Furthermore, it is a 
question of whether the lives of animals and of humans are equal in value. Secondly, welfarists 
supposedly assume that it is normatively acceptable to use animals but are concerned about animal 
suffering. Hence, welfare reforms target a right not to suffer, and welfare campaigns aim at reducing 
or eliminating suffering. In contrast, the animal rights approach considers this to be an inconsistent 
moral theory and asks for a right for animals not to be used in harmful ways at all. In case of 
abolitionism, this means a right not to be used at all, and abolishing the property status of animals. 
In short, animal welfare is associated with regulation and reform, while animal rights is associated 
with liberation (also Sunstein and Nussbaum 2005:5; Regan 2008:616; Cochrane 2012:2-3; Chiesa 
2016:568). Thirdly, the two parties disagree on the strategies as animal rights should focus on 
nonviolent vegan education only (at least in an abolitionist perspective following Francione) while 
welfarists combine educational strategies with campaigns targeting legislation (and producers).  
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There is one last issue which arises in the conversation between Francione and Garner in their book 
The Animal Rights Debate. Francione rejects Garner’s use of the word ‘fundamentalist’ to describe 
abolitionism. Thus, a fourth controversy can be stipulated in how the two approaches are portrayed. 
However, these areas of disagreement concern primarily Francione’s abolitionism and Garner’s 
welfarism. Their debate neither reflects animal rights activism as a whole nor necessarily reflects 
animal welfare activism. 
The terms utilitarianism, welfarism, and animal rights describe not just one theory but are used to 
describe families of theories and approaches. Within these families, there are various theories and 
approaches which share certain commonalities but are also different to each other in important 
aspects. Similarly, organisations which for instance qualify as animal rights groups still could show 
great disparities in opinions on human use of animals. In a moderate animal rights approach for 
example, keeping companion animals might be considered acceptable. Also Rollin (2011) suggests 
that animal welfare and rights are essentially similar in aims. Animals have certain needs and hence, 
entitlements which have to be provided by humans (cf. Fisher 2014:646). Granting rights to animals 
is one way of ensuring that these requirements are met (cf. Rollin 2011).  
Moreover, disputes arise not only out of the variety of possible ethical approaches that an 
organisation can adopt, but also out of strategies for animal protection – adding another important 
dimension to the debate.  
I believe that the distinction of welfare versus animal rights ethics and organisations obscures the 
diversity of approaches (cf. Schmidt 2011:156–57). Overall there might not be such a great 
difference in ethical opinions, but rather in ideas about how to best advance the goals of animal 
protection. Some animal welfare activists might actually hold views quite close to classical animal 
rights activists or vice versa, while it is their strategies that differ. 
Recalling the aims of this thesis, I seek to explore these differences, and my findings shall inform a 
framework that can help unite the major approaches and organisations, both theoretically and 
practically. This is especially important as it seems that the internal divisions take precedence over 
their shared goal of animal protection (Garner 1993:48). 
What opinions do animal activists hold in regard to animal ethics, and on how to pursue animal 
liberation? What divides them and what unites them? The answers to these questions will be 
illuminated in the course of this thesis through sociological enquiry. The next chapter introduces the 





CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
The animal welfare versus rights debate - and the division it causes between animal activists - is  
considered to hinder progress within the animal advocacy movement (Garner 1993:48; Francione 
1996; Ryder 1998:41; Francione and Garner 2010). Literature available on animal activism focuses 
either on the academic, ethical debate or on particular sociological aspects concerning activism 
itself; rarely do these two approaches intersect. This thesis aims to combine insights from both 
realms in order to better understand, approach and subsequently transcend the debate. This 
chapter explains the methodology behind the sociological enquiry into the debate. Initially the 
research context will be discussed in more detail, and it will be concluded that semi-structured in-
depth interviews are best suited to explore opinions and experiences of animal activists. The chapter 
will then introduce the design process including the sampling technique and choice of organisations 
and interviewees; the data collection including the development of the research instrument; and 
data analysis.  
 
3.1 RESEARCH CONTEXT 
The two prominent ethical theories in animal ethics, utilitarianism and animal rights, aim at 
providing a universal framework for conceptualising appropriate relationships with and treatment of 
animals. The more traditional approaches assume that conflicts can be overcome if we managed to 
improve the theories. However, it seems unlikely that any one theory could manage to provide a 
fully satisfactory account for how we ought to treat animals. Moral blind spots exist in any theory 
which are often better addressed by an opposing theory, as is the case with utilitarianism and animal 
rights. In response to these insurmountable problems, MacIntyre (2007) proposes that these 
disputes cannot be overcome as they do not acknowledge the specific historical and cultural 
background they originated in. In a similar manner, various authors criticise analytical philosophy for 
providing simple solutions to decontextualized problems that provide little guidance to real world 
dilemmas (Light and McGee 1998:1–2, 5; Levitt 2003:23; D’Andrea 2006:xv). Formal philosophy 
usually does not take into consideration social processes behind ethical behaviour (Haimes 
2002:112), although it might be fruitful to do so for at least two reasons. Firstly, theories of justice 
(like the one proposed later in this thesis) need to take into account social, economic, historical, and 
human nature constraints (Garner 2013:13). Similarly, Levitt (2003:23) argues that usually more than 
one morally relevant factor needs to be taken into account when making ethical decisions. For 
example, the decision to terminate a pregnancy needs to consider ‘factors like the social and 
economic situation of the parent, the health resources they will have available, the ages of their 




Secondly, the approach developed in this thesis aims to be relevant to activists and the challenges 
they face. Professionals (or activists in this thesis) often cannot make use of abstract principles 
developed in bioethics, that fail to recognise social life and lived experiences (Spallone et al. 
2000:192). Sometimes it might just be a simple misunderstanding of technical terms (see chapter 
four: ‘Conceptions (and misconceptions) of animal rights’), but often it concerns different 
assumptions and values of ethicists and professionals that prevent fruitful exchange (Spallone et al. 
2000:200). Moreover, approaches based on philosophical theory alone tend to focus on education 
and argumentation, considering the individual an independent agent. Yet, sociological and 
psychological research suggests that context and other ‘agent-shaping’ powers might also need to 
be taken into account (DeVries and Conrad 1998:249).44 
Hence, the empirical research conducted in this thesis serves at least three purposes. The data 
should (1) help to better understand the debate, (2) contribute to existing knowledge on opinions, 
attitudes and motivations of animal activists, and (3) inform the development of an approach to 
animal activism that allows for contextualisation, taking into account all relevant considerations 
(including the possibilities and limits of social actions) (cf. Bennett and Cribb 2003:17), and ideally 
speaks to important values and principles held by all activists.  
Qualitative research provides us with the tools to reveal people’s ethical opinions and behaviour 
(Haimes 2002:106) and to obtain an understanding of the debate’s social context. It offers us means 
to explore, understand, and interpret ‘people’s perspectives in the context of the conditions and 
circumstances of their lives’ (Ritchie et al. 2014:22). Within this interpretivist framework, 
epistemological and ontological assumptions are fundamentally based on constructivism as the 
research seeks to understand ‘constructed realities of people in a particular setting, and explores 
their meanings and explanations’ (Ritchie et al. 2014:18). Societies – and their moral debates – are 
after all a product of people engaging with each other. Understandings and experiences influencing 
this debate are relative to the ‘specific cultural and social frames of reference’ (King and Horrocks 
2010:9). The debate between animal welfare and animal rights is no less a constructed one, shaped 
in the Western culture. 
Against this background, the research aimed to explore and understand the two questions from the 
point of view of the people engaged in the debate (i.e. animal activists): 
What divides animal advocates? 
What (ideally universal) common ground exists between people in the advocacy movement 
which could inform a unifying framework? 
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Interviews, in particular, provide a tool in qualitative research to explore such questions. Holstein 
and Gubrium (2011:151) suggest that qualitative interviewing is ‘a process of experiential animation’ 
which capitalises upon the researcher’s and the participant’s contributions. This means that both the 
participant’s and the interviewer’s opinions and feelings productively influence the whole research 
process. The interview itself is considered ‘a knowledge construction project’ (Holstein and Gubrium 
2011:156) which is deeply embedded in a specific historical and cultural background. The meanings 
people attach to the social world can be investigated to some extent but meanings are also 
constructed and developed through interviews. The interviewer’s bias therefore is not only 
acknowledged as such, but expected to unavoidably co-construct the encounter (King and Horrocks 
2010:134). Pidgeon and Henwood (1997:250) identify four dimensions which influence the research: 
the participant’s own understanding, the researcher’s interpretation, the cultural meaning system 
which informs the participant’s and the researcher’s understanding, and validity judgment of 
particular interpretations by the scientific community. Thus, within this constructivist approach, 
facts and values are not distinct; objective value-free research is considered impossible (Ritchie et al. 
2014:12); and social reality cannot be reflected ‘accurately,’ only faithfully. 
My own bias towards more traditional animal rights philosophies would have influenced the 
development of thesis. However, before setting out to engage in this project, my knowledge about 
the animal welfare versus rights debate, especially regarding its practical disputes, was limited. 
Hence, I aimed to provide a fair account of each position, and faithful representation of meanings 
and viewpoints provided by participants; from a perspective that ideally was as neutral as possible, 
acknowledging that no perspective can every fully be bias-free. Therefore, epistemological and 
personal reflexivity (i.e. reflection on the impact of one’s beliefs, interests and experiences) need to 
be an integral part of such constructionist research. A thick description and audit trail should 
guarantee quality assurance within this approach (cf. King and Horrocks 2010:160).  
 
3.2 THE DESIGN PROCESS 
In the following section, the sampling technique will be discussed, including the rationale behind the 
choices of welfare and rights organisations, and a short description of participating groups. 
 
3.2.1 SAMPLING TECHNIQUE 
Numerous animal protection organisations exist in the UK. An initial internet search (see websites 
such as Animal Rights UK 2012; UK Animal Rescuers 2016; Wikipedia 2016a, 2016b) yielded 23 
different welfare groups45 and 19 different rights groups (see figure 1, p. 48; and figure 2, p. 54). The 
                                                                 




list of groups does not make attempts to completeness as more animal welfare (often focusing on 
rescuing and re-homing) and rights groups exist in Great Britain. Also branches of organisations (e.g. 
of the RSPCA) have not been taken into consideration to avoid redundancy. Lastly, organisations, 
which protect animals but do so with a rationale of conservation or protecting nature (e.g. the World 
Wildlife Fund or the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds) have not been included. Nonetheless, 
the initial search results provide a fairly good overview over a wide range of organisations differing 
in size, focus and popularity. 
Overall, 15 participants were recruited of whom four (two from animal welfare and two from rights 
groups) took part in pilot interviews46 and eleven in the final interviews, between March and 
September 2016. Seven participants were employed by, or volunteered for animal rights 
organisations; another seven for welfare groups. The interview with an activist from World Animal 
Net – who identified neither with rights nor welfare specifically – was included within the group of 
welfare activists to ensure anonymity of the participant. Thus, the total number of interviews of 
welfare campaigners reached eight instead of seven.  
In total, six interviewees were male and nine were female. Of eight welfare activists, six participants 
were female and two were male. Four of those participants had started engaging in the beginnings 
of the modern animal protection movement (between 1960 and 1979), and two of the remaining 
four became active after the year 2000. Out of seven animal rights activists, four interviewees were 
male and three were female. Four of those campaigners also became involved in animal protection 
early on between 1960 and 1979, and the other two recently (after 2000).    
The sample size of fifteen interviews was considered sufficient as it involved participants from a 
wide range of organisations, including the most influential, and most controversial groups. An 
increase in sample size would not necessarily have contributed considerably to the results as 
phenomena only need to be recorded once to be part of the analytical map, and as statistical 
inference is not important in qualitative research. Additionally, analysing a bigger sample size would 
have impeded the depth of analysis and would not have been feasible (cf. Ritchie and Lewis 2003). 
The choice of sampling method was cross-sectional, non-probability, purposive sampling as 
organisations were selected based on particular characteristics, relevant to the subject matter (cf. 
Ritchie and Lewis 2003). Random sampling was not considered necessary, as statistical 
representativeness was not the main goal of this research. Instead, the method followed King and 
Horrocks’ suggestion (2010:29) on deciding on one or two key aspects to define a group and to seek 
diversity in other aspects. The relevant characteristics in this study included belonging either to an 
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animal welfare or a rights organisation. The distinction between welfare and rights groups was 
based on information available on the websites of the organisations, usually under a section ‘About 
Us’, ‘Our mission’ or the like. Organisations which focused on reducing suffering (without a 
reference to rights) and used phrases like ‘improve animal welfare’ were considered welfare 
organisations, while animal rights groups used phrases like ‘end animal exploitation’, or ‘animals 
have the right.’ A more detailed explanation will be given for organisations which participated in this 
study.  
Within these two aspects, however, diversity constituted the main factor so as to explore the impact 
of these characteristics (Ritchie and Lewis 2003). The aim was to shed light on meaningful 
differences and commonalities in relation to the research topic (cf. King and Horrocks 2010:29). 
Both, animal welfare and rights organisations show a great variety in size, focus, popularity and 
impact. It was also assumed that animal activists from different organisations would be able to share 
different experiences (as focus and strategies diverge between groups). Their varying backgrounds 
should provide a richer and more complex picture of animal protection. Thus, additionally, a 
maximum variation sampling technique was used. This strategy looks at a small sample with great 
diversity. The results are then likely to show two patterns: a high-quality, detailed description of 
each case which documents their uniqueness; but also shared central themes which derive their 
significance as they emerge out of heterogeneity (Patton 2002).  
The choice of organisations within the two approaches (i.e. welfare and rights) was then based 
mainly on differences in focus which were divided into different (non-exclusive) categories, for 
example broad focus or (other) single issues focus. One or two organisations were chosen from each 
category, also considering other factors like (bad) publicity, popularity, relevance within the animal 
liberation movement and availability/willingness to participate. 
 
3.2.2 ANIMAL WELFARE ORGANISATIONS 
The focus of different welfare organisations was divided into: broad focus (covering diverse animal 
welfare issues and species), other single issues (e.g. intensive farming, sports), companion animals 
(mostly), and wild animals (mostly) (see figure 1, p. 48). The categories are not exclusive as for 
example the International Fund for Animal Welfare’s (IFAW) work is not solely focused on wild 
animals (see the discussion further down). 
Within the category broad focus, the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) 
has had considerable impact and importance in the animal protection movement, but is also 
considered a controversial organisation in some circles (e.g. Phelps 2007). The Humane Society 




UK. Similarly, World Animal Protection (WAP) is more established in Great Britain than Four Paws. In 
contrast to the RSPCA and HSI(UK), WAP and Four Paws pursue animal protection primarily on an 
international level. Thus, the participants from the RSPCA and WAP were chosen for interviews 
because of their greater importance in animal protection within the UK, and to obtain insight from 
activists who engage in work nationally and also internationally. The WAP interviewee was part of 
the pilot phase so as to test and subsequently ensure the applicability of the interviews for a wide 
range of organisations (because of their broad focus and their international work). 
 
 
FIGURE 1 ANIMAL WELFARE ORGANISATIONS  
All considered animal welfare organisations are arranged according to focus (broad focus, other single issues, 
companion animals, and wild animals) in a respective, non-exclusive circle. They grey circle indicates excluded 
groups. The organisations are listed by their income in descending order within the categories. For further 
information on income see Appendix 1. 
 
Compassion in World Farming (CIWF), the League Against Cruel Sports (LACS), the Brooke, and the 
Badger Trust are characterised by focus on one kind of animal welfare issue, e.g. the ending of 
intensive factory farming as in the case of CIWF. CIWF and LACS were invited and took part in the 




The category companion animals includes organisations focusing mostly on companion animals, 
their re-homing, and education of pet owners.47 According to Greenebaum (2009:291), people 
working in animal shelters or as rescuers often do not identify themselves with the animal 
protection/liberation movement. Thus, there was some initial uncertainty about the applicability of 
the interview questions for this category. Wood Green took part in the pilot phase to ensure the 
applicability of questions within this category. People’s Dispensary for Sick Animals (PDSA) was then 
contacted for the final interviews because of its considerable size48 and long history, comparable to 
the RSPCA. However, as they declined to participate and after several failed attempts to establish 
contact with any of the other organisations by phone and email, groups in other categories were 
contacted. The Brooke agreed to an interview. 
The category wild animals comprises organisations with a strong focus on these animals, though not 
exclusively. For example, IFAW’s work also includes companion animals but their website suggests 
greater emphasis on wildlife. Both organisations in this category are internationally active; and both 
were considered equally interesting in regard to the research questions and aims. Thus, willingness 
to participate was the deciding factor and contact was only established with IFAW. 
Two exclusion criteria for animal welfare groups were applied: (1) lack of involvement in activism 
(e.g. only re-homing of animals but no educational or legislative work); (2) a strong focus on just one 
species or breed (e.g. Retired Greyhound Trust) in order to avoid including participants with a bias 
towards one specific species while not being concerned with animal protection per se. In the 
following, a short description of all the participating welfare organisations is provided. 
 
Wood Green – The Animals Charity49 
Wood Green (*1924) is a medium-sized animal charity (cf. Appendix 1) for companion animals 
including less traditional companions such as chickens or goats. Their mission includes rescuing, 
caring for and re-homing animals; providing advice, support and guidance to pet owners; increasing 
awareness for the responsibility towards animals in society; and some lobbying (e.g. to improve the 
Dangerous Dogs Act). They are also members of various associations (e.g. C4 Neutering Services). 
Their vision is ‘a world where all pets are well cared for in loving homes for life.’ They neither use 
utilitarian nor animal rights statements but rely on values and virtues of compassion, openness, 
honesty, and commitment. 
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World Animal Protection (WAP)50 
World Animal Protection (*1981, known as World Society for the Protection of Animals until 2014) is 
a big organisation (cf. Appendix 1) which protects wild, pet and farm animals, and helps animals 
after natural disasters, in Africa, North and Latin America, Asia Pacific and Europe. Their vision is a 
‘world where animal welfare matters and animal cruelty has ended.’ They also mention a right of 
animals to live free from pain, cruelty and suffering. To achieve their goals, they conduct direct work 
(e.g. sterilisation of dogs), educate people, engage in national and international lobbying, and co-
operate with other welfare organisations.  
Though World Animal Protection considers itself a welfare organisation, they address rights of 
animals (at least once on their website). Some of their campaigns tackle welfare reforms but others 
aim to ban certain practices (e.g. the use of wild animals for entertainment). Thus, they are not 
strictly welfarist and also not strictly reformist as a narrow interpretation of welfarism would suggest 
(i.e. condoning all animal use, also see ‘Literature review’). The narrow interpretation does not apply 
to any of the organisations discussed in more detailed here. Thus, in the following a reformist 
approach will refer to a welfare approach which also aims at banning practices that are incapable of 
providing appropriate welfare standards. 
 
Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA)51 
The RSPCA (*1824) is the biggest charity in terms of income (cf. Appendix 1), and probably also in 
employees if their branches were included in the calculation. Their work focuses on ending suffering 
and improving welfare for farm, lab, wild and companion animals. Following a reformist approach, 
they aim to achieve this by pursuing legislative changes, raising awareness, providing the RSPCA 
Assured ethical food label, rescuing animals, and investigating and prosecuting animal cruelty. Their 
vision is to work towards ‘a world in which all humans respect and live in harmony with all other 
members of the animal kingdom.’ 
Though the RSPCA mentions once that animals have a right (to be counted as individuals), their 
approach to solving ethical dilemmas seems to be a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis, as they are 
trying to ‘help maximise positive outcomes for animals and avoid or minimise negative impacts.’ 
Additionally, they address the virtues of compassion and respect.  
Given their size and age, they have considerable impact on the animal protection movement, but 
have also faced criticism and are considered highly controversial in some circles (cf. Phelps 2007; 
Armstrong and Botzler 2008; Dolan 2016; Kite and Craven 2016; Levy 2016). Last but not least, the 
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RSPCA is the only organisation which has expelled people because of incompatible views (though a 
small number), according to Garner (2013:44). 
 
Compassion in World Farming (CIWF)52 
Compassion in World Farming (*1976) is a medium-sized charity (cf. Appendix 1) that seeks to end 
modern, intensive factory farming practices, which they consider as ‘the biggest cause of cruelty.’ 
Their rationale of ending cruelty and their vision ‘of a world where all farm animals are treated with 
compassion and respect’ is neither utilitarian, nor an animal rights approach; it rather seems based 
in virtue ethics.  
CIWF’s reformist strategies include undercover investigations, political lobbying and campaigning, 
raising awareness and working with food companies. The latter entails the provision of ‘Good Farm 
Animal Welfare Awards’ and partnership activities for ‘specific projects to improve farm animal 
welfare in supply chains.’ Additionally, the charity promotes reduced meat consumption, meat free 
Mondays and meat free weeks. 
 
The League Against Cruel Sports (LACS)53 
The League Against Cruel Sports (*1924) is a medium-sized charity (cf. Appendix 1), dedicated to 
stopping ‘cruelty to animals in the name of sport,’ such as hunting, shooting, bullfighting, and so 
forth. LACS’ main approaches include exposing cruelty through investigations, prosecutions, 
research and reports, and media coverage; lobbying (also through public outreach); offering advice 
and support to people affected by cruel sports or wildlife crime; and protecting animals in their 
sanctuary. They do not seek welfare improvements but the end of these practices. In case of animals 
for food, the organisation mentions that rearing and slaughter methods should not cause suffering. 
Interestingly, LACS clearly states on its website that it is an animal welfare group in response to a 
frequently asked question on whether it is an ‘extremist animal rights organisation’ (LACS 2016), 
indicating an association of animal rights with extremism that animal groups sometimes have to 
address. 
 
International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW)54 
The International Fund for Animal Welfare (*1969) is a rather big organisation (cf. Appendix 1) 
working regionally and internationally in more than 40 countries. It focuses on rescuing individual 
animals, safeguarding populations, preserving habitat, and helping animals during and after natural 
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disaster; thus, being one of few organisations bridging the gap between welfare and conservation 
work. Their work encompasses direct work with wildlife, livestock and companion animals; and also, 
education and political advocacy. 
IFAW’s vision is a world ‘where animals are respected and protected,’ meaning animals should be 
recognised as having intrinsic value and as sentient beings. Their work and policies are based on 
science and ethics; and their decisions are guided by ecological and biological sustainability, and the 
precautionary principle. Their approach is reformist, welfarist, but also conservationist. The 
combination of welfare and conservation, as well as their clear statement on the importance of 
working within an ethical framework made them an interesting organisation to include in this study. 
 
The Brooke – Action for Working Horses and Donkeys55 
The Brooke (*1934) is a medium-sized animal welfare charity (cf. Appendix 1), dedicated to 
improving ‘the lives of working horses, donkeys, mules and the people who depend on them’ in 
Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. Their vision is ‘a world in which working horses, 
donkeys and mules are free from suffering.’ Their approach to achieve this goal resembles welfarism 
in a narrower sense as they do not aim at banning the use of horses, donkeys and mules (on which 
the livelihood of people in developing countries depends). Instead Brooke works with people, 
communities, other organisations, and governments to improve practices, policies and regulations 
and thus, welfare. This organisation was included in the sample at a later stage, as one member 
agreed to be interviewed, after several failed attempts to arrange an interview with any of the other 
organisations in the original sample. 
 
World Animal Net (WAN)56 
A 15th interview was included after discovery of World Animal Net. WAN (*1997) is neither an animal 
welfare nor rights organisation, but has aimed to improve communication and coordination among 
animal protection groups around the world. They have built a ‘network of animal protection 
societies with over 3,000 affiliates in more than 100 countries,’ and are consultants to the United 
Nations. WAN has offices in the UK, the Netherlands, the US and South Africa. 
WAN’s mission is ‘to improve the status and welfare of animals worldwide by offering the animal 
protection community information, expertise and new opportunities to connect, collaborate, and 
campaign for change.’ Given their mission, and inclusive approach to all organisations regardless of 
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whether they are welfare or rights based, World Animal Net was considered to provide important 
insights for achieving the aims of the thesis.  
 
3.2.3 ANIMAL RIGHTS ORGANISATIONS 
Animal rights organisations were divided into the categories: diet and services, other single issues, 
broad focus, and associations and coalitions (see figure 2, p. 54). Again, these categories are not 
exclusive, as, for example, Cruelty Free International (CFI), despite being categorised as other single 
issues, also provides a service by certifying cruelty-free cosmetics and household products.  
The Vegan Society and Veggies Catering Campaign distinguish themselves from other organisations 
through their strong focus on plant-based dietary education and provision of services (e.g. the vegan 
trademark) as a mean for animal protection. The Vegan Society was chosen for the interview 
because of its size and age, contributing to their impact in the movement.  
Within the category other single issues, most organisations deal with animal experimentation. Dr 
Hadwen Trust57 conducts research into alternatives to testing on animals. Cruelty Free International 
(CFI) and the National Antivivisection Society (NAVS) work to end animal experimentation. Captive 
Animals’ Protection Society (CAPS) aims to end wild animal captivity in primarily zoos, circuses and 
through exotic trade. Despite several emails and phone calls, no contact was established with any of 
these organisations. As VERO, or Voice for Ethical Research at Oxford, opposes the use of animals in 
medical research at Oxford and was willing to take part in an interview, this group was chosen to 
represent the category other single issues (despite also belonging to the category associations and 
coalitions).  
The category broad focus includes organisations which work on a variety of issues through various 
means, e.g. undercover investigations, educational, and legislative campaigns. Most of them also 
strongly promote veganism. Animal Aid is one of the most prominent organisations within the UK, 
working on a variety of issues. Hence, the organisation has been chosen for a pilot interview so as to 
ensure applicability of questions within all categories, other than associations and coalitions (as they 
work primarily at the grassroots level). 
Campaigns by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) have been criticised for sexism, 
pornography, and other questionable tactics (e.g. Pennington 2013), and for using animal welfare 
strategies (Francione and Garner 2010:30 et seq.). Thus, PETA was considered important for research 
studying the animal welfare versus rights debate. For similar reasons, Viva! was chosen for an 
interview as Francione heavily criticised their single issue campaigns at the London Vegfest in 
September 2015. 
                                                                 






FIGURE 2 ANIMAL RIGHTS ORGANISATIONS  
All considered animal rights organisations are arranged according to focus (diet and services, other single 
issues, broad focus, and associations and coalitions) in a respective, non-exclusive circle. They grey circle 
indicates excluded groups. The organisations are listed by their income in descending order within the 
categories, except for associations and coalitions which do not have an annual income. For further information 
on income see Appendix 2. 
 
The category coalitions and associations comprises organisations which are mostly characterised by 
grassroots activities and networking, and direct actions. Grassroots are often associated with 
radicalism (Garner 1993:51) and violence, though it occurs rarely. Coalitions and associations are 
neither registered as charities nor as limited companies, and do not have offices. The nationally 
working Coalition to Abolish Fur Trade (CAFT), Hunt Saboteurs Association (HSA) and Anti-
Vivisection-Coalition are better known and thus, probably more influential than more local groups. 
Each group was considered equal regarding their potential to contribute important experiences to 
the research questions and aims. All groups were contacted but the response rate was low. HSA 
agreed to take part in a (pilot) interview (to ensure representation in the testing of the questionnaire 
for associations and coalitions), as well as Worcestershire Vegans and Veggies.  
The exclusion criterion for animal rights organisations was a lack of focus on animals and animal 
protection in case of the Vegetarian Society and the Movement for Compassionate Living. In the 






Animal Aid (*1977) is a non-profit (limited) company with a strong educational department; and one 
of the largest animal rights groups in the UK according to their website. Although the organisation 
engages in some campaigns to lessen suffering, its ultimate aim is to abolish all forms of animal use, 
in particular with regards to vivisection laboratories and factory farms. Their strategies and tactics 
focus on educating the public on veganism. Additionally, they conduct undercover investigations, 
examine existing legislation, and lobby and campaign for legislative changes. Their campaigning 
policy strictly objects to any violent strategies including threats and intimidation, and property 
damage. As they do not advocate the abolition of the general use of animals (i.e. also the keeping of 
companion animals), they cannot be considered a strict abolitionist organisation. This is the case for 
all groups discussed here.  
 
Hunt Saboteurs Association (HSA)59 
The Hunt Saboteurs Association (HSA) (*1963) is slightly different compared to other groups in the 
category coalitions and associations as they show greater organisational structure and presence 
through a website. HSA aims to save the lives of hunted animals through non-violent action tactics 
disturbing hunts (e.g. through distraction and scaring animals away by noises), filming illegal 
activities, and prosecuting in court. There are local groups across the UK which are active at least 
once a week either in the field or in fundraising, leafleting and other background work. The Hunt 
Saboteurs report much on their actions but less on their ethical rationale on their website. 
Considering the kind of work (e.g. direct actions) and the belief that killing animals for sports is 
inherently wrong, it suggests an animal rights approach.  
 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA)60 
PETA UK is a large (if not the largest) charity (and limited company) in terms of annual income and 
popularity (cf. Appendix 2). The organisation is concerned about animal suffering and cruelty, 
respectful treatment, compassion and the animals’ interest in ‘leading their own lives.’ Their work is 
‘dedicated to establishing and protecting the rights of all animals’ regardless of species, thus 
advocating a strong rights message. The charity’s work encompasses public education (including the 
promotion of a vegan lifestyle), research and seeking legislative changes. PETA opposes any forms of 
violent actions and advocates peaceful strategies but they are of special interest to this research, as 
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they are well known for offensive/outrageous and shocking campaigns to generate media attention 
(Dawn 2006:199). 
 
Viva! (Vegetarians’ International Voice for Animals)61 
Viva! is a medium to large sized charity (cf. Appendix 2) which wants ‘to stop cruelty and harm to 
animals’ through promoting veganism, but they also embrace people who are vegetarian or try to 
reduce their meat consumption. The organisation works through undercover investigations and 
educational campaigns which also include environmental issues. Additionally, the organisation 
provides information and advice on a vegan lifestyle or the way towards it. Though Viva! looks for 
the abolition of all animal exploitation and though they would like to see a fundamental change, 
they also approve of welfare improvements.  
 
The Vegan Society62 
The Vegan Society (*1944) is a small charity and membership society, which works to promote 
veganism as an ‘approach to reduce animal and human suffering.’ They not only advocate for 
veganism through raising awareness and education, but support people in adopting and maintaining 
a vegan lifestyle. This includes political campaigns, and campaigns to introduce vegan catering in 
institutions like hospitals and prisons. Their philosophy is animal rights-based as they oppose the 
exploitation of non-human animals, but they also state environmental and health concerns as 
motivators to campaign for veganism.   
 
Worcestershire Vegans and Veggies (WVV)63 
Worcestershire Vegans and Veggies is a ‘parent group’ to smaller, local veggie and vegan groups in 
the county. The groups aim to educate about ‘the benefits of a vegan diet and to help people 
become vegan, vegetarian, or reduce the amount of animal products in the food they eat.’ The 
groups organise social activities, including food fairs and talks; and support national groups with 
their campaigns through fundraising or through local outreach work. As the groups promote other 
national campaigns, and also promote the reduction of animal product consumption, they do not 
follow a strictly abolitionist approach of vegan education only.  
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Voice for Ethical Research at Oxford (VERO)64 
Voice for Ethical Research at Oxford (*2006) is a University-based group to oppose Oxford’s 
proposed new biomedical science building. VERO seeks to raise ‘public awareness, especially within 
the University;’ ‘to remind the University of its obligations under the 1986 Act’ to only use animals 
were no other methods of research would work; to persuade the University to increase transparency 
regarding animal experiments; to urge the University to become a pioneer in human-based research 
technologies; and ‘to encourage and support student interest’ in the rights of animals.  
Based on their promotion of student interest in animal rights, VERO can be assumed to be an animal 
rights group. 
 
3.3 DATA COLLECTION 
As outlined earlier, the aim was to include the stakeholders (i.e. activists) and to understand their 
opinions on, and experiences with the animal welfare versus rights debate. Interpretivist approaches 
usually use existing research and theories to inform the planning and designing of studies, the 
sampling approach, and the creation of a fieldwork tool. However, during data collection, the 
emphasis lies on understanding and interpretation, and gaining detailed information on people’s 
lives (Ritchie et al. 2014:22). As this thesis is not aiming at accurately capturing ‘social reality,’ but 
trying to understand the debate, face-to-face semi-structured interviews were used for data 
collection. Interviews are able to provide a richer picture of animal activists and to lend them a 
stronger voice in this debate. Face-to-face interviews are a useful tool to uncover how people make 
sense of their lives and to share their opinions, experiences and understanding (cf. King and 
Horrocks 2010:11, 19–21), and are usually considered to ‘establish a better rapport between the 
researcher and the participant’ (Ritchie et al. 2014:182). In contrast, quantitative methods (e.g. 
closed questionnaires) look for general patterns but cannot uncover deeper meanings.  
A set of (mostly open-ended) questions or topics were designed based a) on the philosophical 
theories and b) on literature on the gap between organisations. Nonetheless, this semi-structured 
approach was flexible regarding phrasing of questions and their order (King and Horrocks 2010:35). 
Semi-structure allows to explore certain topics in more depth or to go beyond the topics if 
participants bring up important issues which had not been considered before (Ritchie and Lewis 
2003). This flexibility and openness is paramount to achieve depth of exploration and understanding 
of the participants’ experiences and opinions (Ritchie et al. 2014:184).  
The interviews provided the opportunity to investigate viewpoints of activists on the treatment of 
animals, on strategies of organisations and on opinions held on other organisations (and their 
                                                                 




strategies). Also gathered was information on successful co-operation or difficulties regarding co-
operation between organisations. This was done to shed light on further sources of agreement or 
disagreement between groups. 
 
3.3.1 THE TOPIC GUIDE 
The topic guide – as the name suggests – helped to guide the semi-structured interviews through 
important topics. Ritchie and Lewis (2003) suggest a topic guide with six to nine discrete subject 
sections for an interview of one to two hours. A topic guide either simply lists the key subjects which 
need to be covered or consists of carefully worded questions including prompts and directions for 
probing. The former enables a more natural flow of the conversation between the interviewer and 
the participant while the latter is especially helpful for difficult and sensitive topics (Ritchie and 
Lewis 2003).  
The topic guide developed for this project tries to integrate both approaches (see Appendix 3). It 
covers the key subjects with sometimes only key words and phrases while also including more 
carefully phrased questions which otherwise could elicit misunderstandings if not worded 
appropriately. The structure of the topic guide follows the suggestions by Ritchie and Lewis (2003) 
(e.g. including an introduction, main topics with instructions and an ending). The topic guide moves 
from participants’ personal views on animal protection to their opinions on organisational work. 
The content on the topic was developed based on various literature on animal ethics and on animal 
protection, in dialogue with the supervisory team, and during a pre-pilot phase with an animal 
activist. In the following, I will explain the rationale behind the main section. 
 
1. Personal details 
Initially, interviewees were asked regarding personal details including their motivation to engage in 
the movement, in their specific organisation, and previous involvement in other organisations. These 
questions were considered fairly easy for participants to answer and were expected to ease them 
into the interview. Additionally, they served the function of gathering some background information 
so as to obtain some additional contextual knowledge of the interviewee in the encounter, to 
further acknowledge and understand situated perspectives (cf. King and Horrocks 2010:19–21).  
 
2. Opinions on animal use 
The initial literature research exposed the image of animal welfare activism as being conservative, 
and reformist while animal rights activism is seen as non-reformist and radical (Garner 1993:48), 




that welfarists are utilitarian while non-welfarists advocate an animal rights approach. This might be 
true for some organisations and their official views, but not necessarily for all organisations and 
activists.  
The first questions on initial and current concerns aimed at a facilitated transition from the previous 
part into opinions on animal use. Concerns around suffering and killing were explored, as well as the 
general permissibility of animal use, unacceptable or acceptable forms of animal use, and their 
dependence on circumstances and human benefits. These questions usually divide abolitionist, more 
moderate animal rights, and welfare/utilitarian approaches. Additional questions investigated the 
reformist (or non-reformist) dimension.  
Another part in this section investigated the understanding of the term rights from the participant’s 
point of view. In the discussion on animal rights, it is sometimes assumed that animals cannot have 
rights because of how rights are framed and defined. Lastly, questions were asked regarding the 
meaning and importance of compassion for animal protection. The promotion of humane or 
compassionate treatment is usually associated with welfare organisations. 
Thus, the second theme explored opinions on animal use covering all relevant areas which are 
commonly discussed in animal ethics. This section was important to think about, and understand the 
philosophical and ethical tensions between activists. 
 
3. Animal protection strategies 
The third main topic explored the interviewee’s attitudes on animal protection strategies. The work 
of different animal protection organisations can be roughly divided into campaigning (i.e. seeking 
change) and provision of services (e.g. of information, labels, awards etc.) (Garner 1993:181). 
Campaigning can be further divided into constitutional (seeking legislative changes), educational 
(seeking behavioural change, e.g. vegetarian/vegan campaigns), ‘organisational policy’ (seeking 
changes in organisational policies, e.g. retailers, schools, hospitals, prisons, etc.), single issue and 
direct action campaigns. These are just rough classifications which do not exclude each other. A 
single issue campaign, focusing on one specific issue, such as the fur trade, can target constitutional 
change or behavioural change. Francione (Francione and Garner 2010:79) criticises single issue 
campaigns believing that they would communicate ambivalent messages about one practice being 
wrong, compared to other exploitative practices being less or not wrong. 
Direct actions can be further differentiated into legal direct actions such as protests or obtaining 
insight into certain industries via employment,65 and illegal actions. Illegal actions especially are a 
highly disputed form of campaigning within the animal protection movement, whether or not they 
                                                                 




are violent. Non-violent forms may include sit-ins, vigils, breaking into and destroying property; 
although the latter two are considered violent by some. Judged as definitely violent are threats to, 
and attacks on, human safety and lives (Garner 1993:216–17). Garner (1993:223–26) argues that it 
draws attention to the act instead of the cause, and increases barriers instead of promoting 
dialogue. On the other hand, he acknowledges that important information (e.g. on the living 
conditions on animals) could not have been gained without such strategies. This section intended to 
provide insight into another area of conflict between organisations, essential to the debate. 
Additionally, the results in this section aided the development of arguments in chapter nine. 
 
4. The participant’s organisation 
The fourth section guided the participant away from thinking about animal protection in general, to 
thinking about the work of his/her own organisation. This included a reflection on the organisational 
views compared to the interviewee’s opinions, on the strategies in use, and on disagreements. 
 
5. Other organisations 
In a next step the participant was asked to reflect on other organisations, on their differences, and 
on organisations the participant did not approve of. Depending on whether the participant worked 
for an animal welfare or a rights group, he/she was invited to share his/her views on the 
organisational approach of the other (including comments on appreciation, and problematic 
aspects). Animal welfare activists reflected whether they agreed/disagreed with the agenda of 
animal rights organisations, whether they thought animal rights strategies could result in beneficial 
change (e.g. improving living conditions, raising awareness), and whether they agreed/disagreed 
with the portrayal of animal rights activists as being radical or extreme. Similarly, animal rights 
campaigners were asked whether they agreed/disagreed with the agenda of animal welfare 
organisations, and whether they thought animal welfare strategies could create beneficial change 
(e.g. lead to the end of animal use, increase awareness and respect). These questions further 
clarified areas of disputes, especially relating to the welfare versus rights debate. 
 
6. Co-operation 
The last section gathered some more contextual information about co-operation between 
organisations, and about the participant’s opinions on factors which lead to (un-) successful co-
operation. This section contributed to a better understanding of additional factors which could 
possibly cause tensions. Lastly, the interviewee was invited to share additional thoughts and ideas 





3.3.2 MODIFICATION TO THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
After a pre-pilot interview with one activist who volunteered for several organisations, four pilot 
interviews were conducted between March and April 2016 to further develop and test the research 
instrument (cf. Baker 1993:182–83). Holloway (1997:121) argues that separate pilot studies are not 
necessary for qualitative research. However, it is common for researchers to review the first few 
recording and transcripts so as to improve the research protocol and questions for future interviews 
(Teijlingen and Hundley 2001). Additionally, it trains novice researchers in interviewing techniques 
(Holloway 1997:121). The pilot interview data was included in the general data set, as so-called 
contamination (i.e. inclusion of pilot data in the main results) is hardly a concern in qualitative 
research, as Teijlingen and Hundley (2001) discuss. Data collection and analysis is progressive 
throughout the interviews, as it builds up on and improves through prior interviews.  
 
 
FIGURE 3 CYCLE OF EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING AFTER KOLB (2015) 
 
The pilot interview procedure followed the suggestions by Peat (2001:123) for improving internal 
validity of a questionnaire and Kolb’s cycle of experiential learning (Kolb 2015) (see figure 3). Kolb 
(2015) suggests that in order to learn from experience one needs to reflect on the experience, 
analyse it, form concepts and theories about it and eventually let it result in action (see figure 3).66 If 
this cycle is complete, similar experiences will be encountered differently (Kolb 2015). Thus, the pilot 
and reflection procedure covered the following five steps.  
The pilot interviews were conducted in the same manner as the final interviews (step 1: experience). 
Pilot participants were asked after the interview to share their opinions on how well-informed they 
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felt prior to the interview, on the clarity and difficulty of the questions, on the smoothness of the 
interview and other concerns (see Appendix 4) (step 2: reflection). Furthermore, the duration was 
recorded to decide whether it would be reasonable (step 3); the aim of sixty to ninety minutes for 
the interviews was met. Then it was assessed whether all questions had been answered (in order to 
ensure that they would be posed in future interviews)67 and whether they yielded the required 
information (step 4: theorising).  
Based on the previous steps, the research protocol remained mostly unchanged, but the 
questionnaire was re-structured and re-worded for the final interviews (see Appendix 5 for the topic 
guide used in piloting, and Appendix 3 for the final topic guide) (step 5: action). The research 
protocol was adapted to put more emphasis on informing people already during recruitment that 
they would be asked to reflect personal views in the interviews (as one participant expressed 
insecurity about this). Moreover, the topic guide’s structure and discrete sections were 
communicated prior to the interview (to align with participant expectations).  
The topic guide also underwent some changes in order to improve the flow of the conversation. The 
first questions on the participants’ reason for entering animal protection usually led them to talk 
about their concerns on animal issues, and offered an easy transition from section one to two 
(opinions on animal treatment). Nevertheless, a question on initial concern was added in the second 
section in case participants did not mention concerns about animal issues while answering questions 
in section one. Furthermore, additional questions for members of either animal welfare or animal 
rights organisations (former section four) were asked earlier on. Questions were moved to either 
‘opinions on animal treatment’ (section two) or ‘opinions on strategies’ (section three) so as to 
explore the differences between animal welfare and animal rights throughout the interview. 
Moreover, the topic guide’s questions were improved in various ways. For example, a few questions 
were re-worded so as to better reflect how participants phrased issues, or to improve their clarity 
and understanding by interviewees. The word ‘animal use’ was substituted with ‘the treatment of 
animals;’ and instead of asking what participants consider as unacceptable, they were asked about 
their concerns of how animals are treated.  
Questions that yielded only small contributions despite probing, such as a question about the ‘good 
life’ of animals, were discarded.  Questions on humane treatment and compassion usually also 
evoked short yes/no answers, except in one interview. Hence, this question was re-phrased to avoid 
being a closed question but remained in the topic guide. In contrast, questions on co-operation were 
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changed to avoid leading questions, as previous questions inherently assumed the need for and 
importance of co-operation. Additionally, activists were directly asked how to achieve more co-
operation if they answered in the affirmative. A question was also added asking the participants 
about change they would like to see in the movement, in order to invite further responses 
concerning tensions.  
Lastly, interviews offered an important chance to practise and improve techniques, especially 
probing. For example, the question on the killing of animals turned out to result in interesting and 
diverse answers when probed with questions on euthanasia and animal experimentation. Another 
important lesson for improving probing resulted from a participant’s suggestion after reading the 
transcript (and subsequent discussion). The participant pointed out a misunderstanding with one 
probing question on whether illegal activities (like trespass) constitute acceptable methods. I 
mistakenly assumed that undercover footage is usually linked with trespass; and undercover footage 
was used as an example for probing on illegal activities. The participant’s answer, however, focused 
on talking about undercover footage itself without a link to trespass. In further interviews, this 
probing question was phrased more carefully. 
  
3.3.3 ACCESS TO PARTICIPANTS, ETHICS AND INFORMED CONSENT 
Contact was established with organisations or their individuals via telephone or email, informing 
them about the study and with the intention to recruit participants. The criteria for participation 
were also communicated, which included engagement in the animal protection movement for at 
least five years, being an employee of an organisation and/or being in a position within a group to 
provide sufficient information on the organisation itself. The latter was considered the most 
important factor for participation. Although self-selectiveness68 is considered problematic in some 
qualitative studies (King and Horrocks 2010:35), informing organisations and their members about 
those criteria rendered this problem marginal. When a campaigner showed interest in participation, 
he/she was provided with information in the form of a letter (see Appendix 6) and its content was 
discussed prior to the interview. This procedure was based on the framework of informed consent 
by Kent (2000), including information (on the project), understanding, voluntariness (as outlined in 
the information sheet), competence of participants and actual consent to participate (i.e. signing a 
consent form). All participants in the pilot and in the final interviews underwent this procedure. 
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THE INFORMATION LETTER 
The information letter (or project information sheet) provided a general introduction to the project 
and the ethical implications of the study, so as to ensure informed consent. Firstly, the research 
student and the aim of the interviews were introduced. It was explained that the participation in the 
interviews was voluntary and could be withdrawn at any time without reason or penalty. 
Confidentiality was discussed regarding anonymity, potential risks and storing of data in accordance 
with Data Protection Legislation (cf. Churchill and Sanders 2007:47; King and Horrocks 2010:108). 
The latter included the information that the interview transcripts and all other files are kept in a 
secure and locked cabinet and/or on a password protected computer; that only the research student 
has access to the original data; and that transcripts and other data are kept for no longer than six 
years (as per Data Protection Legislation 1998). Furthermore, the information letter also provided 
contact details for the research student and second supervisor, information on ethics approval by 
the University of Winchester and information on permission of gatekeepers.69  
Participants were made aware that information they provided might be made public, posing a 
potential risk. Thus, they were asked either not to share restricted information (e.g. private 
information on the organisation), or to indicate if the information should not be made public. The 
participants were also provided with the transcript afterwards, giving them the opportunity to 
exclude statements. Special caution was applied, and in case of uncertainty about whether 
information was private or not, the participant was contacted again. 
Another particular risk to the participant concerned the involvement in illegal activities potentially 
disclosed by an interviewee (e.g. breaking into property to obtain video material, or to rescue 
animals). The participant was informed that there is no legal protection regarding research 
confidentiality, as the research student and her data could be subject to a subpoena. Moreover, 
participants were informed about the legal obligation to report information on acts of terrorism, or 
suspected financial offences related to terrorism (Terrorism Act 2000), to report information on 
money laundering (Proceeds of Crime Act 2002), and on the neglect or abuse of a child (Section 115 
of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998) (cf. BSC 2015). The research student also would have sought 
legal advice or advice of her supervisors on whether to report other involvement in criminal 
activities if these activities would have constituted a serious physical or psychological harm to others 
or the participant.  
Lastly, there was a risk to privacy if interviews took place in public settings. The participants were 
invited to come to University for the interviews. In case where this was not possible, enough privacy 
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to not to be overheard was ensured while providing safety to the researcher through being in a 
public sphere.  
For the researcher, at least three potential risks were identified. Firstly, a risk to the research 
student's safety arose from the possibility of conducting interviews at participants’ homes. This was 
not considered the favoured option; instead interviews at the University, at the premises of 
organisations or in public places were preferred. However, if there was no other possibility for the 
interview to take place except at an activist’s home, special caution was applied. In such cases, the 
second supervisor, Andrew Knight, was informed where and when an interview was to take place. 
Secondly, a risk could have occurred concerning pressure to present results in a particular way. This 
was safeguarded against by informing participants about their right to exclude data from their 
interviews but not to influence data analysis and presentation of results any further. Should such 
pressure have occurred, I would have consulted with my supervisors. There was also a low risk to the 
researcher if participants had disclosed involvement in criminal activities which needed to be 
reported to authorities. Yet, the process of informing the participants about this issue in advance 
rendered this risk highly unlikely. 
 
THE CONSENT FORM 
Participants were then asked to sign a consent form (see Appendix 7) based on the information 
sheet. This also included the permission to record the interviews. In cases where the interview took 
place outside the University (e.g. in the office of an animal protection organisation), the manager of 
the setting was also provided with an information letter and asked to sign a consent form (see 
Appendix 8) agreeing to the study taking place in the setting. 
Participants were given the chance to address issues or concerns about the study throughout the 
process. The provided contact details gave interviewees an opportunity for later inquiries and to 
discuss any issues of concern with the research student, or with Prof. Andrew Knight (2nd supervisor) 
should there have been a need. 
 
3.4 DATA ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF FURTHER CHAPTERS 
The interviews were recorded using an audio recording device (Marantz) and a boundary 
microphone. In cases when non-verbal communication was important to understand the full 
meaning of the conversation, notes were made. The audio files were transcribed into a verbatim 
report following the basic transcription system (see table 1, p. 66) by King and Horrocks (2010:145–




statements better than a verbatim report that does not indicate aspects like pauses, tone etc. (e.g. 
statements read with or without an ironic tone have different meanings). 
 
TABLE 1 A BASIC TRANSCRIPTION SYSTEM BY KING AND HORROCKS (2010:145–46) BASED ON 
POLAND (2002). 
Emphasis Capital letters 
Short pause/long pause/very long pause (p)/(pause)/(long pause) 
Interruptions (interruption) 
Overlaps - (overlap) …. (end of overlap) 
Inaudible parts [inaudible] 
Expressions like laughing, coughing etc. (laughing), (coughing) 
Tone (e.g. ironic, humorous etc.) (ironic tone), (humorous tone) 
Direct speech/mimicking ‘…’ 
Non-verbal communication (e.g. pointing) (points at …), (does …) 
 
The transcripts were analysed using the traditional approach with paper, pen and highlighters, and 
using thematic data analysis. Themes, according to King and Horrocks, are: ‘recurrent and distinctive 
features of participants’ accounts, characterising particular perceptions and/or experiences, which 
the researcher sees as relevant to the research question’ (King and Horrocks 2010:150). The 
thematic analysis involved three stages (cf. King and Horrocks 2010:153): descriptive coding, 
interpretive coding, and derivation of overarching themes. In stage one, each transcript was 
analysed, defining descriptive codes based on relevant material and refining these codes through the 
progress. Depending on suitability, a priori, open, and in-vivo coding were used to establish codes. A 
priori coding involved concepts which were generated from topic-related research and theories. 
Open coding refers to the generation of codes which represented the researcher’s interpretation of 
the respondents’ opinions. In-vivo coding involves the generation of codes by using terms which are 
used by respondents (Churchill and Sanders 2007:65). These codes were then re-worked towards a 
coding framework in stage two. This involved clustering the descriptive codes, and interpreting those 
clusters in relation to the research topic. Finally, in stage three the overarching key themes were 
derived from the data and analysed regarding their relationships between the levels of coding and in 
regard to the theoretical and practical stance of the project. These key themes were divided into 
ethical themes, campaigning themes, and sociological aspects and themes.  
Chapter four discusses ethical themes, which were mostly retrieved through comparison between 




approaches/categories, such as utilitarian animal welfare or best welfare approach. The topics of 
suffering and killing, the meaning of animal rights and compassion (in line with questions and 
sections from the topic guide) were also analysed concerning difference in opinions. Lastly, 
commodification was identified as a separate theme, based on its recurrence in several interviews 
and based on the emphasis those interviewees put on this theme. 
Chapter five discusses campaigning themes, comparing strategies and tactical approaches 
interviewees favoured, their opinions on single-issue campaigns and problematic tactics (the latter 
including direct actions, and violent incidents), and their views on incremental change and 
revolution. Moreover, this chapter subsumes factors leading to (un-)successful co-operation, as 
identified by activists and through analysis of their experiences. Opinions from interviewees on 
campaigning strategies and tactics were also related back to their ethical approach (as identified in 
chapter four) during the analysis, resulting in an interesting observation that ethical stances did not 
necessarily coincide with the favoured campaigning approach. 
This result might be explained by differences and themes described in chapter six, concerning the 
overarching theme of identity. Within the identity theme, various differences occurred related to 
sub-themes such as science or ethics, the reputation issues of animal rights (being associated with 
demonization, aggressiveness, and patronization), pragmatism versus idealism (given non-ideal 
world constraints), romanticised views versus negativistic views, and the free choice paradigm of 
animal rights activists that welfare participants did not necessarily agree with. 
The results from chapter four and six inspired the discussion in chapter seven on species-equality in 
ethical theories, while acknowledging non-ideal world constraints in applying equal treatment. For 
reasons explained in chapter seven and eight, the proposed approach is essentially rights-based. 
However, in line with concerns from welfare participants who adopted egalitarian (i.e. species-
equality) positions but felt that their stance had little real-world implications, the need for a non-
ideal theory is established to bridge animal rights and animal welfare. The introduction of a non-
ideal theory was also inspired by Garner’s (2013) book A Theory of Justice for Animals: Animal Rights 
in a Nonideal World. However, unlike Garner, the theory takes into account the concepts of moral 
tragedy and moral corruption, as proposed by Gardiner (2011). Chapter eight then takes all those 
considerations on board and proposes the principle of proportionality as means to assess human-
animal interactions, in particular moral tragedies. The last chapter discusses the implications of such 











Part II will discuss interview results. Initially ethical opinions will be presented, followed by an 
overview of opinions on campaigning. The last chapter will then identify themes beyond the 
commonalities and differences of ethical and strategical viewpoints, and will explore aspects that 
further cause - and are potentially even more important to - the gap between animal welfare and 
rights. Such themes revolve primarily around aspects concerning identity, for example, scientific 
versus ethical approaches, and reputation. 
As expected, animal activists held a myriad of ethical opinions, ranging from more conservative 
welfare to ethical abolitionism and anything in between. Conservative welfare (or moral orthodoxy) 
refers to the view that it is ethically justified for humans to use animals for their benefits, but in 
doing so they should try to avoid harm and provide an acceptable quality of life (Phelps 2007:xvi). 
Ethical abolitionism describes Francione’s (1996, 2004; Francione and Garner 2010) position which 
views all practices involving animals as inherently wrong, given their property status in such 
interactions. Moreover, he argues that any form of campaigning not directly asking for the end of 
the property status of animals is morally inferior, if not wrong. According to Francione, only vegan 
grassroots education fulfils this requirement, and thus, would be the morally superior form of 
campaigning.  
These two examples – conservative welfare and ethical abolitionism – could be viewed as opposing 
concepts. Supposedly, one theory inherently condones, and the other inherently condemns, animal 
use. However, these two concepts only partially reflected the ideas and concerns raised by welfare 
and rights activists. While some interviewees held ideas close to those two concepts, other opinions 
proved to be more complex, and sometimes more closely connected to each other than expected. 
Indeed, some activists viewed animal protection as a spectrum rather than as opposing concepts.  
 
I’m worried about divisive terminologies […] when actually people are doing different shades of the 
same things and people are at different stages down the spectrum. [welfare activist - WA thereafter]  
 
Animal activism as a whole – combining ethics and campaigning – is probably best described as a 
complex web of viewpoints, in which ideas on ethics regarding our treatment of animals, and ideas 
on ethics and efficiency of campaigns are linked by sometimes surprising connections. Depending on 
where activists find themselves in that web, they might be campaigning for welfare reforms while 
holding abolitionist views ethically; or they might campaign for animal rights, but based on welfare 
rhetoric. While this part will highlight differences and genuine disagreements, it will also seek – in 




CHAPTER 4: ETHICS 
The chapter on ethics will portray the complex varying ethical viewpoints, followed by a discussion 
of the emerging themes of suffering, killing, commodification, conceptions (and misconceptions) of 
‘animal rights,’ and compassion. It is important to note that anything discussed here refers to moral 
opinions on the treatment of animals only, and not to views on campaigning strategies and tactics. 
 
4.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW 
This section gives a general overview of ethical opinions held by activists. It seeks to identify the 
participants’ viewpoints, and compare them to positions of animal rights based on Regan (1985), 
utilitarianism based on Singer (1995 [1975]), and welfare approaches as outlined in the literature 
review. The interview results suggest a variety of ethical beliefs that are in some cases more closely, 
and in others more loosely connected to these ethical frameworks. Within this overview, common 
themes will be identified which will be discussed in more depth in separate sections. It is also 
important to note that activists will be categorised into different ethical approaches, which are, 
however, not absolute. Instead it should be considered an attempt to capture some of the variety of 
positions. Furthermore, in some cases participants used different argumentative tools to justify their 
views in response to probing questions. Sometimes they also expressed contradicting opinions, as 
will become apparent in the following chapters.70 The classifications are therefore to be regarded as 
simplified descriptions of similar, yet also unique, viewpoints. Table 2 (p. 74) provides an overview of 
the identified positions.  
 
4.1.1 ANIMAL WELFARE 
UTILITARIAN AND/OR NON-EGALITARIAN WELFARE APPROACH 
Three out of eight animal welfare activists initially expressed seemingly more conservative welfare 
arguments, arguing that death is not a welfare problem, and that animal welfare is not against the 
use of animals for certain purposes. 
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might occur for various reasons, such as cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) or because of attempts to 
reconcile personal positions with the organisational ethos (for example, the personal view that animals should 
not be killed for food with the organisational position that animal farming is morally acceptable). Personal 
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experimentation, but would accept it if it resulted in a cure for cancer, of which a close family member died. 
Inconsistencies of moral beliefs, or of moral beliefs and behaviour – even if this might appear irrational – are 
common (also see chapter seven and eight). More importantly, conscientiously-held beliefs do not need to be 





I don’t have a problem that they’re killed and this is the difference between welfare and animal 
rights: death itself is not a welfare issue. […] It is acceptable to use animals in this regard but it 
means that we have a duty of care for their quality of life and the manner of their death. 
 
These three participants held a non-egalitarian position on animal issues, as they did not consider 
the suffering, the lives, and interests of animals equally important as those of humans. However, 
these more conservative and non-egalitarian welfare arguments were only raised with regard to the 
consumption of animal products. All three participants disapproved of ‘unnecessary’ practices for 
which animals should not be used and subjected to suffering. Examples included hunting, animals 
used in entertainment, or animal experimentation for cosmetics. 
Given that these participants disapproved of some practices because of their failure to meet high 
welfare standards and wanted to see them abolished rather than improved, their ethical approach 
could rather be classified as a utilitarian, high welfare approach.71 It is utilitarian as the harm needs 
to be justified through a necessity. Furthermore, only a certain quality of life, i.e. high welfare, would 
justify the use. Unlike conservative welfare approaches (which seek to minimise harm but do not 
rule out practices per se), a utilitarian high welfare approach further limits justifiable uses and killing 
of animals. Based on interview data, it appears to confine justified practices to farming, animal 
experimentation for medical purposes,72 companion animals, and potentially pest control.73  
 
Animal welfarists are saying: […] we actually accept the utilitarian ethical viewpoint, which is that it 
is acceptable to use animals. But if we do - because of their sentience - we have a duty of care to 
make sure they have a good life and have a good death. 
 
This position is fundamentally different to the opinions put forward by other interviewees. 
Nevertheless, these activists work relentlessly to improve the lives of animals and support some 
abolitionist goals (e.g. abolition of animals in entertainment). While these campaigners differed in 
the way they argued, they still reached some of the same conclusions as other participants. 
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72 However, one of the three participants discussed here argued that animal experimentation should be 
phased out as more alternatives become available. Moreover, the term medical purposes was further limited 
to diseases for which there are no alternative or sufficient treatments available (see section ‘Animal 
experimentation’).  




EGALITARIAN, BEST WELFARE APPROACH 
Another four out of eight welfare participants expressed egalitarian viewpoints which to some 
extent resembled animal rights theories. All participants were concerned about the suffering of 
animals based on the notion that inflicted suffering was always a moral issue regardless of species. 
Thus, these five participants held strong egalitarian views. Suffering was mentioned as the major 
concern, and the prevention of suffering as the most important task. Their position resembles 
McCausland’s (2014:657) approach who argues that the five freedoms74 (also frequently mentioned 
by those interviewees) can be considered a basis for rights, and that practices inherently violating 
them should be considered unacceptable in a welfare approach. 
 
 It’s just the suffering in general, […] for the same reason as, I guess, it would be problematic when 
humans suffer. […] They have a right to be on the planet as well. 
 
Interviewees also mentioned other ideas such as ‘the right to be on the planet,’ ‘sharing the planet in 
a fair way,’ and living in harmony with other animals and nature (a similar observation was made by 
Jasper and Nelkin 1992:22). Some of these ideas closely resemble Korsgaard’s (2013) argument that 
being born on this planet gives us as a right to, or a valid claim on, its resources, which ought to be 
respected regardless of species.  
They also acknowledged – as did one participant holding a utilitarian, high welfare approach – that 
commodification and the mind-set of humans constituted the fundamental problem and cause of 
animal suffering. They identified this mind-set as lacking compassion and kindness towards animals, 
and seeing animals as resources rather than living beings. Commodification, compassion, and a 
romanticised view of living in harmony with nature were identified as major themes in the 
interviews and will be discussed further later on.  
 
 It goes above and beyond animal welfare. It’s to do with our ethical principles and whether or not 
we are to share this planet in a fair way with other species, without wanting to own them, sell them. 
 
In contrast to (strong versions of) animal rights theories, participants would not necessarily argue 
generally against the use of animals or the killing of animals. This view was accompanied by an 
acknowledgment of human-inflicted suffering and killing of animals as being unavoidable or 
necessary. For example, one interviewee mentioned that sustainable hunting, or a natural way of 
farming chickens for eggs, might not be problematic. Similarly, another participant commented that 
                                                                 




backyard chickens might continue in developing countries for a long time. However, the participant 
also added that farming would be unnecessary in developed countries.  
 
 I don’t think it’s like ever that suffering is JUSTIFIED. But I understand that sometimes people have to 
make hard choices and sometimes the reality of the world is that it can’t be free of suffering. 
 
On the other hand, participants also expressed contradictory opinions to some extent. One 
interviewee felt that lives were equal in value but also did not consider killing animals for food an 
ethical issue. The interviewee made use of a utilitarian argument in this regard (see next quote). Yet, 
it did not seem that she would generally evaluate actions based on utilitarianism. Given her 
background of working in developing countries, she might have chosen to use a utilitarian argument 
for a situation in which killing an animal was a necessity – and not using the animal would have a 
considerable negative impact on a human being. 
 
In every situation, you kind of have to weigh out the ethics of it and who’s benefiting and who’s 
losing; and what is the most fair situation for both parties. 
 
Moreover, these four participants, despite their ethical concerns regarding animal farming, were 
hesitant to express the opinion, that animals should ideally not be consumed or used in harmful 
ways. They emphasised that they were expressing personal opinions and regarded it as ‘contentious’ 
or ‘dangerous’ area.  
 
We’re on dangerous ground here but PERSONALLY […] I don’t think people would use animals for 
ANY purpose apart from where it’s a symbiotic relationship - maybe companion animals if they’re 
treated in the best way. 
 
The last quote also demonstrates how close this interviewee’s opinions are to animal rights. 
Interestingly, another participant who was not against sustainable hunting and very benign forms of 
farming, also approved of animal rights and disapproved of keeping companion animals, resembling 






TABLE 2 OVERVIEW OF DIFFERENT ANIMAL ETHICS APPROACHES* 
Approach Egalitarian Harm Killing Use 
Conservative 
welfare 












depending on the 
manner of death 
and the necessity 
Acceptable, if no harm 
involved or if reduced to a 
minimum, and if high 










Acceptable, if no harm 
involved or if outweighed 
by benefits 




Acceptable, if no 
harm is involved 
and if there is a 
clear necessity 
Acceptable, if no harm 
involved and if best welfare 
guaranteed 
Pathocentric Yes Unacceptable Unacceptable, as 
killing involves 
harm 




Yes Unacceptable Unacceptable Acceptable, if no animal 
rights are violated 
Pragmatic 
abolitionism 
Yes Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable, as all use 
involves harm to animals 
(but not inherently wrong) 
Ethical 
abolitionism 
Yes Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable, as all use 
constitutes violation of 
animal rights and hence, 
inherently wrong 
* The table lists the different ethical approaches that have been identified in chapter four, either through 
literature (such as the conservative approach or the utilitarian approach by Singer (1995 [1975]), or through 
the interviews. It is important to also note that harm here refers to pain and suffering only. In some viewpoints 
death might be considered a harm. However, this consideration has not been included here as it was not 





EGALITARIAN, PATHOCENTRIC75 THEORY 
A different interpretation of these four interviewees’ position might be an egalitarian, pathocentric 
approach. Such a theory could be founded on the premise that inflicted suffering is a moral issue 
regardless of species. As an animal rights theory, this framework would prescribe a right for animals 
(and humans) not to be caused suffering. Such an approach has been theoretically developed by 
Garner (2013) who argues that any practice inflicting suffering constitutes a moral issue. Unlike in 
utilitarian theories, however, inflicted suffering cannot be justified by a harm-benefit analysis. 
Moreover, death is only problematic if associated with suffering (at least in Garner’s non-ideal 
sentiency approach). Interestingly, one welfare activist, who identified with animal rights and 
engaged in rights groups, also argued from a strong pathocentric or suffering-based position but 
within an animal rights framework. Pathocentric arguments were frequently expressed across 
animal welfare and animal rights activists. It will be described in more depth in the next section 
(‘Suffering’).  
 
It’s MORE the suffering. I don’t have an outright problem with killing animals. [WA identifying with 
animal rights] 
 
4.1.2 ANIMAL RIGHTS 
Opinions among the seven interviewed animal rights activists were more consistent overall than 
those of welfare activists. All rights campaigners agreed that adopting a vegan lifestyle was of 
utmost importance to behave fully ethically towards animals. Five out of seven participants 
subscribed to an animal rights approach morally, and two others to abolitionism. 
The concept of rights as understood by those activists varied. In some cases, they referred to 
intrinsic rights not to suffer and to life (three out of seven), but also to legal rights, or the notion that 
humans did not have the right to inflict suffering and death on animals. This will be discussed further 
in the section ‘Conceptions of animal rights.’ Furthermore, these activists would argue that animal 
suffering and killing animals, as well as commodification, constitute moral problems because of the 
failure to respect animals and their interests. This focus on respect for animals and their interests 
was more strongly emphasised by rights activists (five out of seven used the word respect) than by 
welfare activists (three out of seven).  
 
                                                                 
75 Pathocentrism describes positions assuming that moral concerns should extend to sentient beings for their 
ability to consciously experience pain and suffering (cf. Wolf 1996; Krebs 1997; Willemsen 2009). The word 
pathocentrism or pathocentric was chosen to describe the participants’ approach because of its strong focus 




We don’t have the right to inflict that suffering upon the animals. We need to respect their interest in 
life and living, and not use them for our purposes. 
 
Two activists also argued based on the Golden Rule that we should do (or not do) unto others as we 
would have them done (or not done) unto ourselves (e.g. Matthew 7:12). Whittier (2015:116) also 
notes that over half of the women she interviewed as part of feminist research mentioned the 
Golden Rule. She argues that this principle is widely known and consistent with (Western) 
mainstream culture, explaining its occurrence in the interviews. 
 
 Anything we wouldn’t want to experience ourselves, we shouldn’t inflict on others. 
 
All seven rights activists agreed that we should not be inflicting harm (including death) or suffering 
on animals for our purposes, implying strong egalitarian views. One rights activist – similarly to other 
welfare interviewees – expressed ideas of living in harmony with nature and the need for society to 
re-structure itself so as to accommodate for the needs of animals. These views are also reflected by 
Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011). Two other rights interviewees also pointed out that animal issues 
extend beyond our immediate interactions with them, to human-induced climate change and other 
negative impacts on animals. 
 
In this country, a million mammals are killed on the roads by the vehicles, […] and a lot say ‘Well, 
that’s just accidentally! It’s not our fault!’ But IT IS our fault. 
 
Those five activists adopting an animal rights approach were eventually classified as such because 
they did not consider the keeping of companion animals as intrinsically wrong, in contrast to the 
abolitionist position. However, it is important to mention that one activist pointed out that – based 
on suffering involved in the breeding industry and suffering though ignorance of human owners – he 
would favour abolition. Thus, this participant adopted a pragmatic abolitionist, rather than an ethical 
abolitionist, viewpoint. The latter considers the breeding and keeping of companion animals as 
intrinsically wrong. In contrast, pragmatic abolitionism asks for a cessation of the breeding of 
companion animals because of (inevitable) welfare issues associated with this practice. 
 
ABOLITIONISM 
Two out of seven animal rights activists were classified as holding abolitionist views. It is important 




campaigning. These participants differed from the other rights activists as they felt more strongly 
that companion animals were a moral issue on an intrinsic level. 
 
I want a vegan world, I don’t want any companion animals. 
 
However, one out of those two participants – like other animal rights activists – expressed more 
flexibility regarding ethical viewpoints. For example, one rights campaigner conceded that he would 
not object to animal experimentation as strongly if it resulted in a clear human benefit. In this 
particular case, the interviewee used a utilitarian argument but only for what he called ‘an idealised 
situation.’ Overall the participant adhered to strong animal rights views.  
 
If it could be shown categorically that testing on animals would save more human lives, it could 
potentially be justified. But at the moment I don’t see that as being the natural situation. 
 
Whilst participants deemed the killing of animals and inflicting suffering as wrong, they also 
acknowledged that it could not be fully avoided, and that (in rare cases) necessity might justify such 
practices. Such necessity could be the killing of animals for meat by indigenous people (e.g. Inuits) 
whose lives are dependent on this source of food.  
 
I suppose if you’re an Inuit or you were somewhere where there were no vegetables available to you 
[…], then we’re on a level playing field where all species are competing against each other. But we’re 
not competing against each other. 
 
The quote above also highlights the importance of having a choice to act differently. This idea 
resembles Hume’s concept of the (objective) circumstances of justice, claiming that issues of justice 
do not arise in circumstances of extreme scarcity or infinite resources.  If every person could have as 
many resources as he or she liked without reducing another person’s access to resources, principles 
of justice are not needed. Conversely, extreme scarcity is a circumstance in which a person 
struggling for survival could not be expected to think about justice (Hume 1998:Section III, Part 1). 
Hence, eating meat – if no other food was available to someone (within a critical period of time) – 
might then not raise concerns over justice. However, virtues such as compassion and kindness in the 






4.2 SUFFERING  
Unsurprisingly, the suffering of animals as a problematic moral issue was the most frequently 
mentioned theme among welfare and rights activists. Animal welfare is considered to focus on 
suffering while animal rights advocacy is considered to focus on justice (Regan 2004 [1983]:334; 
Armstrong and Botzler 2008:8). The interview data suggests that animal activists in general care 
about the suffering of animals. Sunstein (2005:5) also argues that choosing between concepts of 
animal welfare or rights does not matter greatly when it comes to suffering. However, unlike welfare 
participants, rights activists responded to the moral issue of suffering by pointing out that suffering 
ultimately could only be prevented by not using animals.  
However, interview data also suggest that it is the suffering involved in the use of animals that 
renders their use ethically problematic, rather than the use itself being problematic. The practice of 
keeping companion animals in particular yielded greater agreement in this regard than might be 
expected. Interestingly, activists again defied common assumptions as not all welfare interviewees 
gave outright approval to companion animal ownership, and not all rights participants were strictly 
against having animal companions. One rights activist opposed it because of a belief that they would 
necessarily suffer (pragmatic abolitionism). Another rights and one egalitarian welfare campaigner 
were concerned about subduing natural instincts and interests, and restricting freedom, in particular 
the animals’ freedom to choose, if bred and kept as companions.  
 
Every companion animal effectively is a captive animal and I don’t want any captive animals like I 
don’t want captive people. [rights activist - RA thereafter] 
 
As such, having freedom to make own choices rather than subduing interests seems to be at the 
heart of ethical abolitionist disapproval of companion animal ownership, as expressed in the 
interviews. This is also addressed by Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011) who argue that these issues 
could be resolved by re-structuring our society, rather than by asking for abolition. 
One welfare activist strongly disapproved of ethical abolitionism, arguing that their assumptions 
would make animals suffer more. The participant argued based on scientific evidence suggesting 
that a dog’s welfare is improved by being with humans, and thus, keeping animal companions per se 
should be considered positively. While the interviewee did not mention issues involved in, for 
example, domestication and breeding as being problematic concerning companion animal 
ownership, he addressed invalid anthropomorphism within some animal rights arguments. Indeed, 
the question should be asked whether it is valid to speak of a restriction of freedom of a companion 




are met, and its interests are considered and attended to sufficiently – as also proposed by Kymlicka 
and Donaldson (2011). 
 
I think the danger of animal rights is: you’re putting your own perspective, your own views on an 
animal and that’s very dangerous. [WA] 
 
Other activists also did not inherently disagree with keeping companion animals. Some – both 
welfare and rights campaigners – mentioned problems such as overbreeding and mutilations and 
referred to domestication as an ‘ill.’ Yet, they concluded that keeping companion animals would not 
be a moral issue if these animals were well cared for, and if stricter controls were in place. Hence, 
the primary issue regarding companion animals is their suffering, not their inclusion within society.  
Suffering was also frequently mentioned as the underlying problem of commodification and of killing 
animals; though it was not the only problematic aspect.  
None of the interviewed rights activists argued that reducing suffering or animal welfare 
improvements were wrong, rather they were in favour of any measures which would improve the 
lives of animals. Some animal rights campaigners also pointed out that certain practices were worse 
than others in the amount of suffering they cause, making them a stronger concern than others. 
 
Whatever you can do to reduce suffering of animals is a good thing. I just think it could be taken 
further. [RA] 
 
Yet, they also mentioned that reducing suffering should not be the only goal. Therefore, any 
framework aimed at bridging the gap ideally should take suffering as one main concern, while not 
aiming at settling all matters. Instead, it should constitute a minimalistic basis that does not preclude 
avenues for more progressive views and ethical questions beyond animal suffering. Such further 
questions on how we ought to treat animals revolve around respecting interests, especially the 
interest in staying alive.  
 
4.3 KILLING 
Interviewees stated that they also considered the killing of animals a moral issue. Ethical problems 
about taking the lives of animals – as mentioned by participants – included suffering, the lack of 
necessity to kill them, disrespecting their interests, not having the right to take a life, and a duty not 
to harm. In this section, responses to the question of value of life, lifeboat cases, and euthanasia will 





4.3.1 SUFFERING AND THE REASON TO KILL AS MORALLY PROBLEMATIC 
Ten out of fifteen participants considered killing per se wrong. Most participants across welfare and 
rights advocacy raised concerns about slaughtering animals for food, in particular because of the 
suffering involved, regardless of whether they considered killing animals for food as problematic per 
se. Yet, they seemed to differ in their perception of whether slaughter in all cases caused suffering. 
Rights activists took a bleaker view on this matter than welfare activists. However, most welfare 
campaigners agreed on the unlikeliness of slaughter without suffering, based on current demand for 
animal products, and current methods to meet this demand. In particular one welfare interviewee, 
who identified with animal rights, only viewed killing as wrong if suffering was involved 
(pathocentric position), and believed that this was generally the case. However, like others, he also 
considered meat production unnecessary.   
 
I think they come hand in hand [suffering and killing of animals in food production]. […] I have had to 
personally view footage of the slaughter of hundreds of animals and it’s never a nice business. [RA] 
 
I’ve been to slaughterhouses, good ones and bad ones, and I’ve seen that you CAN do it with the 
minimum of fear, and perhaps just a little sort of apprehension at the end. [WA] 
 
Overall, interviewees focused primarily on the suffering involved in killing (or the ‘manner of death’), 
and the reason or necessity to kill. Some welfare activists considered food a necessity; one also 
mentioned population control. However, the latter could effectively be considered euthanasia if the 
animals were killed to prevent them from starving to death.  
 
When you’re dealing with an animal welfare issue just ask two questions: Why and how? And that 
answers all questions. [WA] 
 
In contrast, rights activists did not consider food production a strong enough reason to justify the 
slaughter of animals. However, killing might be justified if one’s life depended on it as would be the 
case in self-defence, or if humans lived in a habitat with no access to other food sources; and in the 
case of euthanasia. 
Four welfare activists did not consider slaughter (for food) a moral issue. One person adopting an 
egalitarian, best welfare approach and a vegetarian diet, expressed contradictory views as she 




The other three subscribed to a utilitarian and/or non-egalitarian welfare approach. Nevertheless, 
one of those interviewees also chose a vegetarian diet based on the ‘personal opinion’ that currently 
most farming practices would not meet appropriate welfare standards.  
The other two utilitarian welfare activists were the only non-vegetarian campaigners interviewed. 
They acknowledged an interest of animals in their lives but without considering it important to the 
moral significance of slaughter. On the other hand, one of these two interviewees also mentioned a 
feeling of guilt over not being vegetarian indicating a mismatch between behaviour and ethical 
convictions.  
One caveat applies to these views: participants considered killing as a moral issue if done for ‘the 
wrong reasons’ such as human convenience. An example included killing working animals at the end 
of their life while they could have been rehomed. One participant also mentioned killing of animals 
as wrong if people are eating too much meat and are wasting it. 
 
 I wish I was vegetarian. […] I would respect them in terms of their needs for a life, not to be eaten, 
but equally I don’t have an issue with animals being farmed for food. 
 
In contrast to the killing for food, answers in response to a probing question, asking whether 
suffering and death could be justified by clear benefits, for example in animal experimentation,76 
yielded greater agreement than expected. All activists (except for one activist adopting a non-
egalitarian viewpoint)77 agreed that animal experimentation was morally problematic, and hoped to 
see it phased out over time. Several campaigners implied that humans should use their skills, 
intelligence and creativity to find appropriate alternative methods.  
 
I think that some things are fundamentally wrong, and I think humans have a great ingenuity and 
creativity. [WA] 
 
Again, many considered the killing and suffering of animals associated with the testing for cosmetics 
and household products wrong, because it was unnecessary. In comparison, testing to find cures was 
considered unjustified by one welfare activist, if effective treatment is already available, for 
example, for issues related to smoking or obesity. Two rights interviewees considered animal 
experimentation less problematic if it could clearly help to reduce suffering overall.  Hence, also in 
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this regard, associated suffering (not only of the being that is killed) and the reason or necessity to 
kill were paramount in the participants’ deliberations. 
 
4.3.2 OTHER MORAL ISSUES  
Beyond the problematic issues of motive and suffering entailed by animal killing, the sanctity of life 
and not having a right to kill, or a duty not to harm, were mentioned. Only two participants (one 
welfare and one rights) mentioned ideas around the sanctity of life, which were, however, not 
discussed further in the course of the interviews.  
The argument that humans do not have a right to kill, for a duty to respect interests of other beings, 
or a duty not to harm (their interests), was expressed by advocates adopting egalitarian approaches 
to animals. It could be argued that their arguments around duties and rights inherently rest on 
respecting an animal’s interests. However, as is indicated in the last quote below, respecting their 
interest in life is only possible when there is no necessity to kill. 
 
I can’t see where we get any right to kill other creatures any more than I have a right to kill you. Why 
would I have the right to kill a sheep? [WA] 
 
I think the killing of a healthy animal that doesn’t want to die is always morally wrong. I think it’s 
morally wrong to be raising animals to kill them for food when we don’t need to. [RA] 
 
Interestingly, two participants also acknowledged that – similarly to animal suffering – killing them 
could not always be avoided. Yet, the examples given below concern animals not considered 
sentient in science, and are thus, not included within prominent animal ethics theories. 
Nevertheless, both welfare and rights activists expanded their moral concerns to invertebrate 
animals.  
 
Personally, in the sense that animals are individuals that are beings, I like as far as possible to avoid 
killing them. But I drive a car, so I know I kill a lot of insects all the time by driving a car. And I have 









4.3.3 THE VALUE OF LIFE AND LIFEBOAT CASES 
Before I move on to euthanasia, answers to the questions regarding the equal value of human and 
animal lives, as well as lifeboat cases, warrant some discussion.78 Activists subscribing to egalitarian 
best welfare or animal rights approaches provided surprisingly similar answers. They argued that 
subjectively and emotionally, anyone would feel that human lives are more valuable. Equally, most 
humans would consider the lives of those closest to them, whether they be human or non-human 
animals, as more important than others. However, objectively, there would be no difference in value 
between lives according to some campaigners. 
 
I think that all lives are valuable, but I think individuals inherently always value the ones they’re 
closest to more than others. [WA] 
 
The fact that someone would kill an animal rather than a baby does not prove that humans are more 
important than animals. [RA] 
 
Moreover, some participants mentioned that favouring one’s own species, or those beings one has 
an emotional attachment with, is not indicative of how humans ought to treat animals generally. 
Hence, lifeboat scenarios could not be used to prescribe how we ought to treat animals, or to justify 
our current treatment of them. Also, interviewees felt that these scenarios were problematic as they 
do not reflect real-world problems. These answers resemble arguments raised by Francione about 
lifeboat cases being exceptional cases and not referring to institutionalised rights violations 
(Francione 2008:226). Therefore, however one wishes to resolve a matter of competing rights in a 
lifeboat case, it should have no bearing on ethical matters between a party whose rights are violated 
and another whose rights are not violated. 
 
4.3.4 EUTHANASIA 
Euthanasia is defined as ‘good death’ based on its Greek origin: eu meaning good, and thanatos 
meaning death. The term describes ‘ending the life of an individual animal in a way that minimises or 
eliminates pain and distress’ according to the American Veterinary Medical Association (2013:6).  
Participants also described it as a good death – if performed correctly and for appropriate reasons. 
Those reasons would include medical issues, especially terminal illnesses, and other forms of severe 
and intractable suffering.  
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When I come across rabbits with myxomatosis, I’ll kill them because it’s the right thing to do – 
because it ends their suffering. [WA] 
 
Other examples (also causing suffering) included: having to spend a lifetime in a shelter; not being 
re-homeable because of aggressiveness; not being able to take care of an animal (if a shelter was 
overcrowded); and potentially even population control if the animals would otherwise starve to 
death. Similarly, in some developing countries, a participant considered it better to euthanize 
animals appropriately before they are killed through more controversial methods (e.g. 
decompression chambers) by state authorities.  
Several interviewees also mentioned that they would be in favour of euthanasia being available to 
humans. In any case, participants also strongly emphasised that such a decision should not be taken 
lightly, never for convenience, and ideally by medical professionals. This opinion was probably based 
on the expertise of veterinarians, and because they are expected to have the animal’s best interests 
at heart. Having the animal’s interests at heart was considered important to prevent abuse of the 
practice.  
 
Euthanasia is NOT exploitation of – and it is the kindest and most dignified way that you can help 
animals. […] You’ve either got a choice of keeping them locked inside a tiny cage to go crazy for the 
rest of their lives, or to give them a painless and loving way out of this life that we have brought 
them into in the first place. [RA] 
 
The killing of an animal to spare it from suffering was not considered a welfare or an animal rights 
issue by interviewees. One welfare participant was worried about rights approaches potentially 
putting the right to life of an animal above the issue of suffering. However, all interviewees agreed 
with euthanasia if performed correctly and for the right reasons. It would be the right, and the 
kinder thing to do.  
Euthanasia is a good example of where the right not to suffer is considered more important than 
other rights held by an animal, in particular its right to life. It also highlights a difficulty of animal 
rights if they were to be legally implemented similarly to human rights as animals cannot consent to 
their death. Thus, euthanasia could become more difficult legally.79 The topic of euthanasia also 
highlights another shortcoming of animal rights besides legal issues, as it might conflict with virtues 
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and principles of kindness. For example, an obligation to exercise kindness might require one to 
disregard the right to life, and participants – including rights activists – emphasised the kindness of 
sparing suffering through euthanasia as more important than the aforementioned right.  
 
It would be much much more cruel to say ‘Well, I’m not gonna euthanize you because that’s killing an 
animal’ when in fact you’re causing ten years more of suffering and pain. [RA] 
 
4.4 COMMODIFICATION 
Commodification was mentioned by several participants, regardless of their welfare or rights 
background. Commodification means treating or considering someone as a commodity; i.e. as 
something that can be bought and sold (McIntosh 2017), which is problematic because of its 
association with a disregard for the person as an individual being with interests. The status of 
animals as property within the law can also be considered commodification as property can be 
bought or sold without acknowledging its interests. 
All activists who mentioned commodification associated it with a problematic mind-set that neglects 
the animals’ interests, or that views the animal’s value ‘as less,’ eventually causing or contributing to 
animal suffering. Some welfare activists contrasted commodification with exercising kindness and 
compassion. Another participant also concluded that the worst welfare issues occurred because of 
commodifying mind-sets which fail to consider the interests and needs of animals.  
 
Yes massively, which is why we have intensive farming which is the problem […] purely because they 
are commodities. This is the problem – so it’s the mind-set. [WA] 
 
While issues around commodification undeniably link to suffering, rights activists in particular 
pointed out that the problem should be seen beyond suffering. Most commonly, they argued for 
respecting interests other than the one in avoiding suffering, for example, the interest in life. They 
also agreed (as did a welfare activist) that humans would be less likely to inflict suffering if they did 
not consider animals as commodity or property.  
 
That often links with a great deal of suffering because they are treated as property. But on an 
intrinsic level, I don’t think we should be treating them as property even aside from the suffering. 
Each one is a unique individual, they have their own emotions, their own desires and I think we ought 





A contrast arose between one welfare participant (subscribing to a utilitarian, high welfare 
approach), who viewed commodification as problematic but not animal use per se, and other 
interviewees. Unlike other activists, this welfare campaigner considered the use of animals 
compatible with respecting their interests. The fundamental difference here lies in the argument 
that death is not a welfare problem, and is not per se inimical to the interests of an animal.  
Moreover, it should be noted that the majority of participants did not consider the keeping of 
companion animals to fall under practices in which animals are used and exploited. Participants 
emphasised the difference between caring for animals and owning or using them, with the former 
ideally being at the heart of keeping companion animals. Although they acknowledged the welfare 
issues associated with this practice, they felt that those should not lead to abolition and extinction of 
domesticated animals all together. Instead, the human-companion animal relationship should be 
improved.   
 
When it comes to companion animals, we should be treating them as sort of their carers, rather than 
their owners. [RA] 
 
Moreover, some campaigners raised potential benefits associated with keeping animal companions, 
such as humans extending their concerns to other animals through their bond with their animal (cf. 
Waldau 2011:28). This bond would hopefully evoke compassion, and contribute and facilitate a 
paradigm shift, according to these interviewees. Conversely, one participant was wary about 
abolitionist ideas regarding companion animals as they could be harmful to the movement, given 
that most people would not be receptive to these views. 
 
I actually think domestication is an ill, like colonialism is an ill. […] Now we have it. I’m not quite sure 
whether companion animals have an unhappy life, and I think the kind of closeness between people 
and their companion animals is a bond that’s important for their treatment of animals. [WA] 
 
Some people say that there should be complete separation and humans shouldn’t mix. BUT, I’m a 
great believer in the kind of: there’s grey areas within everything. […] If you start saying to people 








4.5 CONCEPTIONS (AND MISCONCEPTIONS) OF RIGHTS 
Another important theme concerned the (mis-)understanding and (dis-)agreements concerning the 
concept of animal rights. The responses varied considerably but can be categorised into intrinsic 
rights, legal rights, and the notion that animal rights as a concept is not fit for purpose.  
Three out of seven animal rights activists referred to intrinsic rights to freedom from suffering, to 
life, and to freedom from exploitation. One participant talked about an intrinsic right to be free from 
(negative) human interference; and in the case of an activist holding abolitionist views, an intrinsic 
right to be treated the same as humans. One of these activists also mentioned a moral duty to not 
cause suffering, stating that humans ‘do not have the right to cause suffering.’ Moreover, all three 
activists also referred to the importance of legal rights to protect animals. 
 
I think in terms of intrinsic rights, they should have the right not to suffer, they should have the right 
to access to food, to water and the other things to meet their other sort of biological needs 
effectively. And within the law, I think they should have sort of rights to protection from violence and 
from being exposed to other forms of suffering. 
 
The other four rights and some welfare participants spoke about a duty to respect and to protect; 
and related to that, about humans not having the right to inflict suffering or cruel treatment. In 
particular, rights campaigners also saw the need for legal protection, but expressed concerns about 
subsequent implementation, especially regarding enforcement. Some activists (both welfare and 
rights) also acknowledged that animal rights as a philosophical concept might not necessarily be very 
useful when seeking social change. The philosophical concept, as pointed out, is a concept ‘made for 
humans.’ It would assume a framework of rights but also duties which would not apply to animals.  
 
It’s something that’s been created by humans. [RA] 
 
Rights are just sort of a human mental creation. […] These are all just ideas really. [WA] 
 
Other problems raised regarding the concept of animal rights included the legal concept of rights 
(see also ‘Euthanasia’), and the association of animal rights with extremism (which will be discussed 
later on).  
 
Animal rights is sort of associated with extremism. […] And animals - they don’t fit into the human 





Legally speaking, animal rights can be incompatible with conservation which concerned some 
activists (both welfare and rights). Similarly, to speak about ‘the same rights for animals as for 
humans’ – as one activist did – was considered unpractical or impossible by other participants. One 
interviewee suggested thinking about animal rights in terms of particular interests instead. This 
would also imply abandoning universal animal rights, and judging individual cases in terms of 
meeting interests rather than rights.  
 
I think a lot of rights are not practical for other animals. For example, people always come up with 
the joke about voting rights and no – I mean that isn’t practical. […] You can’t even necessarily say 
that one rule applies to all different animals – so that that always works. I think you do need to look 
at the situation. [RA] 
 
The issue of advocating the same legal rights for animals was considered especially problematic by 
welfare interviewees. It also contributed to their misconception of animal rights being about ‘the 
same rights’ and led to their subsequent disapproval of this position. Several rights activists 
acknowledged this issue, and pointed out that sometimes people would be ill-informed about the 
meaning of animal rights (cf. Garner 2005a:20; Waldau 2011:56–57). 
 
In our society, it would be very challenging to give a right to freedom to animals, as in: they can run 
free. I can’t see that that would work in our society. [WA] 
 
Another rights activist raised the problem of competing rights and concluded that, ideally, animals 
should have the right to ‘display natural behaviours and to live in a way that was natural to that 
animal.’ Both this description, and the first quote in this section mentioning biological needs, 
strongly resemble the concepts behind the five freedoms (Brambell 1965; Farm Animal Welfare 
Council 2009a). As such, the five freedoms could be considered animal rights, even though they do 
not cover the right to life. Several welfare activists also referred to the five freedoms as basically 
being animal rights. However, one participant stated that they are not termed animal rights as this 
would be considered less palatable to the public and the government – hinting again at the 
association of animal rights with extremism. 
 
If you look at the definition of animal welfare and if it includes not only the physical and mental but 




the five freedoms if they’re not rights. […] Animal welfare – so it’s widely acceptable. […] A lot of that 
taps into rights but doesn’t present itself as such because it has to work. [WA] 
 
Thus, the question about the meaning of animal rights revealed agreements between the different 
activists. Animal rights advocates were concerned about a lack of right to life in welfare approaches, 
and the insufficient implementation of the five freedoms. However, welfare participants agreed on 
the lack of implementation, as they otherwise would not be campaigning for improvements. 
 
4.6 COMPASSION 
Several interviewees used words like ‘kindness,’ ‘thoughtful,’ ‘love,’ and ‘compassion’ to describe 
ideal relationships with animals. Compassion, especially, was used by both welfare and rights 
activists. The meaning of compassion – as understood by most participants – relates to the human 
capacity for empathy, but not to empathy alone. While activists hoped that people would have 
empathy for animals and would relate to an animal’s interests, needs and suffering through 
empathy, compassion would also be expressed by acting accordingly.  
 
I think it’s both useful for human AND other animal causes. And it comes from an empathy that we 
feel for the suffering of other beings – and we want to act on the empathy by showing compassion. 
[…] It could be by directly being kind. [RA] 
 
Interviewees considered empathy and compassion as the driving force behind activism. Hills 
(1993:123–24) also found that empathy was associated with support for animal rights in her study 
on attitudes, although it remains unclear whether empathy is a causal factor (a similar finding was 
also reported by Pivetti 2005:152). Furthermore, participants deemed empathy and compassion 
necessary for sustainable human-behaviour change. Hence, activists considered tactics aiming at 
evoking compassion in people to be an important tool for reaching out to the public. While activists 
strongly focused on compassion as a tool, it also suggests an underlying moral tenet. Being a ‘good’ 
person in relation to animals – in the virtue ethics sense – should be about kindness and 
compassion; as such it could be vital to the previously mentioned paradigm shift.  
This paradigm shift should be about more than improved welfare, according to several activists. 
Instead, it should lead people to consider animals as individual beings with emotions rather than 
commodities (see ‘Commodification’). This would entail that humans would not inflict suffering and 
death on animals for our own benefit, as is currently the case. Furthermore, it should also be about 





I think it’s probably the foundation of animal protection – is compassion. […] I think it is the basis – to 
feel the animals at some sort of level in your heart and you want to help them and stop the suffering. 
[WA] 
 
I think it’s kind of -  just really of living life as a decent human being. [RA] 
 
Compassion clearly is part of the bigger picture of animal protection. However, this is not necessarily 
used as an underlying moral tenet. Several possible explanations were identified through the 
interviews. One of the reasons related to a general concern that having empathy for animals could 
be considered as being sentimental, in contrast to being objective about animal issues (cf. Foer 
2010:74). One interviewee, for example, who was asked if she considered herself compassionate, 
replied in the affirmative but also contrasted it to being objective. The issue of objectivity (and 
scientific opinions) in contrast to being emotional will be discussed in more depth in chapter six. 
 
YES, but to a degree; and I would say I’m probably around the middle because sometimes I would 
appear to be fairly objective. [WA] 
 
Another concern about being compassionate relating to empathy was, what one participant called, 
the ‘collapse of compassion.’ She argued that if people were confronted with too much suffering, 
they would become paralysed by it. Instead of acting on their compassion, they would turn away 
from the issues of concern. Similarly, several activists expressed this difficulty with empathy for 
animals causing them to feel helpless, or even leading to burn-out.80  
 
You can be so compassionate that it causes yourself so much pain and distress that you can’t operate 
and function effectively. [WA] 
 
Another group of reasons related to the interpretation of what it meant to act and be 
compassionate. For example, one rights activist pointed out that the word compassion was used by 
welfare organisations which promoted welfare improvements but would not question the killing of 
animals per se. However, the interviewee asserted that only veganism would be a truly 
compassionate way of living. Other activists believed compassion alone was not sufficient to spare 
                                                                 
80 Jacobsson and Lindblom (2012:52) also observed a frequent mentioning of depression and burn-out in relation 
to activism in interviews. Burn-out, depression, and also ‘collapse of compassion’ can probably be traced back 




animals from suffering. In the case of activists advocating intrinsic rights, they felt that treating 
animals properly were matters of logic, justice and freedom, which were not necessarily guaranteed 
through compassion. 
 
Personally, even though compassion helps us achieve more, for me it’s just logic. That’s what it 
comes down too and that’s exactly what animal rights is – that you can be as little or as more 
compassionate as you want but these animals have rights and there’s nothing you can do to take 
that away. [AR] 
 
Yet, it could be argued that acting compassionately would be incompatible with being unjust or with 
restricting someone’s freedom. It would depend on how compassion was understood and it could 
also be argued that a compassionate dictator or torturer represent an ethical oxymoron. Instead, 
acting based on compassion might help us to decide difficult cases in which utilitarian, welfare or 
rights approaches cannot provide a clear answer. The best example given in the interviews concerns 
euthanasia as it might be a kind and compassionate act to kill a rabbit suffering from myxomatosis81 
to spare it from suffering.  
The fundamental problem though with compassion – as a moral tenet for animal activism – is that it 
is about the kind of people humans should be. A virtue ethics approach in animal protection might 
ask humans to change their character and behaviour instead of changing outer circumstances (such 
as the housing conditions of farmed animals). In other words, in a virtue ethics approach to 
campaigning (similar to animal rights activism focusing on vegan education), the focus might lie on 
changing people’s attitudes and behaviour, implicitly putting blame on their past and current 
behaviour; rather than shifting blame to factors external to individuals. However, human behaviour 
change is a problematic area, which will be discussed further in the next chapters (five, and seven to 
nine). Moreover, as will be argued in chapter seven, unlike compassion, the concept of rights bears 




                                                                 
81 The severity of the disease depends on rabbit species and virus strain. More severe forms are acute and 
usually fatal. The virus causes myxomas (myxoid tumours) which amongst others lead to distortions of the 
face, purulent nasal discharge and weeping, and distortions of the shape of the back and hindquarters. 
Secondary infections are common due to immune system dysfunction. The virus was introduced in 1950 in 
Australia and in 1952 in France to control rabbit populations (Bertagnoli and Marchandeau 2015). Welfarists 
have assessed this method of pest control as resulting in poor welfare and as inhumane (e.g. Loague 1993; 





This chapter identified the various positions animal advocates adopted, ranging from conservative or 
utilitarian welfare approaches to abolitionism. Welfare activists overall emphasised a duty of care 
more strongly than rights activists who focused on respecting animal rights through not interfering 
with their lives. However, such a description seems overly simplistic, given the differences, especially 
between welfare campaigners. 
A more pronounced difference was found in opinions on the killing of animals. Rights advocates 
generally did not see any justification to kill animals for any human purpose or benefit. Welfare 
activists more strongly emphasised that the manner of the death and an underlying necessity would 
need to be considered. The (im)morality of killing animals for human purposes and more specifically 
the purpose of food production, thus seems to be a dividing aspect between the moral approaches 
of welfare and rights activists. In contrast, the suffering of animals was a less controversial issue. It 
might constitute a solid shared foundation for animal advocates, as they unanimously felt that 





CHAPTER 5: CAMPAIGNING 
This chapter discusses interview data with regard to campaigning. It is important to note here that 
ethical beliefs are not the only aspects influencing strategies and tactics. Factors like effectiveness, 
remit, target audiences, but also an activist’s identity, experiences, and wider world view influence 
their approach to campaigning. The latter will be discussed in the next chapter. 
It is sometimes believed that animal welfare in terms of campaigning means improving welfare of 
animals through incremental steps, by either working with the government or with industry. Welfare 
activists are criticised for entering those coalitions and settling for compromises that do not result in 
more substantial changes for animals (Francione and Garner 2010:230–31; Röcklingsberg and Sandin 
2013). Abolitionists (e.g. Francione) believe that these welfare activists contribute to the continued 
exploitation of animals by not challenging the use of animals per se. Instead abolitionists allege that 
welfare improvements imply that high welfare standards are being met, hindering further public 
questioning of animal use. Furthermore, supporters of abolitionism believe that national groups 
(regardless of a welfare or rights background) are primarily focused on raising money rather than 
advancing the cause.  
In contrast, animal rights activists would not welcome such incremental welfare improvements, but 
would aim primarily for the abolition of certain practices through (mostly) public outreach and 
economic campaigns. Their goal is not only a change of practice, but a paradigm shift, recognising  
that animals should not be used for our benefit (Francione 1996, 2004, 2008; Regan 1998, 2004 
[1983]; Phelps 2007; Francione and Garner 2010). Abolitionism (as proposed by Francione 1996, 
2004, 2008 etc.) as a strategic approach distinguishes itself from animal rights as it opposes national 
animal advocacy groups, any work with government or any industry, and campaigns focused on 
anything other than solely promoting veganism as the ultimate moral baseline (that should be 
adopted by everyone immediately). Abolitionists argue that campaigns without said focus would 
hinder the progression of the animal advocacy movement. Yet, this uncompromising approach is 
considered less effective in creating change. As a radical approach, animal rights campaigning might 
be considered less effective in reaching the public or other stakeholders (Garner 1993:211). 
Abolitionists sometimes also view campaigns aimed at promoting veganism as inherently bad, if the 
message is not communicated in a similar uncompromising tone. For example, the campaign 
‘Veganuary,’ aimed at promoting veganism by asking people to try a vegan diet for the month of 
January (Veganuary 2017), has been harshly criticised for ‘promoting veganism as a free choice’ that 
people would only need to adopt for one month. Instead, the campaign should be communicating 




This chapter will give a general overview of the opinions activists held, and secondly, will discuss in 
more depth legislative, single issue, and problematic campaigns, abolitionist campaigning, and 
incremental change versus revolution. 
 
5.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW 
5.1.1 ANIMAL WELFARE 
Animal welfare participants were engaged in working with government, policy makers, industry, and 
also in more practical projects working directly with people to improve animal welfare. In line with 
the general tenet of the movement (Harrison 1979; Paterson 1979; Wynne-Tyson 1979; Garner 
2005b:111), the majority of welfare activists agreed that the primary goal for the future of the 
movement should lie in raising awareness and education of the public, and subsequent human 
behaviour change. Three welfare activists and one rights participant also pointed out that in order to 
achieve this, the movement should be aiming to incorporate welfare education within school 
curricula, or other such education starting at an early age. The latter would be especially important, 
as trying to change adult behaviour was deemed difficult. Nevertheless, welfare participants also 
considered working with government and industry as important (see ‘Legislative campaigns’).  
Another animal welfare participant did consider all three strands of animal protection – educational 
campaigns, legislative campaigns and practical projects – as equally important to achieve a paradigm 
shift. Legislative changes would send a message of importance to people, and would help to punish 
those that would deliberately mistreat animals. On the other hand, public support was considered 
equally important to achieve that legislative change in the first place, and to ensure that people 
would ‘be able to obey.’ Finally, working with people to educate them and improve their practices 
with animals was also considered an important tactic.   
The interviewee also emphasised – as did other animal welfare participants – that to achieve such 
change, animal groups should be working with stakeholders to find solutions. Activists highlighted 
the importance of understanding target audiences and tailoring approaches to those particular 
audiences and their needs. As such they positioned themselves differently compared to animal 
rights activists who were perceived as asking for change without involving their target audiences in 
deliberations on the kind of change that should be sought. Indeed, animal rights activists were 
referred to as evangelical in some instances. This particular perception of animal rights approaches 
will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
 
[This organisation] is really the only organisation I think who FULLY encompasses the approach that I 




owners, listening to them, not just kind of campaigning for what we think is right. [It’s] trying to 
understand both sides, and find what the best solution is. [WA] 
 
PRACTICAL WORK AS BEST PRACTICE PROJECTS 
However, not all interviewees considered engagement in practical projects as necessarily the most 
effective approach. Two participants felt that resources in projects were spent on addressing 
suffering when or after it occurred, although it would be more efficient and (ethically) important to 
prevent it. The perceived problem concerned a lack of resources for prevention through education. 
According to one campaigner, supporters tend to donate money to address cruelty after it occurs, 
rather than to prevent it.   
 
I think more needs to be done to be put in to prevent the cruelty in the first place […] So, you have to 
do that through changed behaviour and if you do that through changed behaviour, that costs a lot of 
money. [WA] 
 
Another participant stated that animal protection groups take on too much of the practical work 
themselves, leading authorities to ‘abdicate’ their responsibilities. Instead, animal protection 
organisations should be conducting best practice pilot projects, to be further implemented by 
authorities and other institutions. This should enable animal groups to reach out further and achieve 
more with their limited resources. Similarly, another participant addressed the issue of projects 
continuing for too long. She argued in favour of addressing the worst issues in particular projects 
with specific animals, and then moving on. This would mean being able to help animals on a larger 
scale, instead of consuming resources to address the problems of a smaller number of animals in 
greater depth. 
 
I think historically animal protection organisations have been too much on practical projects, and I 
think the real change comes from advocacy and education/awareness. […] Rather than animal 
protection organisations doing a pilot project […] and then advocating for it to be spread out 
mainstream, they’ve taken it on themselves to do the work. [WA] 
 
5.1.2 ANIMAL RIGHTS 
Animal rights participants were engaged in working primarily on vegan campaigning/education, 
campaigns to stop certain practices (e.g. hunting), lobbying to some extent, and to a minor extent in 




approach to campaigning. Their opinions on this approach will be discussed in the section 
‘Abolitionist campaigning.’ 
Rights activists considered their work as being primarily consumer- or public-oriented, trying to raise 
awareness for animal issues and educating people about veganism, to drive social change forward. 
Hence, they employed different tactics (compared to welfare groups) which focused on getting 
media attention through official outlets like newspapers and on social media. Rights groups will also 
sometimes use celebrities or other role models such as athletes to create awareness. Their greater 
tendency (compared to welfare groups) to use direct actions stems from this tactic’s propensity to 
generate media attention.  
 
It’s about being part of this movement to actually change people’s perception of what animals, or 
who animals are rather than just ‘Oh let’s get them bigger cages’. [RA] 
 
While participants agreed on the importance of targeting infrastructure to provide more vegan or 
animal-friendly alternatives, most efforts focused on vegan education. Veganism was also 
considered the fundamental solution for two reasons. Firstly, participants mentioned that it spares 
the most animals from suffering and death, indicating a utilitarian based argument for the choice of 
campaigning issue. Secondly, interviewees stated that vegan education encourages the desired 
paradigm shift towards anti-speciesism. In their opinions, adopting a vegan lifestyle has more effect 
than trying to convince people to not visit zoos, as the former would be more clearly anti-speciesist 
than the latter. However, activists also seemed to acknowledge that adopting a vegan diet was a big 
change (and bigger than not visiting zoos) which was not easily achieved. As such its effectiveness in 
sparing suffering and death of animals needs to be called into question. Besides the strong focus on 
vegan education, animal rights participants agreed that ultimately a variety of tactics, including 
political solutions, were needed. Political campaigning though can be more difficult for animal rights 
groups. 
 
5.2 LEGISLATIVE CAMPAIGNS 
Both welfare and rights activists saw the need for engagement with politicians and policy makers, 
although to varying degrees. The most important reason to (not) engage was the difference in remit 
of either focusing on public outreach, or on lobbying. Some welfare organisations engage in both, 
but also have more resources at their disposal, while rights groups tend to be smaller.  
Another difference lies in the kind of relationships animal welfare and rights activists have with 




public outreach, rather than lobbying, groups. Furthermore, some rights campaigners stated that 
governmental bodies would usually only accept minimal improvements, and would be driven by 
public pressure in the first place.  
 
You make baby steps towards improving welfare politically and in fact actually government is playing 
catch-up with people. […] So again, it’s kind of direct interactions with humans because – for us – it’s 
gonna have the most effect. [RA] 
 
Groups with an outreaching focus consider media coverage and attracting people’s attention as 
important to educate consumers. This sometimes may require more ‘outspoken’ or ‘bold’ tactics, 
including the aforementioned use of celebrities. The latter has been criticised by one rights activist 
for being too concerned about lifestyle, rather than the moral arguments. A welfare interviewee also 
expressed disapproval about the use of celebrities as it could damage an organisation’s credibility. 
In general, for groups aiming at working with governmental bodies, tactics aiming at attracting 
media attention could potentially harm their credibility. As welfare activists noted, direct actions – 
even if legal – could also have such an effect; as would any association with illegal activities (also see 
Jasper and Nelkin 1992:172). Instead, an evidence-based approach to the suffering and welfare of 
animals (rather than an ethical approach, see chapter six), and practicable and palatable solutions to 
problems would need to be presented in order to achieve change.  
 
BUT they [government] will also not listen to you if they don’t take you seriously. And they don’t take 
you seriously if you don’t have the facts and therefore you say something which is stupid. And also, if 
you’re doing things which are against your brand or the brand of animal protection and I think direct 
action falls into that. [WA] 
 
Interviewed rights activists did not oppose legislative campaigns as fundamentally as abolitionists. 
Instead, they mainly considered those campaigns outside their direct remit. Rights participants also 
felt that legislative change was based on too much compromise and required a long uphill battle 
against vested interests. Yet, legislative change was considered a step in the right direction, and a 
change that could potentially also help their work. Bans on certain practices (for example, hunting 
with hounds was banned under the UK Hunting Act (2004)), or requirements such as CCTV (closed-
circuit television) in British abattoirs were recognised as important to reduce suffering, even though 




interviewees also expressed frustration over the lack of implementation and enforcement of the law 
with regard to animals, which can render these changes ineffective. 
 
I think it would be childish of us to say that if the suffering of animals at the moment can be lessened 
by legislative change, then that shouldn’t be taken. […] For instance, the sow stall was banned in the 
United Kingdom in 1999. That would have reduced the suffering of sows in the United Kingdom but it 
didn’t END the suffering. It just kind of reduced it slightly. [RA] 
 
In contrast, several welfare activists were more optimistic about legislative changes and their impact 
in the past. They also stated that legislation would often have a broader impact in reducing the 
suffering of animals, instead of just saving a few lives by convincing somebody to adopt a vegan diet. 
In contrast, one activist reckoned that enough legislation was already in place, and only saw a need 
for greater control and a licensing requirement for animal shelters. 
Like other rights campaigners, two welfare participants pointed to the importance of influencing 
people in key positions. Moreover, they urged the need to build coalitions with people who might 
not be directly engaged in animal protection but whose decisions would affect animals. One 
example included the issue of governmental funding accidentally promoting practices which are not 
considered animal-friendly, such as intensive farming. One interviewee – with extensive experience 
in international policies – pointed out that more could still be achieved on a policy level if people 
knew how to influence decision makers internationally. 
 
I think of it in big picture terms and international policy and what’s happening at the UN, and what 
about the world organisations running the whole, and how can we influence those. [WA] 
 
Another welfare campaigner stated that many positive legislative changes had occurred, but had 
received little attention as they were difficult to communicate to the public. Several interviewees 
also mentioned that legislative campaigns receive less interest from supporters, and are not 
perceived as ‘sexy’ campaigns. Hence, less appealing governmental campaigns would often not be 
pursued as it is considered easier to raise money for other causes such as shelters.   
 
Sometimes that stuff that’s really not very sexy, not very easy to talk to the public about, not very 
easy to campaign on – […] talking to policy makers – in terms of the campaign that is publishable and 





5.3 SINGLE ISSUE CAMPAIGNS 
Single issue campaigns are a common tool which allow animal advocacy groups to funnel their 
energy and resources into specific topics or animals. They usually target specific practices in relation 
to specific animals, and aim for the practice to either be improved or ended. For example, welfare 
and rights groups have previously criticised sow stall use as a practice that should be banned. While 
welfarists opposed the practice because of low welfare standards, rights group opposed it as part of 
a general disagreement with animal farming. 
Rights groups consider it problematic that welfare organisations do not address the wider moral 
issue of farming animals, potentially contributing to consumers becoming complacent. People could 
be led to believe that animal suffering could be resolved through such campaigns and hence, might 
not question their consumption of animal products, and their own involvement in the perpetuation 
of these problems.  
However, rights groups have also been criticised by supporters of abolitionism for running single 
issue campaigns. Despite these campaigns – which usually advocate the abolition of specific 
practices – abolitionists criticise them for insufficiently promoting veganism as a moral imperative. 
As such, they could lead to complacency as people would come to believe that single issues like foie 
gras or hunting were – morally speaking – graver problems than other animal issues.  
 
5.3.1 REASONS TO ENGAGE IN SINGLE ISSUE CAMPAIGNS 
All participants mostly disagreed with the aformentioned critique. They considered single issue 
campaigns an important tool for animal advocacy, for several reasons. 
 
5.3.1.1 RAISING AWARENESS – THE KNOCK-ON EFFECT 
First and foremost, activists felt that single issue campaigns would not always breed complacency. 
Instead, they could raise awareness for and greater sensitivity to the suffering of animals in 
particular cases without overwhelming people (see ‘Compassion fatigue’). Moreover, this greater 
sensitivity then might expand to other issues as well. Several participants, including welfare and 
rights activists, reported that engaging in a single issue would be the first step for many people to 
becoming concerned about other problems. For some, it also would be the first step towards 
vegetarianism and veganism. Thus, single issues could have a knock-on effect on people helping 
them towards the desired paradigm shift.   
 





Time and time again I’ve seen people – as I say actual people I know, who I’ve met – who have come 
into single issue campaigns. Rather than it making them feel comfortable in the other areas of 
exploitation, it has SHOWN them other areas of exploitation and how dreadful they are as well, and 
it’s turned them against those. [RA] 
 
Moreover, one welfare and one rights interviewee pointed out that by agreeing to a welfare reform 
or a ban, people, industry, and government would admit that welfare problems were moral issues. It 
would contribute to changing our understanding of how animals ought to be treated. Thus, welfare 
improvements would also address the desired paradigm shift. 
 
You’re saying actually we admit this is cruel and it’s got to go. […] You’re admitting that you have to 
do it because there is a moral imperative to get rid of it. So, you’re kind of changing the whole 
conception of animal welfare and so companies change and people realise: actually, it is a moral 
issue. [WA] 
 
In the case of rights groups, veganism as fundamental solution would also invariably be 
communicated as part of the campaign. Rights activists did not feel that they were unduly 
communicating that some issues were more important than others. 
 
5.3.1.2  BEST USE OF LIMITED RESOURCES 
Welfare and rights activists also agreed that single issue campaigns were a viable way to channel 
resources for specific aims. Several participants mentioned the importance, and problem within 
activism, of focusing on particular aims, rather than pursuing multiple issues while not addressing 
any sufficiently.  
 
Let’s not go back to the old days where we try to be all things to all people. That was our biggest 
mistake in the past and it’s still a tension within us. […] Our motto is ‘Do fewer things better’. [WA] 
 
Similarly, within both the welfare and rights camps, some activists felt that certain issues were more 
important or severe than others, warranting greater importance to be addressed with the limited 
resources. Despite the difficulty in making comparisons, some participants mentioned that certain 
practices cause more suffering. Trying to end the most abhorrent practices was thus considered a 
morally justifiable goal, and not in conflict with the desired wider social change. Interviewees did not 




value of life of different species; thus, it would not contradict the ethical baseline of veganism (and 
abolitionism).   
 
If you have a campaign against the foie gras for instance, […] it comes back to the issue – [is] the 
suffering of those birds more extreme than the suffering of a chicken on a broiler farm in Britain? And 
the answer to that would probably be yes. It doesn’t necessarily mean that there’s a moral difference 
between taking one life than the other. [RA] 
 
5.3.1.3 COMPASSION FATIGUE 
A third reason included the issue of compassion fatigue,82 referring to people becoming 
overwhelmed by campaigns trying to educate them about all issues at once. They may then become 
more likely to disengage and resist change than if they were presented with smaller or fewer issues, 
according to several activists. Hence, the campaigners believed it would be better to be selective in 
their campaigns.  
 
There’s too many problems in the dairy industry. If you tell me all those problems, I can’t deal with it. 
I know for myself it’s too hard for me to give up milk and cheese. I can’t engage. Whereas if you talk 
about lameness, […] that gives […] people like ‘Ok one problem at a time. We can do this.’ [WA] 
 
5.3.1.4 NEW ACTIVIST RECRUITMENT 
The fourth reason was brought forward by one rights activist who thought that more vegans needed 
to become active in campaigning for animals in order to achieve animal liberation. He stated that it 
would be better for people who were passionate about an issue to campaign on it rather than not be 
campaigning at all. The interviewee highlighted that not everybody feels equally comfortable with 
campaigning for a particular issue. Thus, it is probably unrealistic to expect everyone to engage in 
vegan education. If activists would insist on everybody engaging in one activity only, they might run 
the risk of losing some of their supporters.  
 
5.3.1.5 ENGAGEMENT OF THE MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC 
The last reason mentioned by one welfare activist (who also identified with animal rights) concerned 
media engagement. The media – like the public – tends not to support or report on campaigns 
promoting veganism. However, messages by animal groups focusing on changing a specific practice, 
                                                                 
82 Compassion fatigue, also sometimes referred to as perpetration-induced traumatic stress, is a form of burnout 
due to continuous exposure to extreme suffering; which is commonly encountered in health care professions, 




rather than people, would be more easily spread, potentially making them more effective than ‘the 
vegan message.’83  
 
It’s very difficult to get a story placed in the media that says, ‘Look at those conditions, you should 
stop eating meat;’ whereas ‘Look at those conditions, we should ban this one particular thing’ is 
more likely to get an interest. [WA] 
 
Similarly, several rights activists stated that with certain (single) issues people would be more easily 
persuaded to listen and engage, which could be used to educate them further. Most rights 
campaigns should be considered as aiming at attracting people through particular issues, with a view 
to educating them further. As such they could not be considered to trigger complacency in the way 
some welfare single issue campaigns might bear the risk, according to rights campaigners.  
 
 You get people who haven’t even really made the connection to veganism or animals really, but love 
animals and hate the idea of them being treated badly. So, if you can get them to sign a petition 
saying, ‘Ban the farrowing crate,’ you then opened them up to saying, ‘You care enough about that, 
have you made the connection?’ [RA] 
 
5.3.2 THE COMPLACENCY ISSUE 
While rights groups did not agree that their campaigns involved a complacency risk, they worried 
about such a risk in welfare campaigns – despite acknowledging their importance in reducing the 
suffering of animals. Rights campaigners were concerned that people might use welfare 
improvements as an ‘easy opt-out rather than making a change for themselves,’ and that they might 
reinforce belief (rather than behaviour) modification, in order to resolve cognitive dissonance.84 The 
complacency risk was mostly mentioned by rights activists when it came to campaigns promoting 
one animal product over another (such as organic meat over non-organic meat). This reservation 
towards those campaigns also stemmed from high-welfare labels not being considered reliable 
indicators of good welfare and/or decreased suffering. Instead, one campaigner argued, companies 
would utilise approval by welfare organisation to increase their sales and soothe the welfare 
concerns of customers, while not necessarily adhering to best practice or acceptable standards.  
                                                                 
83 Several activists used the term ‘the vegan message’ to express direct communication on veganism being a 
moral imperative, the only way to prevent suffering, and to achieving justice for animals.  
84 Cognitive dissonance theory suggests that in case of a conflict between ethical beliefs and actual behaviour, 
humans will strive for harmony and will avoid disharmony. The cognitive dissonance then causes either a 
change of behaviour or of beliefs in order to establish harmony, with the latter being more likely (Festinger 





People tend to want to do something about the cognitive dissonance problem that their beliefs are 
not in line with what they do. And they believe then buying cage free or organic products is actually 
good enough. […] And by focusing on the solutions like that, you could potentially fall on the track 
that people are complacent and that they don’t need to take any further action. [RA] 
 
However, it should be noted that consumers buying high welfare products might do so precisely 
because they acknowledge an underlying moral issue, which might cause them to be more sensitive 
to animal issues in general. Moreover, some welfare activists felt such risk was acceptable, based on 
the improvement that the campaign would create in the targeted animals’ lives. Interestingly, some 
animal rights campaigners agreed to that to some extent. 
 
I think there is a risk – that may happen, but I think that’s irrelevant. If you’re a hen, would you rather 
be in a cage or free-range? [WA] 
 
I think obviously most important to me is to abolish those systems. […] But I don’t think that 
undermines the other things that people do, improvements that people can do along the way. I mean 
it must make a difference to you if you’re a chicken that’s kept in a cage or a chicken that’s free to 
roam. [RA] 
 
Lastly, one rights activist also stated that it could be considered a moral issue if welfare reforms 
were to improve the lives of animals so drastically that people would stop feeling conflicted about 
consuming them (acknowledging this situation’s unlikeliness given the current circumstances). Such 
a worry might fuel abolitionist critique but it seems an odd argument to suggest that it might be 
better to let animals suffer in order to eventually achieve animal liberation. It could be argued that 
current versus future animal suffering are a case of conflicting rights.  
 
You potentially get to the point where your animals are treated so well, that people don’t feel 
morally conflicted about eating them. That would be problematic. [RA] 
 
Moreover, it is morally questionable to refrain from alleviating suffering on the grounds that it might 
communicate an undesired message. A single issue campaign addressing, for example, equal pay for 
women, would not be considered to undermine the overall objectives of feminism. If an organisation 




prostitutes, it would not directly address human trafficking. However, it would improve the lives of 
the people trafficked into prostitution. Should this be considered unworthy of our time because it 
would not overtly convey the wrongness of human trafficking? I shall return to some of these 
questions and considerations in chapters seven to nine.  
Most interviewees concluded that the goal and reason behind a campaign were important. If it was 
only done to improve or end one practice while not having the broader picture of animal suffering in 
mind, it was considered more problematic than if an organisation’s general aim was to end at least 
the suffering of animals.  
 
I think you’ve always got to have the goal in sight that you want to abolish vivisection, but any 
improvements you can make along the way are surely better, surely helping the animals. [RA] 
 
5.4 PROBLEMATIC CAMPAIGNS 
In this section, tactics will be discussed which were considered problematic by interviewees. The 
campaigns discussed here were either called into question because of moral disagreement, potential 
ineffectiveness, or were considered damaging to the movement. This includes campaigns that are 
politically incorrect, shocking campaigns, and direct action, both legal and illegal kinds. 
 
5.4.1 SHOCKING CAMPAIGNS 
Two welfare participants raised concerns about campaigns that used images depicting animal 
suffering or cruelty to animals too blatantly. One interviewee worried that ‘shocking campaigns’ 
could desensitize people, and thus they might come to accept that suffering as normal. Another 
welfare participant was concerned that shocking campaigns might not be an efficient tool in all 
cases. Campaigns using images that starkly convey animal suffering might increase the likelihood of 
people not wanting to confront it. Similarly to the problem of confronting people with the whole 
concept of animal liberation (as previously discussed with regard to single issue campaigns), 
depictions of extreme suffering could be overwhelming for people (also see ‘Compassion fatigue’). 
Thus, these tactics could impede the possibility of change for those people. Consistent with this, one 
interviewee reported not feeling comfortable with working in anti-vivisection because of the 
suffering.  
 
And I was so shocked by what I read, much of which I believe to be true. But I felt it was almost too 





If you just keep throwing really violent images at them, they might go on the defensive and not want 
to do anything about it. [RA] 
 
While several activists reported experiences with people who did not want to see images and 
confront the suffering of animals, in their own lives exposure to suffering often led to lifestyle 
changes. Hence, the participant felt that people needed to be informed about animal suffering, in 
order to raise their awareness of the issues. Research suggests that, on the one hand, seeing 
someone in need can motivate empathetic people to help. On the other hand, if the initial empathy 
leads people to focus on their own upset feelings, they will seek to reduce their own distress by 
ignoring the problem (Batson et al. 1997).  
Mika (2006:920–21, 933) claims that shocking images might be more successful in getting attention 
than less controversial ones, and could initiate the beginning of lifestyle and behaviour changes, 
even if the first reaction might have been negative.85 Yet, negative reactions leading to an 
undermined credibility of the source and rejection of the cause is an equally plausible outcome, 
according to Mika. It remains unclear if those campaigns tend to lead to behavioural changes, or 
more often cause people to turn away from animal issues.  
 
I think I am probably that sort of person that would respond to that. Some people have gone vegan 
just on the strength of one leaflet they’ve seen; or a film. [RA]86 
 
5.4.2 POLITICALLY CONTROVERSIAL CAMPAIGNS 
Politically controversial campaigns refer to campaigns that are associated with sexism, racism or the 
like. They can also refer to campaigns that cause controversies over what people might consider 
inappropriate comparisons. For example, the comparison of the Holocaust to contemporary farming 
practices and slaughterhouses has caused such a controversy (Karlsen n.d.; Megged 2015). PETA’s 
campaigns have also been repeatedly accused of political incorrectness, especially because of 
alleged sexism (Pennington 2013). The rationale behind these sort of campaigns often is an attempt 
to generate media attention and public discussion (Dawn 2006:199). 
Politically incorrect campaigns were only discussed with some participants, and primarily with rights 
activists. Those tactics are rarely used in welfare campaigning as they could damage credibility with 
government or other stakeholders. Most rights activists also felt uncomfortable with those 
approaches, as they (1) did not resonate with their moral beliefs; (2) should not be necessary to 
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generate media attention; or (3) could potentially damage the public image of animal rights (also see 
chapter six). 
 
I think it often draws the wrong kind of attention. I think they also often say things that get them in 
the press but for the wrong reasons. […] I think that unfortunately impacts on other groups, 
individuals in the animal rights movement and makes us look like a bunch of crazies. [RA] 
 
However, in two cases activists felt that getting publicity for the animal cause would justify such 
techniques. They used a utilitarian argument that weighed the costs of bad publicity against the 
benefits of encouraging people to talk about the issues. One activist also acknowledged – even 
though he would not feel comfortable with it – that other audiences or demographics might find 
politically incorrect approaches appealing. As such, it could be considered as a different form of 
outreach, to help a different audience to connect with veganism.  
 
Is it better to get that information in using Pamela Anderson […] or not? And I would argue the 
former is the lesser of – not two evils but is still preferable to not getting anything in at all. [RA] 
 
While some audiences might find those tactics appealing, it remains questionable if the majority of 
the public or media would. Would it lead them to discuss the animal issue, or would they focus on 
the problematic campaign itself in their discussions? In the case of the campaign involving Pamela 
Anderson (PETA n.d.), does the public understand the comparison between the exploitation of 
women and animals? Mika (2006:935) argues that men did notice women in sex appeal campaigns 
by PETA, but ignored the intended message, hinting at its ineffectiveness at reaching them. In 
comparison, feminists might misunderstand such campaigns, thinking that animal rights advocates 
would legitimise sexism through their campaigns, when animal groups were actually trying to 
highlight how both constitute social issues (Adams 2010). The movement might then run the risk of 
alienating potential supporters for whom political correctness is important. 
 
5.4.3 DIRECT ACTION – LEGAL  
Legal direct actions involve activities such as protests, divestment campaigns (e.g. by convincing 
retailers not to buy products from particular suppliers), or sabotage of hunts with hounds in the UK, 
where such hunting is now largely illegal. These actions are characterised by adherence to the law 




Welfare activists personally engaged little if at all in direct actions, partly because of the 
organisations they were involved in. Most welfare groups aim to influence policy and decision 
makers. Thus, they considered it counterproductive to be protesting against the same people they 
were trying to work with. Protests against companies or particular people could contribute to 
targeted groups becoming more defensive and less open to change (also see Foer 2010:97 on a 
interviewed farmer who refuses to co-operate with PETA because of their attacks). Instead, welfare 
organisations often aim to achieve results by talking to stakeholders and influencing ‘by persuasion 
rather than [by] using a battering ram.’  
 
It drew public attention to things but I think perhaps in some respects it made the [people who were 
protested against] digging deeper. Just like I say with people: if you kind of lobby people too hard and 
too publicly, they basically shut down. [WA] 
 
Furthermore, one interviewee mentioned a risk that direct actions may make people angry about an 
issue and potentially supportive of a cause for a short period of time, but without resolving the 
issue. The participant pointed out that any such campaign or action would only be effective if it 
happened in a concerted effort along with other connected campaigns.  
Another concern by three welfare participants referred to the potential of negative publicity of 
animal activism through direct actions. The public might start associating engagement with animal 
issues with people they could not relate to, and thus would not relate to the welfare or rights 
problems presented.  
 
It can also signal in their mind: […] lameness equals crazy people out on the streets, blocking traffic, 
making my commute in the morning horrible. So I think there is like this risk to it. [WA] 
 
Similarly, a rights participant indicated that media coverage was not always assured by those tactics, 
and that the media would not necessarily present the cause in the desired way. Also Munro 
(2005:79–80) argues that the media is more likely to report on activists’ activities, if these can be 
captured in dramatic headlines. Hence, violence and extremism characterise the preferred portrayal 
of animal activists by the media. Moreover, media coverage might focus on the act rather than the 
issue (Mika 2006:921).  
One participant reported having experienced the difficulty of engaging in education or legislative 
campaigns because of the negative image associated with their direct actions. Despite not using 





I think if [we] approached the government and said we want legislative change, they’d tell us to go 
away. [RA] 
 
Overall, welfare campaigners questioned the effectiveness of protests and other confrontational 
direct actions. Yet, they also agreed that in some cases these might be a useful tool. Most 
importantly, welfare activists considered direct actions such as protests to be a last resort, if other 
avenues remained fruitless.  
 
Yes, that’s an important tool but I wouldn’t – and we don’t – go there as the first point of action. 
[WA] 
 
In contrast, rights activists, despite questioning the effectiveness of direct actions, were less 
opposed to their use, as long as people were aware of their potentially limited impact. Additionally, 
they acknowledged that actions like protests could act as a morale boost for supporters, and would 
make people feel ‘like they are doing something,’ although interviewees were unsure if those actions 
would impact anything beyond that.  
 
Not very effective are things like boycotts or demonstrations [and] most petitions online. I think 
people feel that they are doing something but actually it doesn’t really achieve any change. [RA] 
 
5.4.4 DIRECT ACTION – ILLEGAL 
Direct actions can also involve illegal methods, such as inflicting property damage, animal rescue, 
and physical or psychological violence (e.g. intimidation). Official charities and registered 
organisations do not engage in such activities and follow a strict ethos of only engaging in non-
violent and legal activities. Besides the charity commission guidelines, the remit of welfare 
organisations of working with governments makes illegal activities impossible – or in the words of 
one welfare participant: 
 
Every organisation I’ve always worked for has always been trying to change the law and enforce the 






All activists generally opposed illegal direct actions as they believed it would not constitute an 
effective tool to create change. Animal rights campaigners often opposed such actions on the 
grounds of ineffectiveness at creating change, and risking bad publicity and loss of credibility.  
 
RESCUING 
However, probing questions on rescuing and undercover footage elicited a different response 
concerning the normativity of illegal direct actions. Again, welfare organisations would not be able 
to engage in such activities without losing their charitable status. Yet, personally welfare activists did 
not necessarily oppose rescuing of animals in distress depending on the case (a similar observation 
regarding the opinions of shelter workers has been made by Taylor (2004:326)). For example, one 
welfare interviewee stated that she would rescue a dog which was trapped in a hot car. However, 
two activists also emphasised that rescues needed to be organised appropriately, meaning that a 
proper home and proper care for the rescued animals should be organised.  
 
I don’t really have a problem with that, PERSONALLY. […] If you’re not hurting anyone but just 
damaging a lock in a building, I don’t mind – and as long as you got that back up, you’ve got 
somewhere for the animals to go – they can survive and live. [WA] 
 
Rights activists expressed similar opinions, though in some cases they were less cautious and more 
enthusiastic about rescuing. One campaigner, for example, called it ‘a praiseworthy thing.’ Another 
explained that the action of rescuing could again create media coverage which could educate 
people. This might be the case in open rescues (based on the Australian model where activists 
record the rescue and reveal their identities), which have been mentioned as a positive example by 
several activists. Nevertheless, rights interviewees questioned whether rescuing would change 
anything beyond the fact that those animals were set free from suffering. They acknowledged that 
these activities did not necessarily challenge the underlying problems of systemic animal suffering.  
 
The people that rescue the [animals] – that’s brilliant for these individual [animals] that are rescued. 
[…] I don’t think there is any wrong in that. I think it’s a good thing to do but it doesn’t actually 
challenge the cause of it. [RA] 
 
UNDERCOVER FOOTAGE 
Activists also mostly agreed about undercover footage being an important tool to expose animal 




participants. This difference might again be influenced by the restriction on welfare organisations, as 
charities, from engaging in such activities. In contrast, rights groups do not usually hold charitable 
status and hence, are not similarly restricted. Welfare participants did not generally oppose 
undercover investigations, but they more frequently pointed to the importance of activists adhering 
to strict guidelines and codes of conduct when engaging in this activity. This is especially important 
for welfare groups that consider using undercover footage, shot by non-charity groups, in their 
campaigns. One participant also pointed out that property damage as part of shooting undercover 
footage could discredit evidence.  
Secondly, welfare participants felt that undercover footage should not be used for ‘public shaming’ 
but rather be taken to authorities. They believed that only then would be evidence used effectively. 
One participant indicated that this was also important for the safety of the farmer.  
 
We don’t say ‘It was Mr. So-and-so’s farm,’ so no one’s going to go and beat him or her up. […] As 
long as you’re not laying the farmer open to violence, I think it’s ok. [WA] 
 
However, one rights activist replied that undercover footage taken to authorities would often fail to 
result in prosecution. For that reason, and as animal rights groups primarily target consumers, they 
are also more inclined to use undercover footage to raise awareness. 
 
VIOLENT TACTICS 
All participants opposed violence for several reasons. The most frequently mentioned was 
ineffectiveness in changing conditions for animals.87 Participants were also concerned about the 
negative connotations those direct actions might cast on the movement (cf. Waldau 2011:113). They 
believed that it would create an association of animal rights with extremism which would be 
alienating for the public. One welfare interviewee explicitly stated that she felt alienated by the 
‘coldness’ of those activists who engaged in violent tactics. As the animal protection movement is 
trying to convince people to support their cause, violence would be counterproductive (Munro 
2005:80 made a similar finding in his interviews with animal activists).  
 
I think it actually can create negativity around animal rights and the people who are involved in it. I 
think we really need to try and be as friendly and as open, welcoming to everyone. […] It kind of 
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paints animal rights activists or campaigners as like fringe, strange people who you could not 
possibly relate to. [RA] 
 
One welfare activist also suggested that violence would cause a victimisation portrayal of industry, 
further contributing to the negative image of animal rights. Again, people would then tend to agree 
with the industry as the victim, rather than with the animal rights cause. In a similar manner, 
another interviewee stressed that violent and illegal tactics would create a strongly ‘polarised 
discussion’ blocking constructive debate and change. This participant – like several others (including 
rights activists) – also felt that illegal and violent activities in the early 2000s had set the movement 
back. Rather than opening the debate, violence closed avenues for communication and change; and 
contributed to a negative image of animal rights.  
 
The discussion becomes very polarised and therefore the discussion doesn’t tend to get heard, so it’s 
completely negative and took the movement back many years. [WA] 
 
All but two participants were also opposed to violence for ethical reasons.88 Since several activists 
adopted egalitarian positions, their ethical beliefs about not harming other living beings applied to 
both animals and humans. Some mentioned that it would be hypocritical to oppose violence 
towards animals but not humans (cf. Waldau 2011:113). 
 
I find it counterproductive […] as well as I don’t wish to cause suffering to other creatures, I kind of 
view the humans and animals in the same respect. [RA] 
 
Interestingly, rights participants also expressed understanding of why some people would use 
violence. They could relate to activists who considered the law to be wrong, and thus wanted to help 
animals outside the law. Some interviewees added that they would not condone violence, while 
another participant felt it was not his place to judge.   
 
I personally can’t condone illegal tactics - breaking into property or destroying property. I understand 
why people do it but I can’t condone that. [RA] 
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My personal perspective is that it should always be non-violent but I can’t speak for other people. It is 
for them to say where they’re coming from, to justify their actions. [RA] 
 
In comparison, two participants indicated that it might make the activists feel ‘good’ and engaged in 
the cause, but that it was a misplaced feeling of engagement and impact. Indeed, two other rights 
interviewees described (non-violent) direct actions as appealing, as it made them feel more strongly 
engaged (in contrast to ‘carrying placards’), and that it was associated with an ‘adrenaline rush.’ A 
similar observation was made by Derville (2005:529), who stated that discourse and compromise 
would leave some activists with a sense of defeat, while direct actions gave them a sense of 
fulfilment.  
Lastly, one rights and one welfare activist (identifying with animal rights) did not oppose violence 
against people they viewed as animal abusers.89 While they would not encourage it because of 
potential negative publicity and imprisonment (effectively preventing one from helping animals), 
they also would not condemn violent tactics. 
 
I’m not encouraging someone else to break the law when I’m not prepared to do that myself. That’s 
wrong, isn’t it? BUT, if say for instance, [someone] killed an animal experimenter, I wouldn’t 
condemn them. […] I might feel myself that tactically that might not have been the best thing to do. 
[RA] 
 
One of these two interviewees also suggested that the ALF saved animal lives and was therefore to 
be considered positive, despite its negative image and association with violent tactics. In contrast to 
other participants, this activist did not feel that those activities harmed the movement or prevented 
people from going vegan. However, he also conceded that there might have been better methods 
and that the group had a ‘false idea of how change came about.’ Furthermore, the interviewee 
explained that ALF groups consisted of mostly young and enthusiastic but inexperienced people.  
 
I think overall the ALF was a very good thing. I mean whether it was the best thing is a different 
question. […] It got to a situation where [they] started to believe that [they] could actually win a kind 
of military victory. [RA] 
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While it is true that violence has always been part of social justice movements as one participant 
pointed out, and that ‘one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter’ according to 
another, it is morally unjustifiable from an animal rights perspective. Animal rights demands respect 
for the wellbeing and the lives of all sentient creatures regardless of any benefit that might accrue 
from overriding those rights.  
 
5.5 ABOLITIONIST CAMPAIGNING  
Given the controversies abolitionist supporters cause within the movement, their proposed 
approach of vegan grassroots education only also warrants some discussion. Vegan grassroots 
education offers some advantages, such as not relying on donations, direct social interactions and 
local networks, and based on that, the possibility to effect change in communities. However, there 
are also several risks and shortcomings not addressed in grassroots education, pointed out by 
participants. 
Firstly, education, too, is a slow process and does not necessarily effect change in the desired way. It 
might even be fair to say at this point that the aforementioned complacency could be a universal 
issue. Behaviour changes are less likely to happen than changes of ethical beliefs concerning the 
behaviour in question (Festinger 1957; Bastian et al. 2012). If people are confronted with 
abolitionism, they do not necessarily change their behaviour – which might be considered 
complacency. Alternatively, we might need to think about such change as a much more complex 
subject in which knowledge does not always directly impact behaviour. Similar to the gap between 
environmental knowledge and environmental behaviour (Kollmuss and Agyeman 2002; Ito 2017), 
humans display gaps between their ethical beliefs concerning animals and their behaviour, for 
example, with regards to meat consumption (Bastian et al. 2012). I shall discuss this issue in more 
depth in the next chapter (‘The free choice paradigm’) and in chapters seven to eight. 
Secondly, several interviewees pointed to a general change of ‘activism culture,’ meaning that 
activism moved away from being street-based to being social media-based. In some cases, animal 
rights supporters would focus on sharing recipes and arranging social activities online, rather than 
getting involved in actual activism.  
 
There’s lots of people that have joined, that really embrace the vegan lifestyle. But all they want to 
do is go out and eat. They don’t wanna stand on street corners shaking tins. […] They’re just going 
out for meals – so this kind of vegan societies and vegan groups that are just a kind of glorified dining 





Hence, these activists hinted at a lack of people willing to engage in campaign work. While people 
might choose to passively support a group by signing up to their newsletter, or go vegan, only a 
small percentage get involved in campaign activities. Thus, the question arises of whether it would 
be realistic to expect people adopting a vegan lifestyle to also engage in grassroots education as 
Francione suggests. If the animal protection movement already suffers from a shortage of activists, it 
might be unrealistic to expect that abolitionism would attract sufficient supporters to engage in 
these activities. 
Thirdly, for many people the choice of campaigning has do with passion for an issue, or the feeling of 
urgency of a particular cause. While rights activists mostly agreed with abolitionism ethically, they 
did not feel that it was a realistic approach strategically. The commitment of the interviewed 
activists to their work was accompanied by fully embracing and feeling aligned with the approach of 
the organisation. It is unlikely – as campaigners explained – that they would feel comfortable using a 
different approach. Therefore, the demand that every vegan activist should engage in vegan 
grassroots education only, could take away the very passion that enables their engagement in the 
first place.  
 
Like I said, the attitude of people that take the abolitionist view is often that they condemn all other 
forms of campaigning […] - then you’re losing a whole section of people that you might be able to 
bring into the movement. [RA] 
 
Another issue with vegan grassroots education is that even if people considered becoming involved, 
they could feel uncomfortable engaging because of their lack of experience. Employees and 
volunteers of national organisations will often receive training or guidance on campaigning. Vegan 
grassroots education offers only a loose network of people and little guidance. One participant 
pointed out that after engaging in direct actions for years, he initially felt insecure when changing to 
campaigning focused on vegan outreach, pointing at the need for guidance in activism. 
A fifth risk, related to the previous point, concerns the professionality and effectiveness of vegan 
outreach. As activists are aiming to trigger human behaviour change, they should be familiar with 
the right techniques. However, even activists engaging in renowned national groups admit that they 
do not know what eventually triggers change. Most participants deemed confrontational tactics as 
damaging. As such, vegan outreach might be even more difficult than other campaigns as it could be 
considered more controversial. The public is aware what vegan organisations want to achieve and 
are more likely to already resist initial contact. If vegan outreach activists are not briefed on the 




expressing confrontational behaviour towards people who do not adopt a vegan lifestyle. This could 
reinforce the image of animal rights activism as being extreme and evangelical (see chapter six).  
 
Today I saw Greenpeace out there doing their kind of asking people to join, and everybody wants to 
help the planet. Some people more so than others, but it’s not a controversial thing necessarily. But if 
we go out and say ‘Hey, do you want to help animals’, people say ‘Yes, I love animals.’ ‘We’re a 
vegan organisation’ – ‘Well, I’m not a vegan’, so it adds those challenges there. [RA] 
 
If people feel that they’re being told to do something that they’re not ready to do, they will just kinda 
block it out. And you may make some converts but you gonna make an awful lot of other people who 
resent the vegan police – who see veganism as an extreme thing and who see it as an affront to their 
integrity. [WA] 
 
The uncompromising approach of abolitionism also brings other negative consequences. Adopting a 
plant-based lifestyle is a major change in a person’s life which often happens in smaller steps of 
reducing consumption of meat and animal products. To ask people to go fully vegan immediately or 
within a very short period of time, including abstinence of food, cosmetics, clothes, and any goods 
containing animal products, requires a major reshaping of habits. It also brings inconvenience as 
society does not fully accommodate people choosing a vegan lifestyle, despite the increasing 
availability of vegan products. Instead, some activists – both welfare and rights – suggested 
supporting and encouraging every little step towards the desired behaviour change. 
 
There’s no such thing as a perfect vegan, and so I think it’s useful to help people understand that. […] 
Veganism needs to be an achievable goal for people. [RA] 
 
Moreover, two welfare participants reported that they had felt unwelcomed by rights activists in the 
past for not being fully vegan. Such a feeling might more easily arise if activists hold and 
communicate very strong opinions on how others ought to behave. It is more likely to make people 
feel criticised, leading them to stop engaging with those activists. Thus, this might preclude avenues 
of change for a person.  
 
I think if you just dismiss anyone who’s not a strict vegan then you miss a lot of opportunity for 
change. I can remember when I first went to work […] and I was vegetarian, not vegan. And some of 




opposite. […] And I wouldn’t change for a long while – I wouldn’t change just because it’s kind of 
alienating. [WA] 
 
Another reported issue concerned the limited outreach of vegan grassroots education, making it 
effective only on a smaller scale. Two interviewees mentioned that organisations used to run 
workshops with small groups which successfully helped those people to move towards the desired 
lifestyle. However, those organisations also suspected that they did not have enough impact and 
thus decided to engage in wider but less specific outreach. Vegan grassroots education might have 
the advantage of helping people travel further on their journey than bigger groups would have the 
time and resources for. However, the impact measured against the greater social change remains 
small. Convincing a few people every year to adopt veganism affects the suffering of billions of 
animals only to a small extent.  
 
You may have influenced a few individuals to go vegetarian and so on. Or if you run a sanctuary you 
rescued sixty animals or 200 animals and that’s lovely for them. But of seventy billion animals out 
there being killed every year – and you haven’t touched it. [WA] 
 
Similarly, one rights activist suggested that veganism would not necessarily affect other areas of 
animal suffering as there were no alternatives available, for example, for medication tested on 
animals. This constitutes an important critique as it might be the case that even if a larger number of 
people turned towards veganism, animal experiments for medical purposes might still continue.  
 
I can opt out of the dairy and the meat industry by going vegan. […] I’ve never found that difficult. 
But it’s much harder to opt out of the vivisection industry. [RA] 
 
Based on these considerations and lack of evidence of the actual impact and effect of abolitionism 
and other campaigns on the wider social movement, there is a case to be made that vegan 










5.6 INCREMENTAL CHANGE VERSUS REVOLUTION 
A general theme revolved around incremental versus revolutionary change. All but two activists90 
indicated that they considered animal protection to be a social change movement,91 and all but one 
activist agreed that change happens incrementally.92 They also unanimously agreed that 
improvements for animals which lessened their suffering would be positive. Moreover, several 
activists acknowledged that certain campaigns were more difficult than others, because, for 
example, particular topics were less interesting or appealing to the public. For that reason, and 
because organisations have limited resources, anything that would help animals should be 
considered good. Interestingly, two welfare activists did not consider their work to be focused on 
improving conditions, but rather on abolishing the worst practices.  
 
Anybody who is trying to get improvement is doing a good job as far as I’m concerned. […] If they are 
working hard for the welfare OR rights of animals, jolly good luck to them. [RA] 
 
We don’t see ourselves as improvers. The net result of banning the worst system is that you get the 
one that’s not quite so bad. [WA] 
 
While animal welfare campaigners focused more strongly on incremental changes in industrial 
practices or in legislation, rights activists emphasised the need for incremental change in individuals. 
They emphasised the importance of encouraging small changes towards a vegan diet rather than 
asking for it immediately, for several reasons. Firstly, participants deemed it unrealistic to expect 
people to change quickly, as personal and professional experiences from both welfare and rights 
participants seemed to confirm the need for gradual changes. Some interviewees underwent a 
quicker transition from eating-meat to veganism within two months; others took years to adopt a 
vegan diet; and yet others simply ‘were not there yet.’ One activist also reported that in their surveys 
meat eaters would usually look to reduce meat consumption or to adopt vegetarianism, while 
vegetarians would strive towards veganism. Cases of people going vegan immediately based on an 
ethical insight were rare. But reducing the consumption of animal products would reduce suffering 
of animals – and even though not ideal, would be better than no change. 
 
                                                                 
90 Those two activists potentially considered the animal protection movement a social change movement but 
did not clearly state it.  
91 Goodwin and Jasper (2015:4) define social movements as ‘collective, organized, sustained and 
noninstitutional challenge to authorities, powerholders, or cultural beliefs and practices.’ 




Certainly, I didn’t change like that and all the people I know [who] have been in animal rights for 
years – none of them went vegan overnight. We all did it gradually. [WA] 
 
Secondly, two participants (one welfare and one rights) mentioned that gradual change would be 
more sustainable. One activist also pointed out that in his experience, somebody adopting veganism 
overnight would be more likely to go back to eating meat later on. This contrasts with the 
abolitionist accusation that encouraging reduction rather than full cessation would breed 
complacency.  
Lastly, one rights activist – similarly to welfare participants – emphasised the importance of 
dialogue. Finding common ground through respectful debate, resulting in incremental change, was 
considered the key to progress. Several participants felt that abolitionists would not engage in this 
and hence, would not be able to convince people, even though their arguments might be morally 
consistent. 
 
BUT you could argue that: Well ok, fine, you don’t bend and then it gets nowhere. OR you both bend 
a little bit and you get a little bit further. [WA] 
 
In contrast, welfare advocates focused more strongly (although not solely) on incremental change in 
industry, the government, and also infrastructure. For example, one interviewee expressed her 
agreement with abolition of animal experimentation but also mentioned that it was unrealistic to 
expect it to happen quickly. As our infrastructure and industry took many years to be built up 
incrementally, it would also need to be incrementally replaced. The same participant reinforced the 
importance of enabling people to change their behaviour by providing an alternative infrastructure 
(for example, offering more high welfare animal products or vegan goods). While all activists, with 
whom infrastructure was discussed, agreed on the importance of alternatives, this received little 
attention in the interviews. I shall return to this matter in the next chapter (‘The free choice 
paradigm’) and in chapter nine. 
 
If you want to persuade other people to change their behaviour, you HAVE to bring them along on 
this journey. You have to work to make sure the infrastructure is there to simply replace it. [WA] 
 
Furthermore, some activists pointed out that right circumstances and luck were sometimes crucial to 
achieving goals, which should be seized upon, given that they might not be winnable at other times. 





In 2005, avian flu happened and the campaign was won within two weeks. […] So, [the organisation] 
ran the best campaign ever for fifteen years and achieved nothing, or did achieve something but not 
achieved the final goal. In two weeks [the organisation] ran the worst campaign and achieved the 
goal. [WA] 
 
I worked for years on cosmetic testing and I remember them saying at that time that it was only 
30,000 – ONLY 30,000 animals a year. But it was winnable; and it was one that drew a lot of public 
attention to the issue and now it’s having a knock-on effect. [WA] 
 
Lastly, some campaigners considered successful incremental campaigns to be indicators for progress 
in a journey towards greater goals, as compromises and concessions would constitute an 
acknowledgement of a moral imperative. The implementation of reforms or cessation of single 
practices would signal that people admitted to an animal issue being a moral concern which needed 
changing. 
Overall, welfare participants considered gradual changes to the infrastructure of society as most 
important and more realistic for achieving change. They were more accepting of compromise as they 
felt that without it no progress would have been achieved at all. However, one welfare interviewee 
pointed out that the organisation had to be careful about how to communicate their compromise to 
supporters. Criticisms of compromises seem to go beyond discussions between animal protection 
groups, extending to supporters within the wider public. Yet, one could argue that not only welfare 
organisations have to settle for compromise. It is unlikely that any rights organisation, engaging for 
example in vegan outreach, is able to convince all people to go vegan. Rather, rights groups accept 
and welcome smaller changes in people’s lives – for which they are criticised by abolitionists.  
Another reason that might influence welfare activists to choose working within the system and to 
accept compromise is the negative image that comes with more revolutionary approaches. 
Interestingly, in the interviews some rights activists reinforced this perspective by using language 
indicative of a fight between opposing sides (see chapter six). 
In contrast to the abolitionist viewpoint, all rights activists agreed that welfare improvements were 
important to lessen the suffering of animals ‘at this point in time.’ However, they raised doubts 
about how much such improvements would contribute to the wider social change, especially as 
welfare ‘would not always go far enough.’ Yet, one interviewee also acknowledged that welfare 
groups were restricted in their messages, given their remit and the stakeholders they were looking 





Although getting bigger cages is good for them at this point in time, it’s not actually the end goal. 
[RA] 
 
5.6.1 REVOLUTIONARY TENDENCIES 
While all activists agreed that change would happen gradually, two rights campaigners expressed 
some ideas about more revolutionary approaches. Both activists engaged or had engaged in direct 
action in the past; reported that it was associated with an adrenaline rush; and used language 
associated with ‘fighting’ against animal cruelty. One activist also mentioned that he was a ‘radiant 
anarchist,’ and the other participant had aimed at a ‘military victory’ [sic.] of animal liberation 
through direct action, in previous activities. This participant also felt that more vegans should 
engage in direct actions to achieve animal liberation.  
 
It’s about that only direct action that you can get involved these days where you actually directly 
save the life of an animal. […] Whereas walking down the street caring a placard saying ‘Ban 
vivisection’ – even if twenty years down the line that works – you don’t actually get the thrill, the 
buzz, the adrenaline that comes from actually saving that […] animal. [RA] 
 
Their revolutionary approach and ideas might relate to the fact that these two activists joined the 
animal protection movement in the 1960s. The 1960s and 1970s were characterised by a wave of 
protest in all social movements (Barker 2008:46). Although other participants also became active 
during that time, they held different views, which might also be related to their lack of anarchistic 
tendencies.  
When confronted with potential negative effects of direct actions, both aforementioned participants 
denied those. One interviewee acknowledged that dialogue might be needed to encourage change. 
Yet, he assumed that dialogue was unlikely to happen and thus, direct actions would need to 
continue. The question arises though, whether their direct actions against certain practices and the 
people involved in them might not contribute to preventing fruitful dialogue in the first place. 
In other social movements, revolutionary approaches achieved change, for example, the civil war in 
the United States which contributed to the end of slavery (Berlin 1992; Vorenberg 2001). However, it 
came at grave costs including death and destruction which are an inevitable part of war. Even if the 
animal protection movement could mobilise enough supporters to trigger a revolution, the question 
remains whether it can be justified to violate fundamental rights to achieve a greater good. 




implemented, and laws based on such a cause might not be obeyed. This is, for example, the case in 
Sweden where illegal hunters are prosecuted but also supported and celebrated by the rural 
population which opposes the law (von Essen et al. 2015). Thus, rights groups potentially could 
impede their own goals by asking for legislation that restricts people too much in their current 
practices. It could cause strong opposition, and continued persistence of those practices, with little 
chance to overcome that opposition.  
 
5.7 CO-OPERATION BETWEEN ORGANISATIONS 
In the past chapters, several disagreements and sources of tensions between different groups were 
described. Ethical and tactical disparities were identified, as well as identity-related differences (see 
chapter six). These discrepancies indeed can affect the willingness of groups to co-operate with each 
other. For example, welfare campaigns focusing on reducing meat consumption through promotion 
of less but higher welfare meat are incompatible with the approach of rights organisations. Rights 
activists inherently disagree with what they often referred to as ‘happy exploitation’: the promotion 
of higher welfare animal products or ‘happy’ meat, eggs or dairy. While they agreed with welfare 
improvements with the aim of reducing suffering, the promotion of ‘better’ animal products would 
further contribute to the commodification and violation of animal rights. Framing would be of 
importance.  
 
It kind of depends on HOW it’s framed. […] If you’re saying this form of animal exploitation isn’t ok 
and really you want to see it gone, but in the meantime, it would be an improvement if certain things 
would change – if you say it in that way – that’s completely different.’ [RA] 
 
Differences in tactical approaches can also prevent collaboration between groups. For example, one 
organisation might want to run a public campaign while another might prefer lobbying away from 
the public eye. Charities need be careful to fulfil their charitable purpose and/or act for public 
benefit. The pursuit of political or non-charitable purposes, and engagement in unlawful actions or 
those against public policies would cost them their charitable status (Charity Commission for 
England and Wales 2013). Tactics are also inevitably linked to reputational risks (also see chapter 
six). Some groups avoid being associated with, for example, direct actions, to avoid endangering 
important relationships with stakeholders. 
Nevertheless, all interviewees agreed that co-operation between organisations also offers benefits. 
Close collaborations, if based on honest communication, helps groups to put their limited resources 




contributes to saving resources. Furthermore, collaborations can increase chances of success 
especially when a campaign seeks legislative or policy change. It can improve credibility and increase 
pressure on governments and stakeholders if groups work in a concerted effort.  
 
I think you do need to work with other organisations to get more credibility, to have access to 
knowledge and resources that you might not have otherwise, to share and learn from each other, to 
give each other support and to have a greater chance of success – particularly when you try to lobby 
the government or something, you need to be working in coalitions then. [RA] 
 
Besides these tensions preventing collaborations or causing them to fail, another eight interrelated 
reasons have been identified that negatively impact co-operation.  
 
(1) LACK OF FOCUS 
The first reason – a lack of focus or shared aim – was frequently mentioned as an important factor, 
caused by activists’ feelings that all issues are important. Participants identified the need for a 
shared objective as the first step for successful collaboration, but felt that agreeing on such would be 
difficult.  
 
My feeling is that very few people are clear on what they’re actually trying to achieve – saying ‘We 
wanna help animals’ is SO broad. What does it even mean? [WA] 
 
(2) LACK OF EFFICIENCY 
The lack of a shared aim also relates to the second difficulty: a lack of efficiency. Some participants 
reported being caught up in ‘endless’ discussion at the expense of engaging in the actual campaign. 
Once the aim is identified, groups need to discuss methods and outcomes, and set deadlines. 
However, some activists reported that, smaller groups especially, sometimes do not adhere to those 
structures, impeding the success of campaigns. A lack of efficiency slows down organisational work, 
leading groups to run campaigns by themselves.  
 
I’ve been to so many alliances and coalitions where you just sit there talking generally around and 







(3) LACK OF IMPACT 
Inadequate focus and efficiency further affect the impact groups or their campaigns will have. A lack 
of professionalism, knowledge about creating change, reputational damage and other reasons can 
reduce the impact of campaigns. This in turn might lead some organisations to refrain from working 
with particular groups.  
 
We can’t spend time working with a group that we don’t think is going to have a big impact in the 
long term; or I think if a group was going to bring the movement into disrepute or anything like that, 
then I don’t think we’d touch it. [WA] 
 
(4) LACK OF HONEST COMMUNICATION 
Some interviewees also reported poor communication as factor negatively affecting collaboration. It 
is also another factor potentially reducing impact. Furthermore, participants mentioned the 
importance of honesty in response to the question about what was needed for successful co-
operation. Honesty might further relate to the building of trust between groups which was also 
pointed out as necessary for collaborations. 
 
Honesty, but also regular updates on what each organisation is doing to avoid overlap or duplication; 
but also, to help each other where you could actually be stronger together. [RA] 
 
(5) LACK OF CONSISTENCY IN ORGANISATIONS 
Reason five concerns a lack of consistency in organisations either of profile and branding, or of 
people. Two activists reported that successful collaborations were based on positive relationships 
with individuals in other organisations. However, a high turnover of employees or volunteers 
negatively impacts co-operation as relationships need to be rebuilt. Equally, inconsistent branding or 
profiles of groups could complicate working together. Collaborative campaigns rely on shared aims 
and compatible messages. Groups that frequently change their profile and subsequently adjust their 
communicated messages tend to be inconsistent in collaborations, according to one activist. 
 
There is so much movement in people or CEOs and other staff members in organisations that will lose 
the continuity and the momentum sometimes. And you build up a great relationship, and people 





I like to see consistency, I like to see a track record of success and an organisation building on that – 
not trying to remake themselves into whatever they think is the current fashion. [WA] 
 
(6) BIG EGOS 
The majority of participants named clashing personalities, dominant characters or ‘big egos’ as the 
most frequent cause for failing collaboration. Some activists would insist on their position and be 
unwilling to compromise.  
 
I think co-operation – it’s all down to personalities. It’s just people getting on with each other. [WA] 
 
People with very big egos or organisations with very big egos who want to eclipse all of the others; or 
who are not sensitive to the needs of the other organisations. [WA] 
 
Big egos, however, not only referred to individual people but also to organisational egos. When 
advertising successes of campaigns, groups can be tempted to neglect the contribution of others in 
their communications, in order to secure and increase their own financial and membership support. 
It goes without saying that this is detrimental to collaborations. 
One activist reported that their campaign was hijacked by a group who had not been working with 
them. The interviewee, however, also mentioned that she would not mind that much if it would help 
animals. Indeed, many participants indicated that credit-taking issues should ideally not affect 
campaigns, as everyone should be working for a greater common good.  
 
There can be concerns about who takes the credit for things because one of the things with a charity 
or with a group is essentially: you got your supporters […]. I mean most of the time it isn’t really a 
problem because ultimately people are all working towards a common good. [RA] 
 
The competitiveness over donations and legacies and income: we would be cautious about sharing 
that information. […] Obviously in some respect they ARE competitors for that type of income – but 







(7) LACK OF FOCUS ON THE GREATER COMMON GOOD93 
The issue of big individual or organisational egos as well as many other disputes in the movement 
eventually might come down to a failure of appreciating the greater common good that all activists 
are working towards.94 Even if groups lose sight of or cannot agree on the greater common good, 
they would still receive the benefits of information and resource sharing as outlined before, which 
they would miss out on when failing to collaborate with other groups.  
 
Making sure that the cause is more important than the organisations because you see all unravel 
where people want their name on this in bigger letters. [WA] 
 
(8) LACK OF LEADERSHIP 
The last reason might be an underlying problem behind all mentioned aspects impeding successful 
collaboration: a lack of leadership. Focus, efficiency, impact, honest communication, organisational 
egos and profile are all to some extent dependent on good leadership. Several activists reported that 
some groups are run less effectively because of hierarchy issues which are also leadership concerns. 
One participant suggested that umbrella organisations would increase the success of collaborations. 
This might also help to overcome leadership issues in partnerships. 
 
They have too big a hierarchy or something, or they’re perhaps just not very well run. [RA] 
 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
Most activists held the opinion that respecting animals and their lives was morally right. They mostly 
agreed that, in an ideal world, humans would not subject animals to suffering and death. Their ideas 
– though not identical – were in many cases similar to abolitionism. In contrast, their tactical 
approaches differed considerably. They agreed that lessening the suffering of animals was 
important, though some campaigns might be more effective in achieving that than others.  
In any case, animal advocacy often requires prolonged struggle, regardless of the type of campaign 
activists are engaged in. There are no strong indicators at our disposal which would help us to decide 
which tactics are more effective or efficient. Most likely – as the participants agreed – the movement 
will need to use all available channels, rather than a single approach, to drive social change forward. 
                                                                 
93 The term ‘greater common good’ was used by interviewees to describe a shared goal of animal advocates to 
help and protect animals. 
94 Taylor (2004:335) also observed that display of commitment to helping animals and alluding to the best 





One participant also acknowledged that this social change might never happen, in which case 
anything that lessened suffering would be all activists could aim for, as part of ‘damage limitation.’ If 
the desired social change, however, can be achieved, it will probably depend on rights groups 
reaching out to the public, and welfare groups reaching out to governments and policy makers. 
These differences of approach and remits might constitute a strength of the movement, as it allows 
different groups to target different audiences. This also constitutes an important counter-argument 







CHAPTER 6: ‘THAT’S NOT WHO I AM’ - IDENTITY AS A DIVIDING ASPECT BETWEEN 
ANIMAL RIGHTS AND WELFARE 
This chapter will focus on the relationship between animal welfare and rights, beyond ethical and 
campaign themes. It will discuss emerging differences, commonalities, and aspects potentially more 
important to the gap between the two approaches. This chapter will explore the main theme of 
identity of animal activists, including its various facets, such as science versus ethics, reputational 
concerns, pragmatism versus idealism, romanticised views versus negativistic views, and a theme 
called the ‘free choice paradigm.’ The chapter will conclude that the gap between animal welfare 
and rights is not necessarily counterproductive, and might even be considered to reinforce the work 
of both sides. 
 
6.1 IDENTIFICATION WITH ORGANISATIONS 
In all interviews, activists expressed strong identification with the ethical and tactical approaches of 
the organisations they worked or volunteered for. Participants frequently reported that their 
decision to work for an organisation was based on approval of its approach. The reputation of a 
group also played a crucial factor in determining whether interviewees would consider working for it 
(see also ‘the reputation issue’), as identification with a group was paramount in this decision. Some 
participants did actively look to work for an organisation, while other interviewees happened to see 
a job advertisement and decided to try their luck, and chance also played a role. In another case, the 
decision to work for either a welfare or a rights group was based on which group would first offer 
the job.  
 
 I could say ‘[another organisation] has a horrible reputation for being the rightsist, the flag waving, 
the real activist.’ And that is an absolute no-no for me personally. That’s not who I am. [WA] 
 
Another important factor involved in decision making was impact or ‘making a difference.’ Activists 
frequently considered having a positive impact through their work (i.e. its effectiveness) as being 
their major motivator to work or volunteer for a group. For some interviewees, impact depended on 
the size of the organisation; for others on being able to lobby; or on being able to save the lives of 
animals through direct actions. Some participants also mentioned the importance of being able to 
put one’s skills to their best use. Activists – like any other humans – have different capabilities and 
strengths, and having an impact will also depend on using those strengths in the right activity. This is 
another argument against abolitionist campaigns only, as not all activists will do equally well in 





I didn’t really want to work anywhere else ‘cause I found we were actually effective and [inaudible] 
this is the organisation that actually does get stuff changed, and does achieve change for animals. 
[WA] 
 
Identification with an organisation can both be traced back to previous (work/campaigning) 
experiences of interviewees but also their current involvement in their organisation. Scientific 
degrees sometimes laid the foundation for several welfare participants to work for welfare groups 
(see ‘Science versus ethics’). In contrast, two rights campaigners and the welfare activist who 
identified with rights reported that they had been involved in the human rights and anti-apartheid 
movement. As animal rights philosophies tend to use similar arguments to human rights theories, it 
might be an easier leap for those activists to also advocate animal rights. Also Goodwin and Jasper 
(2015:216) argue that biographical aspects such as experiences, memories, cultural understanding 
and identities influence an activist’s approach. 
 
Before I got involved in animal rights […] I was involved in the anti-apartheid movement. So, that 
really struck a chord in me. [WA identifying with animal rights] 
 
Their approach very much matched my own sort of ethics and ways of doing things; and it was very 
much in line with the previous sorts of campaign work I’ve been doing as well in a different sort of 
area. [RA] 
 
Yet, working for an organisation, and experiences associated with that, also appear to shape the 
views of activists. One example was given earlier of a welfare activist reporting that slaughter with 
little suffering was possible while a rights campaigner was negating this viewpoint. Similarly, rights 
interviewees reported that they witnessed cruelty on a regular basis while some welfare participants 
focused more on ignorance as common issue. Commitments, including moral ones, and experiences 
during advocacy activities might shape an activist’s perception of how abundant and severe cruelty 
is. This might also explain why welfare participants would put more emphasis on the need for 
education while rights activists asked for the cessation of practices they perceived as cruel.   
 





Education is the biggest issue because there is a great deal of ignorance out there. I don’t see animal 
cruelty that often. [WA] 
 
6.1.1 THE ANIMAL PROTECTION CONUNDRUM 
A strong identification with an organisation and/or an approach, however, can also lead to strong 
convictions which might prevent activists from positively impacting on animals. On the one hand, 
some participants felt that other organisations were engaging in important work. For example, rights 
activists acknowledged the need to reduce the suffering of animals through welfare reform. On the 
other hand, these interviewees stated that they would not want to work for those organisations as 
they disagreed with the underlying ethical beliefs. One rights activist mentioned that he would 
rather not work in animal protection than work for a welfare group. Similarly, one welfare 
participant would not want to work for a group with which her beliefs did not align completely.  
 
I would find it very difficult to work – PERSONALLY, on a personal level – for an organisation that was 
campaigning for animals to be treated better, but killing them. […] I’d rather do this off my own back 
and work for something completely unrelated to animals or that type of thing, rather than work for 
an organisation that was promoting what I don’t believe in basically. [RA] 
 
My values are very important to me and I wanna work with an organisation, that’s values are exactly 
aligned with mine. […] With even on one animal issue – even if I’m not working on that issue but my 
colleagues are – I have a hard time working for an organisation who then on a different issue I’m 
completely against. [WA] 
 
It seems to be almost a conundrum that activists who are dedicated to helping animals would 
choose to not support everything that aims at reducing their suffering and the number of deaths. It 
might seem odd that some rights activists disagree with a welfare approach despite acknowledging 
its potential to reduce suffering. It is equally odd that some welfare activists do not support 
vegetarianism or veganism despite its potential effectiveness in reducing suffering and the number 
of deaths. The solution to this conundrum might partially lie in the importance of identity in 
activism.95 It is about who those activists identify with – as either a welfare or a rights person – and 
all the associations (and reputations) that come with this (see further below).  
                                                                 
95 In many cases, campaigners will justify such inconsistencies by referring to, for example, the earlier mentioned 
risk of complacency in welfare campaigns; or lacking impact of animal rights activism due to its idealism. 
However, as will be demonstrated in chapter nine, those arguments do not withstand scrutiny as they might be 





6.2 SCIENCE VERSUS ETHICS 
One emerging difference between animal welfare and rights was a theme of science versus ethics 
and/or emotions. Garner (1993:208) also pointed to this theme when he described welfare groups 
as relying more heavily on animal welfare science. Indeed, welfare activists in several cases 
emphasised the importance of scientific evidence and considered it a cornerstone of their work. 
Welfare campaigning was associated with science, objectivity and professionalism in contrast to 
rights activism being overly focused on ethics and/or emotions,96 and on getting attention.  
 
Animal welfare is very important because this organisation produces its position based on the 
scientific facts and the information. We do not produce our position based on emotions and ethics 
and that’s the main difference between the two. [WA] 
 
Two interviewees emphasised that animal welfare as a science would translate directly into animal 
protection; and one contrasted it against the ethical arguments brought forward by animal rights 
groups. The latter also felt that rights campaigners tend to raise arguments contradicting scientific 
evidence, such as the quote from a rights activist stating that ‘every companion animal effectively is 
a captive animal.’ In contrast, the welfare participant mentioned that scientific studies would show 
that dogs were happier in company of humans, and thus, it would be wrong to argue against the 
keeping of dogs. However, by separating science and ethics, they failed to see the normative aspects 
that are part of their work. There is a difference between asking how much stress an animal 
experiences, and how much stress we should inflict on animals (Rollin 2015). Science alone cannot 
answer the latter.  
 
As soon as you’ve got the evidence for a particular behaviour, or the animals feel in this particular 
way, there is no further case to answer. There is your evidence and here is how your behaviour 
should change to build that into what you do. [WA] 
 
There are several potential reasons why welfare activists expressed a greater importance of science 
as a foundation for animal protection. Firstly, five participants stated that they had an academic 
                                                                 
activism. Hence, a general and dogmatic rejection of either approach, as sometimes occurs, could potentially be 
explained based on aspects concerning identity.  
96 The association of activists as being in grip of their emotions, to the extent of behaving irrationally, could 
potentially be traced back to scholars studying social movements up until the 1960s, who – as part of the elite 





interest, a background, or a degree in animal welfare science, animal behaviour, or conservation. 
Another interviewee used to work in a governmental department related to animal welfare. Their 
previous studies or work related to animal welfare science, animal behaviour or conservation was 
also mentioned as providing a stepping stone into animal protection. In contrast, only two rights 
activists indicated a scientific background or degree, which only one of those participants considered 
important to her career. This interviewee also had previously worked for welfare organisations.  
Secondly, welfare groups tend to work primarily with industry and legislative bodies; the latter 
especially use an evidence-based approach to support decision-making. Merely ethical arguments do 
not achieve the same end, according to some campaigners. Furthermore, scientific evidence was 
associated with credibility, which was contrasted to trying to attract public attention, a tactic more 
often used by rights organisations. 
 
That I think is the biggest danger that animal rights people have: is that as we’re moving in this 
direction on everything being much more scientific and factual, they’re still in this direction saying, 
‘It’s all about the media and making fun of things.’ [WA] 
 
Thirdly, participants reported that welfare science helped improved the credibility of organisations’ 
work. While animal activism was sometimes associated with sentimentality and being an ‘animal 
lover,’ scientific evidence directly counteracted those associations.  
 
Animal welfare has gone from being: ‘Oh, this is just about cute animals,’ into being a science and 
that’s really important. [WA] 
 
6.3 THE REPUTATION ISSUE 
Another reason for welfare organisations to separate their work from rights groups, and for welfare 
advocates to refrain from engaging in rights activism, is its negative reputation. Words such as 
‘extremist,’ ‘militant,’ ‘harmful to the movement,’ ‘aggressive,’ ‘angry,’ ‘loud,’ ‘crazy,’ ‘evangelical,’ 
and as ‘demonising others,’ have been used to describe the (public) image that comes with rights 
activism.97 While they agreed that this image stemmed from primarily past activities of groups on 
the fringe of the movement, they were worried about its continued persistence and its alienating 
effects.  
 
                                                                 
97 This description of rights campaigners refers to what interviewees believed to be the public perception of 
animal rights. A minority of welfare interviewees also partially seemed to believe that this description would 




6.3.1 ASSOCIATION WITH EXTREMISM AND VIOLENCE 
A particularly strong association became apparent between animal rights and extremism, which 
welfare participants considered particularly alienating. This association with extremism might be 
related to direct actions involving violence towards people and the subsequent negative media 
coverage, despite these incidents being rare (similar observations were made by Jasper and Nelkin 
1992:34; Taylor 2004:322; Munro 2005). Rescuing was also mentioned in one case as ‘more militant’ 
– probably as it involves direct action and property theft (as animals are regarded as property under 
the law). However, as one interviewee suggested, any campaign promoting more progressive views 
puts welfare organisations at risk of losing credibility and of being associated with the negativity 
around animal rights.  
 
You start talking about rights and you’re not even in the room, because the word itself carries so 
much baggage. [WA] 
 
They’ve [a welfare organisation] done a few things that are, like, I think a little bit more extreme – 
not illegal by any means; but, like a little bit more on the extreme side. And whenever they do that 
I’ve noticed there is a bit of a backlash towards them. [WA] 
 
An association with extremism, however, is not necessarily related to violent tactics alone, but also 
to a certain aggressiveness and unpleasantness associated with rights activism. Three welfare 
participants contrasted their approach to animal rights by pointing out that it should be about calm 
conversation rather than ‘shouting and screaming.’ Conversely, aggressive tactics might create an 
impression of violence, even if that violence is not physical. This might be particularly the case if an 
activist’s approach appears to be distanced and indifferent to human concerns and even suffering. 
One welfare participant was particularly concerned about the ‘coldness’ of abolitionist supporters. 
 
They were talking about quite radical actions – sort of burning trucks and farms and things. And I 
said: ‘How can you do that?’ […] They’re just so COLD about it. It’s like it doesn’t matter. […] So that 
very kind of cold intellectual stuff REALLY puts me off. [WA] 
 
Alternatively, as two rights interviewees pointed out, anti-oppression symbols, sometimes worn by 
activists, could alienate the public as these symbols might be associated with fringe groups. Rights 
interviewees also acknowledged this negative association and stressed the importance of being 





Some of the kind of more violence, anti-oppression symbols that you see also in the human rights 
movement are used in animal rights; and most people in the mainstream – the public don’t find that 
appealing. They find that off-putting. And that’s still very much the case in the UK that the 
mainstream see animal rights activists as maybe aggressive, emotional, irrational. [RA] 
 
However, several participants across welfare and rights pointed out that this association – as well as 
the distinction between welfare and rights – was also perpetuated by the media and by ‘opponents.’ 
Some interviewees stated that opponents of animal rights would use the term to defame activists by 
invoking the association with violence and extremism (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011). Others 
reported that the media would reinforce the bias as items about violence and extremism would 
attract more readers (cf. Munro 2005).98  
 
The people that I’m employed by is an animal welfare group and they don’t like to be termed animal 
rights group. Our opponents use it as they slur against our organisation. [WA] 
 
Sometimes you almost feel it’s a conspiracy in the media. I think more often than not, it’s lazy 
journalism, that they have a scenario they want to present and they want sensation as well. [RA] 
 
6.3.2 ASSOCIATION WITH DEMONIZATION AND PATRONISATION 
Another association linked to extremism and violence, although slightly different, was a connection 
to demonization. Several welfare interviewees pointed out that sometimes rights campaigners tend 
to demonise or condemn people who engage in behaviour deemed morally incorrect (cf. Jasper and 
Nelkin 1992:120 who also observed dehumanisation of scientists in animal rights publications). This 
association might be related to incidents such as rights activists shouting, ‘Shame on you’ at adults 
and children eating at a McDonalds (as reported by two rights participants). Moreover, some rights 
campaigners expressed thoughts and used language that further fuelled an impression of 
demonization. Some described the people involved in practices causing suffering as ‘animal abusers,’ 
deviant and in one case even mentally disturbed.  
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‘tendency for people who are highly involved in an issue to see news coverage of that issues as biased, […] 




They must be mentally ill. That’s the only explanation for their behaviour. Their behaviour is so 
aberrant. How can anybody derive pleasure from watching the slow painful death of another 
sentient being? [on hunting with hounds] [RA] 
 
A minority of rights activists, mostly those previously or currently engaged in direct actions, also 
used words such as ‘opponents,’ ‘enemy,’ ‘people on the other side,’ or ‘being in the front line.’ This 
language gave an impression of war, and campaigners fighting against society or some of its people 
(Munro 2005:79–80 made a similar observation in his interviews with animal activists). Although 
activists agreed that demonising people who consume animal products was counterproductive to 
educating them about veganism, they blamed people in the industry instead.99 
 
I think there’s a difference between people that are leaders of animal abuse and people that are 
followers. You can’t blame those people equally, and I’m not saying that [inaudible] meat eaters for 
years are innocent but I’d say that the guilty people are the people who encourage other people to 
eat meat. […] They’re the demons, not ordinary people. [RA] 
 
Conversely, demonization was also somewhat associated with a patronising approach of some 
animal rights activists. For example, one participant described rights groups as being evangelical; 
another felt that they would not accept other beliefs, causing this activist not to want to work for 
them. This association also became apparent when welfare interviewees contrasted their belief of 
people being caring rather than cruel, their aim of working with stakeholders rather than against 
them, and being humble, to opposite approaches, in particular the rights approach.  
 
We’ve all got to be humble enough to recognise that the majority of these people that do these 
things and test on these animals are not innately cruel. […] My view is we need to change the 
infrastructure, not demonise the people. [WA] 
 
Moreover, one welfare participant reported that a patronising approach, and ‘ghastly’ behaviour 
had prevented her from changing her beliefs and behaviours (compare to chapter five, section 
‘Abolitionist campaigning’). The problem of contesting someone’s view or behaviour, especially in an 
unpleasant way (as unfortunately would happen), leading to a defensive reaction and rejection of 
the cause, was also acknowledged by rights interviewees. 
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Even if you say the same things but you don’t try to find that common ground – you kind of stick to 
your guns a lot – it just doesn’t help. It doesn’t win people over, and that is so important. That is 
MORE important than whether you’re right or not. [RA] 
 
6.3.3 THE REPUTATION OF WELFARE ACTIVISM 
While much has been said about welfare activists distancing themselves from animal rights based on 
its reputation, the converse also warrants a few words. Although less prevalent, an impression 
emerged that welfare activism could be associated with a lack of care for the suffering and lives of 
animals. While no rights participant directly expressed this association, some quotes hinted at such 
an image. One interviewee mentioned that some welfare activists are speciesist; another that they 
sometimes would be more interested in pursuing political careers. One welfare participant also 
pointed out that other activists would sometimes ‘creep into relationships with industry,’ would 
adopt their language, and be persuaded and influenced by them. Indeed, another welfare 
campaigner used the word ‘product’ to talk about an animal, hinting at a certain degree of 
commodification which has been criticised in the interviews. However, it should be noted that this 
participant might have adopted those words to resonate with the audiences he usually talks too, and 
to achieve a certain effect (see quote below).  
 
They’re people interested in pursuing political careers – don’t necessarily have much of an interest in 
animals. [WA identifying with animal rights] 
 
You gonna end up with a product which is probably diseased, probably gonna cost you a lot of money 
at the vets and probably will die. So that’s when people then start to think about these things. [WA] 
 
6.4 PRAGMATISM VERSUS IDEALISM 
Another important theme related to identity was a tension between pragmatism and idealism. This 
tension became apparent within some activists who felt that there was a difference between ‘the 
ideal world and the real world.’ In a similar manner, two activists mentioned that there was a 
difference between ethics and tactics. 
 





Ethical ideas were considered important but difficult to implement. Hence, tactical goals would need 
to divert from ideal ethical aims to be successful. Both welfare and rights participants considered 
that to be the case but to varying degrees.  
In particular, welfare activists exhibited strong pragmatism in their approach to campaigning in 
various ways. One strong indicator was the recurring expression that welfare improvements 
positively affect the lives of animals despite not being ideal. Furthermore, it would be better to 
improve the lives of animals on a large scale, rather than campaigning for veganism and only 
affecting a few animals by convincing a small number of people to adopt a plant-based lifestyle. 
 
96% of the country eats meat, so therefore you cannot ignore 96%. You have to raise the standards 
for those people that are eating meat. [WA] 
 
It doesn’t make any difference whether I approve of zoos or not. That’s neither here nor there, if I can 
help them improve things. [WA] 
 
Moreover, they tended to focus on ‘winnable causes,’ and on working with audiences and with 
stakeholders to achieve change. Pragmatism could also be underlying theme in this quote 
highlighting the importance of campaign effectiveness: ‘then you need to look at how quickly you can 
achieve change which tends to be around government.’ This pragmatism might also be linked to the 
greater flexibility of (ethical) beliefs held by welfare participants. For example, the quote below 
highlights the flexibility of the interviewee’s beliefs and constitutes a strong contrast to the beliefs of 
several rights participants who negated any need for people to eat meat.  
 
I used to think that nobody needs to eat meat. I used to believe that very strongly. I’m not so sure. It 
may be that some people have a biological need to eat meat. I’m OPEN on that issue. [WA] 
 
Rights activists expressed stronger idealism in their ethical and tactical approaches which 
contributes to the animal protection conundrum being seemingly more prevalent within rights 
activists.100 Strong idealists might be more likely to refrain from supporting welfare improvements as 
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they do not fully tackle animal rights goals. Nevertheless, rights interviewees acknowledged ‘moral 
complexities’ and grey areas.  
More pragmatism, however, was displayed by rights campaigners with regard to tactical approaches, 
such as making veganism ‘an achievable goal’ by not asking people to go vegan immediately. They 
also expressed pragmatic ideas on campaigning, or on how human behaviour change is achieved. 
One activist also mentioned that strong idealism makes it more difficult to engage with people. 
 
It is in an ideal world that humans and animals would live side by side. […] BUT, we’re living in an 
imperfect world, and sometimes trying to implement perfect rules on an imperfect world is not 
helpful. [RA] 
 
In contrast, abolitionism was considered too idealistic, too unrealistic, potentially extreme, and as 
the opposite to pragmatism by most interviewees. Some participants described abolitionism as 
thinking in terms of ‘either-or,’ ‘black and white’ or ‘binary.’ Another interviewee pointed out that 
Francione’s arguments simplify things ‘to the point of abstraction’ which the participant considered 
wrong. While the campaigner agreed that ethically all (sentient) beings should be considered as 
equals, campaigns on, for example, wild animals would need to be run differently to campaigns on 
farmed animals in order to be successful.  
 
There is this whole movement that everyone should be vegan from now and it’s on the extreme side – 
I don’t even want to use the word extreme – the ideal side of where we wanna be. But I don’t think 
it’s particularly realistic. [RA] 
 
While ethical beliefs did not translate directly into particular tactical approaches, as for example 
welfare campaigners would hold views closely related to animal rights, idealism or the lack thereof 
(i.e. pragmatism) could potentially explain the connection between the two. It appears that an 
activist’s idealism or pragmatism is decisive for how they put their ethical beliefs into action.  
 
6.4.1 PURITY VERSUS INCLUSIVENESS 
Strong idealism might also be associated with an aim for purity, i.e. people trying to live up to their 
ideals. Some people choosing a vegan lifestyle will go to great lengths to avoid any animal products, 
potentially even including avoidance of any indirect support of the ‘animal industry’ (for example by 
not eating in restaurants that also serve meat) (cf. Jacobsson and Lindblom 2012:44, 51–52). None of 




Welfare participants especially stated that they were not ‘pure.’ Instead they emphasised hypocrisy 
as a common human fault that they were guilty of. Moreover, as previously pointed out, some 
deemed it impossible to live up to ideals as the infrastructure would not allow people to do so.  
 
When people are particularly vocal about their particular stance I get concerned that it’s impossible 
for one person to be completely virtuous. It’s impossible. [RA] 
 
Some participants also felt that idealism and purity would negatively affect the inclusiveness of the 
movement, leading to competitiveness (cf. Jacobsson and Lindblom 2012:49) and rejection of those 
not living up to the ideal (for a similar observation see Greenebaum 2009:290). One participant 
compared striving for purity to a religious approach, which also has been identified in the literature 
as such (e.g. Jacobsson and Lindblom 2012:52). For example, Wenk et al. (2000) describe animal 
rights activism as a functional religion with separate communities and cult as indicators, including 
the striving for purity. 
 
I think they can be a bit polarising. They make people feel bad if you’re NOT one of us and I think 
that’s not the way to go. [WA] 
 
Occasionally you go to a meeting where it’s almost like a competition: ‘I’m a better vegan than you 
are.’ I don’t think it helps the cause. I think personally you can do it but you don’t have to keep 
banging the drum. It’s like a very religious person. [WA] 
 
Animal activism and veganism, if focused on idealism and purity, can run the risk of alienating 
people. Jacobsson and Lindblom (2012:49) also argue that being conceived of as moral giant can 
prevent people from identifying sufficiently with activists, making it more difficult to convince 
people of one’s cause. It is then not only about consumer choice but community membership and 
identity. In particular minority groupings define themselves in comparison and in contrast to 
mainstream groups, leading them to be more hostile to those who are similar but not quite like 
them (for example, vegans towards vegetarians) (Kateman 2017). Some rights campaigners also 
acknowledged issues around inclusiveness and emphasised its importance. 
 
What I liked about [this organisation] was: it was very inclusive. It wasn’t about the secret society for 
vegans. […] It was about taking that out to other people and showing them why it would be good for 





6.5 ROMANTICISED VIEW VERSUS NEGATIVISTIC VIEW101 
Another difference that emerged between participants, in relation to the identity theme, concerned 
romanticised and negativistic views of human-animal interactions. Particularly welfare but also rights 
interviewees expressed romanticised ideal world visions of humans and animals living together in 
harmony and sharing the planet. In their vision, humans and animals would not live separately but in 
‘symbiosis.’ One participant mentioned that this could involve a benign or ‘natural’ form of farming. 
For example, eggs from chicken could be used, but the animals would not be slaughtered and might 
only be consumed after dying a natural death.  
 
I think people should regain the kind of awe and respect for animals and nature like the ancient 
traditions. [WA] 
 
Some (non-abolitionist) rights activists could potentially approve of such farming if the animals were 
not suffering and were not killed. However, some rights participants felt that farming was too 
business driven to ever fully acknowledge the animals’ needs (cf. Foer 2010:220). They also more 
frequently mentioned that practices would involve consciously inflicting cruelty on animals, and 
used the term ‘animal abusers’ to describe people engaged in such practices. In contrast, welfare 
participants emphasised that people working in industries that use animals were not ‘innately cruel.’ 
Generally, an impression emerged that some rights activists hold a more negative view of people as 
being cruel or uncaring. In contrast, welfare campaigners – as one pointed out – would hold people 
in higher regard. This impression also derived from demonising language used by some rights 
campaigners, but more so from descriptions of rights campaigners by welfare participants. 
 
I think a lot of them seem to have a very low view of people. I’ve got a very high view of people and I 
think we build on the best. Don’t constantly criticise people and make them feel bad. [WA] 
 
Similarly, a minority of interviewees held a negativistic view more generally about human-animal 
interactions. They believed that human interactions or interference with animals usually negatively 
affect animals and thus, should be avoided.  
 
                                                                 
101 The word ‘view’ here refers to a tendency of describing human-animal relationships in a particular way; i.e. 





I think the less you interfere with animals, the better really. I think ultimately human interference 
generally doesn’t end well for the animals. [RA] 
 
One welfare participant also described the philosophical animal rights position to be based on the 
assumption that animals never benefited from their interactions with humans. While this could 
potentially be attributed to the abolitionist position, not all animal rights theories assume that all 
human-animal interactions necessarily violate animal rights (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011; 
Cochrane 2012; Garner 2013). 
 
From a rights perspective […] there is no positive interaction that animals benefit from […]. So 
therefore, they have the right to be left to their own devices, to live the life that they would ordinarily 
live: natural, in the wild, unaffected by us. [WA] 
 
Activists holding romanticised ideal visions of human-animal interactions might be more likely to 
adopt a welfare or a weak rights approach to work towards that vision. Campaigners who hold more 
negativistic views about our interactions with animals might adopt a pragmatic abolitionist position. 
The latter seem to feel, that in order to not violate animal rights, total abolition would be the only 
solution, despite not all interactions necessarily being harmful or inherently wrong. The mere risk of 
animal suffering seems to be enough to pursue abolition rather than reform. 
 
6.6 THE FREE CHOICE PARADIGM  
The last theme and rather subtle difference between welfare and rights activists was identified as 
the ‘free choice paradigm,’ referring to rights advocates expressing greater empowerment in making 
ethical decisions and acting based on them, as compared to welfare interviewees. This included a 
tendency of rights campaigners to view animal issues as less ethically complex. This theme became 
apparent when rights activists framed veganism as a choice and focused on the solution of people 
having to ‘choose’ to adopt veganism because of the moral imperative. In contrast, some welfare 
participants reported a lack of empowerment, feeling conflicted about their choices and having to 
regularly re-evaluate their viewpoints in the light of new evidence or new situations.  
 
It was that kind of understanding that all animals suffer and that there is a great deal of suffering 
that is because of the hands of human beings. So, I had the power to do something about it, so I 





You CHOOSE to partake in animal suffering and that in itself is problematic. [RA] 
 
Yes, aware of it [farmed animal issues] BUT because there is not an awful lot I personally can do 
about it. [WA] 
 
It’s a constant battle with doing what you do best to live your life. We’re all making our own path 
and you need to make the decisions that make the most sense to you. [WA] 
 
While there certainly is an element of choice in people’s diets, a focus on the choice aspect alone 
runs the risk of neglecting powerful psychological mechanisms behind the activity of eating (animal 
products). It neglects the learning processes, cultural aspects and other influences that surround and 
impact peoples’ dietary choices (e.g. Shatenstein and Ghadirian 1998; Gibson and Brunstrom 2007; 
Just et al. 2007). Choice assumes that people behave fully rationally and that they will change their 
behaviour if they are better informed. Yet, humans are often led in their decisions by heuristics and 
other psychological mechanisms, for example, trying to resolve cognitive dissonance (e.g. Simon 
1956; Festinger 1957; Boudry et al. 2015). Moreover, a focus on choice also runs the risk of ignoring 
the lack of available plant-based foods in some areas. Also Light and McGee (1998:12) argue that 
probably very few acts are ‘unshaped by the biological and social structures of personality and 
temperament, upbringing, and recent social, emotional, economic, and physical situations.’ Thus, a 
‘choice’ approach might overlook that there are relevant differences between groups, families, 
identities and characters. Also one welfare participant pointed out the struggles of people who do 
not have the knowledge and the economic power to make better choices. Changes that might seem 
easy for some people are not necessarily as easy for other demographics. For some activists, the 
switch to vegetarianism and/or veganism was easy, especially if they considered themselves ‘natural 
vegetarians/vegans’ (indicating a dislike of the idea of meat and killing animals for meat, starting at 
an early age). In contrast, other people might consider it difficult to change – potentially so difficult 
that they dismiss it all together. 
 
I was always probably kind of a natural vegetarian or stroke vegan. When I was younger – because I 
didn’t like meat – and I refused to eat meat. [RA] 
 
We’re lucky in the Western world to have both choices […] but that isn’t going to affect the young 




the cheapest meat she can, so that she can feed her family. […] As far as she’s concerned she’s being 
a good mum. That’s very very sexist and stereotypical but this is the kind of thing. [WA] 
 
All of this is not to say that some rights activists do not acknowledge those pressures, psychological 
mechanisms, or the fact that switching to a plant-based lifestyle means a big change for some 
people. Several participants were, in fact, strongly aware of these issues.  
 
That person who’s shopping in the supermarket and has got two kids hanging of their arms 
screaming, and they’re counting their pennies: they got other worries in their lives. How do I get 
through to that person to make them realise, they can make the change without having a massive 
impact on their life? [RA] 
 
This awareness might have led to an approach countering attempts at purity, in contrast to the 
abolitionist position that people are either vegan or not, with only the former being acceptable (e.g. 
Leenaert 2016). This approach is probably best summarised in a statement attributed to Jack Norris 
(president of the group Vegan Outreach): ‘People say “I’d go vegan but I can’t give up cheese.” Then 
go vegan except for cheese!’ (Mattern 2015; Cuberail 2016). This is fuelled by the underlying 
pragmatic belief that some change – even if it is not what activists are ultimately aiming for – can 
still have a positive impact on the lives of animals.  
 
6.7 CONCLUSION 
The preceding chapters (four to six) presented the variety of differences, disagreements but also 
commonalities, between activists from various organisations. It is apparent that ethically many 
activists hold views closer to each other than expected. All reported the suffering of animals as a 
problem that humans ought to prevent. A majority also agreed that the killing of animals for most 
purposes was ethically wrong, except for euthanasia and a strongly justified need (e.g. in self-
defence).  
While individuals often held similar views, differences between welfare and rights organisations 
arise from the profiles of organisation and their campaigns. Welfare and rights organisations speak 
out against animal suffering and needless killing, although they differ in what they consider 
needless. Moreover, welfare groups adopt a less confrontational approach as they see a need to 
resonate with mainstream opinions, and are wary of being associated with extremism or violence, 
which could negatively influence their relationships with stakeholders such as government or 




do so, they need to catch the attention of (social) media. Controversial statements and actions 
facilitate that. On top of these differences, identity-related factors, such as a scientific versus an 
ethical approach, or idealism versus pragmatism, seem to play a much greater role in determining 
what kind of approach and campaign an activist will engage in.  
Despite all these difficulties, organisations can work together successfully, as some interviewees 
reported. Two participants pointed out that covert collaborations between groups might happen 
more frequently; especially between more conservative and progressive groups that do not want to 
be seen working together publicly. 
 
We would say behind the scenes: ‘Oh we can’t do that – we can’t even be associated with it. You do 
that, we’ll do this. That’s fine for us and we’ll give money for this.’ And then the other organisations 
say: ‘Ok, I’ll do that.’ I may or may not personally agree or disagree but it’s not right for our 
organisation to be seen, to be involved in that. That’s very healthy dialogue. [WA] 
 
Moreover, if organisations struggle to work together, other ways of loose co-operation can be 
sought. The badger cull campaigns were frequently proposed as a good example. Groups were 
working as ‘an armada of organisations’ for a shared goal but tackling the issue from different angles 
and with different messages. This could also mean to ‘agree to disagree’ but to nevertheless support 
each other. Alternatively, one participant suggested that groups should collaborate by dividing work. 
The interviewee gave an example of shelters often being in close geographical proximity to each 
other, while no shelters were available in other areas in the UK. Proximity (both geographical and of 
remit) would also increase competition for income and donations. 
In any case, interviewees deemed honesty, communication, information sharing, respect, openness, 
trust, understanding, and most importantly willingness to compromise, as vital to successful co-
operation. Two participants pointed out that compromise would not necessarily mean that the 
overall ethos of an organisation was compromised. A rights organisation could, for example, support 
reform of a farming practice aiming to reduce the suffering of animals, while also clearly stating that 
eventually they would like to see farming come to an end. 
 
 I think compromise is not a bad thing but I think there needs to be a line in the sand. […] You’re not 
compromising your positions and you’re not agreeing to work with them unless they understand that 





Whatever collaborative approach organisations choose, respectful dialogue is important to a 
successful partnership. However, if groups meet irreconcilable differences and choose to terminate 
collaborations, they should refrain from public critique, as some interviewees emphasised.  
 
The people who criticise – especially when it’s publicly – have broken a number one rule which is: let’s 
all work together! [WA] 
 
Accepting different approaches is not just important to create unity within the movement but is 
necessary for its success. The various organisations each have their own remit, their individual 
strengths, their own target audiences and tailored messages for those audiences. A ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
solution as proposed by abolitionism is unlikely to succeed on its own. Different organisations can 
tackle issues from different angles, with individual approaches and messages that will appeal to 
varying degree to particular sectors of society. Several interviewees also noted that campaigns they 
might not feel comfortable with could potentially appeal to a different audience.  
 
I think there is space for different organisations within this kind of movement because different ways 
of doing things appeal to different people. Similarly, we also tackle different issues. [RA] 
 
I might look at them sometimes and just think that’s counterproductive. I might think that, but 
maybe they’ve reached some people that I wouldn’t reach. [WA] 
 
Welfare organisations have the advantage of being able to more easily outreach to stakeholders 
such as the industry, government or policy makers, but also those sectors of the public that feel 
alienated by animal rights. While this might limit their outspokenness, it is a valuable approach for 
achieving incremental change. Welfare campaigns can raise awareness for those audiences by using 
less controversial and less challenging messages. Even educational work that might not directly seem 
to contribute to the greater animal cause can sensitize people to the needs of animals.  
 
It gets people thinking about animals in terms of their own welfare and their own individuality rather 
than being commodities that you can treat however you want. [RA] 
 
The question remains though whether easily acceptable, non-challenging campaigns alone will 
suffice to drive the development of society into a new direction. This might be the role of animal 




welfare interviewees reported that rights activism was ‘airing’ the ethical arguments and paving the 
way for welfare reforms. 
 
I do often wonder whether or not we have to thank them for laying the foundation, that we can 
distance ourselves from their practices but get things done on an argument that they’ve raised 
awareness for. [WA] 
 
Furthermore, welfare participants mentioned the provision of information on diets, exposure of 
cruel practices, and being able to use tactics charities cannot use as positive features of work done 
by rights organisations (which are not registered charities). Two participants also pointed out that 
more conservative groups could engage in lobbying of industry and government and reward good 
practices, while more radical groups would be able to run negative publicity campaigns against 
companies which did not improve their practices.  
While some participants certainly felt that there was a difference between rights and welfare 
approaches, others emphasised their closeness. The last chapters (four to six) highlighted the 
various overlaps in beliefs between them. They also tried to explain the reasons behind dividing 
factors, which are often based on tactical issues concerning remit and target audiences. Animal 
protection activism certainly is a spectrum, if not a complex web of different positions. As such, it 









PART III  




The divisions between animal rights and animal welfare advocates appear to be significant for some 
(Crump 2010; Fur Commission USA 2011; Francione 2016; Animal Welfare Council 2017).102 In the 
three previous chapters, differences have been discussed with regards to ethical opinions, 
campaigning strategies and tactics, and factors, such as identity, which cause division on an 
interpersonal level. Addressing the latter is beyond the scope of this thesis and what an ethical 
framework can resolve. Instead, this chapter and the next will focus on overcoming ethical 
disagreements.  
The interviews with activists have inspired the development of this chapter in at least three 
important ways. Firstly, they have established a need for open deliberation in order to find common 
ground, rather than the provision of ultimate answers. Secondly, they have highlighted the 
requirement to balance conflicting interests and values but within set boundaries. Thirdly, they have 
called for increased protection of animal wellbeing. Hence, the proposed approach does not aim to 
settle all ethical matters concerning our relationships with animals; rather it seeks to establish a 
small number of shared premises and principles guiding deliberations.  
The first part of this chapter will argue in favour of equal moral standing between humans and other 
sentient animals regarding their claims to wellbeing and flourishing. Initially this chapter will review 
and reject arguments claiming that animals do not have equal moral standing (or none at all) as they 
lack important capabilities that humans possess. Secondly, theories will be reviewed that claim that, 
while they might have some moral standing because they do share important characteristics, their 
lives are still of less value (i.e. their deaths do not matter as much) because, for example, they 
possess those characteristics to a lesser degree. Those arguments will also be rejected; instead it will 
be concluded that comparing moral standing and the value of life between different sentient species 
is difficult, if not impossible. Of course, the absence of fruitful attempts to devise such a hierarchy is 
not evidence of it being impossible. However, the chapter will argue that, at this point in time, it can 
be reasonably assumed that at least the claim to not have suffering and death inflicted by other 
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moral agents is to be considered of equal significance.103 These might not be the only claims of equal 
significance; however, they are the most crucial ones for flourishing, and the least contestable ones.  
Having accepted these premises, it follows that it would be unjust to apply unequal consideration if 
claims have equal moral weight. The principle of justice usually states that the similar should not 
only be considered the same but also treated the same (DeGrazia 1996:50; Regan 2004 [1983]:128; 
Wise 2005:30), and this is prima facie accepted within the framework being developed here. 
However, in the second part of the chapter, attention will be paid to a recurring theme of the 
interviews of living in a non-ideal world, in which conflicts between humans and animals concerning 
fundamental claims to wellbeing are inevitable. It will be argued that some human-animal conflicts 
constitute moral tragedies, meaning that the realisation of one claim necessarily comes at the 
expense of not fulfilling another. Chapter nine proposes the principle of proportionality as a means 
to finding the most just solution for such conflicts. 
However, the last part of this chapter will take the issue of ethical theories in a non-ideal world one 
step further. It will propose that following or aiming to introduce current ideal ethic theories into 
real-world practices is neither feasible nor achievable. This is the case as human-animal moral 
tragedies are part of a ‘moral storm’ (cf. Gardiner 2011) surrounding our interactions with animals. 
The moral storm leaves us vulnerable to moral corruption – this moral corruption, linked to strong 
psychological barriers, is a hindrance to humans’ ability to behave fully ethically towards animals. 
Hence, this needs to be taken into account in a non-ideal theory of animal ethics that makes some 
concession to anthropocentrism. Those concessions do not mean that infringing another animal’s 
claims is any less wrong. However, it allows animal activists to acknowledge very real (but not 
absolute) economic, social and psychological barriers, while looking for a course of action that 
realises an animal’s rights to the greatest extent possible given the aforementioned constraints. This 
means that the proposed framework does not restrict animal advocates to one particular approach 
to realise animal rights (like abolitionism does). Instead, it allows them to seek a variety of ways that 
aim at increasing the realisation of rights and minimising their infringement, which hopefully will 
also mean that society moves gradually towards greater actual equality between humans and other 
animals. 
 
7.1.1 DEFINING THE TERM ‘RIGHT’ 
In the following chapter, I will claim that animals have moral rights, such as the right to be free from 
suffering, pain, and death. Those rights should be considered to be of equal moral significance to 
                                                                 





human rights, but it does not follow that animals can be equally protected. Before I delve into these 
arguments, the term ‘having a right’ should be defined as it otherwise might lead to 
misunderstanding and subsequently disagreements between activists. 
The term right can have different meanings, and unclear distinctions between natural and legislative 
rights tend to complicate discussing these matters. To argue that someone or something has a right 
could simply mean that it is associated with moral standing (Phelps 2007:63; Waldau 2011:2–3; 
Cochrane 2012:13; Fisher 2014:646). Rights can also indicate a valid claim upon others on how one 
ought to be treated, whether or not it is acknowledged by society or within the law (Regan 2004 
[1983]:267–69). However, holding a right does not necessarily imply how much moral significance is 
to be granted, and whether that significance has greater weight over other ethical considerations.  
A second meaning associated with the term is that of natural rights, to which some interviewed 
campaigners appealed to, while others dismissed them. Natural rights theorists ground rights in the 
possession of certain traits (rationality, language, sentience). Other approaches consider rights 
artefacts of state action, implying that rights only exist in the presence of a state that recognises 
them (Nussbaum 1997:273–74). Legislative rights are a third possible meaning of the term.  
Without entering the discussion over the concrete and disputed meaning of rights, I will use Regan’s 
(2004 [1983]:267–69) definition in this chapter, as rights being valid claims on others. This is a 
common definition within the animal ethics literature, and resonates most commonly with the 
understanding of interviewed activists. It also avoids some of the difficulties associated with the 
concept of natural rights, as will be discussed later in this chapter. Moreover, it is more suitable than 
the concepts of interests or preferences in encompassing claims to wellbeing and flourishing, as 
interests or preferences can potentially be harmful to the latter. 
A claim is defined as valid if it is crucial and necessary for wellbeing (cf. Engle 2012:2). Hence, the 
term right – as used in this chapter – indicates a claim to wellbeing, such as a claim to freedom from 
suffering. Animal welfare campaigners recognise that claim, even though they might prefer to refer 
to it as a duty to not inflict suffering. Furthermore, the language of rights is not only a respected way 
of claiming moral standing, but also a highly effective tool to secure moral and legislative protection 
within the Western world (Garner 2005b:165; Campbell 2006:xiv et seq.; Waldau 2011:63; 
McCausland 2014:651). Concepts such as rights and justice are relevant to state enforcement, while 
others will result only in weaker protection (Garner 2013:8).  
One objection to the arguments proposed in this chapter by animal welfare campaigners might 
concern the use of the word ‘rights’ in connection with animals; either because they believe that it is 
an artificial concept that is of little use for animals, or because they cannot refer to animal rights 




out). Understanding the term ‘rights’ as a way of describing claims towards wellbeing (or duties not 
to interfere with that wellbeing), and as effective tools to grant protection within Western societies, 
will hopefully convince welfare campaigners that the term successfully extends beyond humans. 
Whether they can comfortably use the terminology when talking to stakeholders or not, should not 
prevent others from using it within the context of ethical deliberations. Some might refrain from the 
using the word ‘rights’ and instead talk about claims or duties; but the meaning and its implications 
remain similar. 
 
7.2 ALL (SENTIENT) ANIMALS ARE EQUAL104 
Western thought has long believed in the superiority and dominance of humans over nature, 
partially based on classical philosophy (Aristotle, Plato, Descartes) but also on how Judaeo-Christian 
theological texts have been predominantly read (Linzey 1987:23 et seq.; Linzey and Cohn-Sherbok 
1997:20; Davis 2014:25; Cook 2015:590).105 Dominion was granted either by God (Genesis 1:27-29), 
or by the virtue of distinct human qualities such as possession of a soul (e.g. Descartes, cf. Garner 
2013:82), self-awareness, language, rationality, moral agency, and so forth, that animals were 
supposedly lacking (Chomsky 1969, 2011; Garner 2013:87;Davis 2014:19–20; Cook 2015:590–91; 
Pinker 2015 [1994]:332 et seq.). 
New scientific discoveries, however, particularly within in animal behaviour, have brought to light 
complex mental, emotional and problem-solving skills possessed by animals. Some species such as 
chimpanzees, elephants, dolphins and magpies have passed mirror-tests indicating self-awareness 
(Gallup 1970; Reiss and Marino 2001; Plotnik et al. 2006; Prior et al. 2008; de Waal 2008). Despite 
lacking the (anatomical and/or mental) means to speak in a structured language like humans, 
scientists discovered various other mechanism of communication used by animals (Sebeok 1965; 
Endler 1993; Rogers and Kaplan 2005:187–89), some of which might resemble language to a greater 
degree than expected. The most impressive examples include the chimpanzee Washoe which learnt 
to use sign language, or the bonobo Kanzi which used symbols to communicate and was able to 
understand spoken English (Gardner and Gardner 1969; Savage-Rumbaugh 1994). Also rationality in 
the sense of problem-solving abilities (for instance by using tools) have been demonstrated in 
various settings by greatly different species, such as chimpanzees, dolphins, or birds like 
woodpeckers or crows (Boesch and Boesch 1990; Hunt 1996; Tebbich et al. 2001; Krützen et al. 
2005). There is some indication that elephants and dolphins grieve (Bradshaw 2004; Hooper 2011). 
                                                                 
104 From the book Animal Farm (Orwell 2008 [1945]:15).  
105 This is not to say that Judeo-Christian theology sanctions exploitation of animals; a close reading of religious 
scriptures suggests otherwise (Linzey and Cohn-Sherbok 1997:20). However, the Christian tradition has long 




Species, like dogs, chimpanzees or capuchin monkeys have been demonstrated to possess a sense of 
fairness (Bekoff 2004; Brosnan and de Waal 2004, 2014), and potentially even morality (Brosnan 
2006:168). 
There are still many species who have not passed the mirror-test or that have not demonstrated 
complex abilities in problem-solving tasks, but this does not prove that they do not possess any. 
Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Furthermore, each species is adapted to its own 
environmental niche and in many cases, it is more likely that humans did not manage to adapt their 
study design and use the right methods to elicit particular behaviours in a species, which would 
demonstrate such abilities. For example, dogs would be expected to fail the mirror test not because 
they are not self-aware, but because their visual sense is not as important for their perception of the 
world as olfaction (Rogers and Kaplan 2005:176–77). Furthermore, it might make little sense to try 
to rank all species on one (human-centred) scale of intelligence (cf. Wise 2005:40). Instead it would 
be more useful to assume different types of intelligence, and to use the flexibility in behaviour 
(Rogers and Kaplan 2005:178), or problem-solving abilities (Sutherland 1989:211) as marker for it.  
While some animals might possess similar capacities to humans, the latter, nonetheless possess 
those capacities to a greater degree in many (but not all) cases. Hence, some might argue that the 
existence of those capacities is not enough to grant equal moral status, but the degree of capability 
should matter too. 
 
7.2.1 UNEQUAL CAPABILITIES AS MORAL MARKER 
It is problematic though to grant moral status and protection based on degrees of capacities, as 
humans also possess certain qualities to a greater or lesser extent than other members of our own 
species. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (The United Nations General Assembly 1948)106 
claims in its very first article that ‘all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights;’ and 
adds in article two: ‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind.’ This should also encompass distinctions based on capacities as 
humans naturally differ in, for instance, their intellectual, emotional, or creative abilities; none of 
which should give rise to differential treatment with regards to fundamental rights. Furthermore, 
disabilities in humans, rendering them less capable of participating in human society, also do not 
justify infringing human rights.  
                                                                 
106 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights constitutes an assertion of rights based on a diverse 
philosophical discourse including opposing approaches. Most importantly here though, rights approaches 
often establish equality between rights holders, as does the Declaration of Human Rights. For an overview 




The argument from marginal cases is commonly discussed in animal ethics (e.g. Singer 1995 [1975]; 
Regan 2004 [1983]; Garner 2013)107 and sometimes used to point out that it is unjust to treat 
animals, with equal or higher abilities than human marginal cases, badly, if we are not prepared to 
treat disabled humans badly – at least, if capabilities matter. Furthermore, even if gradation of moral 
worth based on capabilities was accepted, not possessing traits such as autonomy or rationality to 
the extent humans do is not sufficient to ‘claim that all human interests are morally superior to all 
animal interests’ (Garner 2013:87). In particular, ethical questions about inflicted suffering are 
determined by the capacity to suffer, not by autonomy (Rachels 1990:186). 
In order to avoid the capabilities trap, Cohen (Cohen and Regan 2001:37) argues that humans 
deserve a superior moral standing simply by their virtue of being human. Humans and only humans 
should be granted rights based on their species membership. However, this argument has been 
refuted by other authors who consider it speciesism and believe that such a position could also 
justify discrimination against, for example, gender or race, which is considered undesirable ( Singer 
1995 [1975]; Cohen and Regan 2001:38; Regan 2004 [1983]).  
In comparison, Rowlands (2002:46) discusses a scenario in which alien invaders could decide to 
dominate and exploit humans for their purposes, based on their virtue of being aliens or having 
higher intelligence. As humans do not belong to their population, aliens could decide to use humans 
as they wish. Alternatively, these aliens might justify their use of humans based on their greater 
intellectual capabilities. Yet humans would judge it as morally wrong to be used in such a way. This 
scenario can be used to refute both justifications of dominion based on species membership, and 
based on the existence and/or degree of certain capabilities.  
 
7.2.2 UNEQUAL VALUE OF LIFE 
Returning to the capabilities argument, however, we find that also proponents of equality in relation 
to animal interests, such as Singer and Regan, grant humans a higher value of life in cases of conflict 
based on either the number and variety of opportunities for satisfaction (Singer 1995 [1975]) or the 
capacity for planning, hoping, meaningful relations and so forth (Regan 2004 [1983]:xxix, 314) (also 
see discussion in chapter two ‘Literature review’). As is the case in Regan’s theory, arguments 
justifying the greater value of human life often relate to personhood, including aspects such as 
rationality, autonomy, a sophisticated communication system, or moral agency. McMahan 
(2002:195) also values deep personal relationships, imagination, aesthetic awareness, and long-term 
goals and ambition that can be characteristics more prevalent in humans than in nonhuman-
                                                                 




animals.108 Moreover, traits such as personhood would entail having a greater interest in continued 
life (cf. Garner 2013:14–15, 129).  
Only very few animals, potentially only mammals (Regan 2004 [1983]:77–78), meet those criteria. It 
is unlikely that all animals possess the kind of awareness of their past, present and future needed to 
conceptualise the meaning of being and staying alive, and to desire doing so, and hence, have an 
interest in life in this sense (DeGrazia 2002:59–61; Garner 2013:129). Thus, DeGrazia (2002:59–61) 
and McMahan (2002:190) – as other aforementioned authors – conclude that killing an animal is less 
of a wrong than taking the life of a human. 
Garner, similarly, assumes that human lives ‘ought to take precedence in the event of a conflict’ 
(Garner 2013:133) based on humans having a greater interest in continuing life. While he argues that 
trivial human interests cannot justify sacrificing significant animal interests, the greater interest in 
life of humans might justify killing animals for other, more important purposes. Hence, in Garner’s so 
called enhanced sentience position, eating meat is immoral but taking life for animal 
experimentation would not be, if no suffering was inflicted (Garner 2013:134).109 
Authors like DeGrazia (2002:61) and Cochrane (2012:66) also mention that harm can, nonetheless, 
be inflicted on animals by depriving them of their opportunities for future experiences, of which they 
do not need to be aware of, in order for this to constitute a harm. However, in this case the human 
species is also supposedly being deprived of more opportunities both quantitatively (based on the 
often longer lifespan of humans)110 and qualitatively (based on their greater psychological capacities) 
(Garner 2013:130).  
 
7.2.3 REJECTING UNEQUAL VALUE OF LIFE  
Most of the authors mentioned argue in favour of significantly heightened protection for animals, 
while at the same time it appears that they also feel a need to concede a special status to humans 
which protects the human species in cases of conflict. Furthermore, their arguments all share the 
same structure: humans have greater capacities – be it for deep relationships, cognition, being 
harmed, or being self-aware enough to value continued life – that grant them greater moral status. 
In chapter two (‘Literature review’), I criticised some of these assumptions. In particular, I 
questioned whether it can be assumed that human experiences or capacities are more valuable, 
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always are. 
109 Garner’s position assumes that animal experiments are likely to result in saving human lives, and thus, serve 
a more important purpose. However, it is disputed whether animal experiments commonly achieve this goal 
(e.g. Knight 2011). 
110 If one chooses to use this argument, one, however, also has to think about the implications for species with 




especially as each species lives in a different ‘Umwelt’ based on their specific sensory organs (von 
Uexküll 1909).111 Humans, for example, do not possess organs to sense magnetic fields, cannot 
echolocate, and perceive only fractions of the olfactory and visual world.112 From other species’ 
perspectives, the world of humans would sometimes appear greatly impoverished. Some animals, 
when killed, would lose capacities and opportunities never experienced by humans, such as 
echolocation in dolphins (cf. literature review and DeGrazia 2002:77). Also, Sapontzis (1987:219) 
argues that philosophers easily underestimate capabilities and experiences of different species, and 
the meaning those have for their lives. Moreover, it can be reasonably assumed that the value of its 
life to a dog is as much as the value of his or her life to a human (Cochrane 2012:70),113 and it is 
neither conceptually nor morally difficult to grant moral value or rights to beings that are unaware of 
said value or rights (Sapontzis 1987:163). 
If, how, and which animals have concepts of life and death, and what and how much they lose when 
they die, are difficult questions to answer. The more important question, however, is whether 
possessing concepts of life and death, or qualities like complex cognitive abilities really matters 
when deciding on the value of life. All the theories discussed on said value will at some point favour 
qualities important to humans; qualities at which humans excel. It appears to me a cleverly disguised 
anthropocentric perfectionism; and both perfectionism and anthropocentrism are problematic.  
The former is problematic because capabilities should not be decisive for treatment. This was argued 
earlier with regards to marginal cases and with regards to such an argument might also allowing for 
differential treatment of humans. Those who are more intelligent, capable or creative could 
establish higher moral significance compared to those that are less gifted (cf. Francione and Garner 
2010:18–20). Whether it is subjectively better to be a dissatisfied Socrates rather than any other 
satisfied human, or even a satisfied pig, should not be used as objective parameter to decide moral 
status (cf. The United Nations General Assembly 1948; Singer 1995 [1975]; Regan 2004 [1983]).  
Singer (1993) would argue that, in cases of conflict, it would indeed be ethically justified to kill a 
disabled person rather than a fully rational, adult human being. Some people may also feel that non-
disabled adult human beings would have more to lose given that they can participate in, and enjoy 
                                                                 
111 ‘Umwelt’ could be translated into environment but has a more specific meaning in Uexküll’s work. Every 
animal species lives in its own environment or ‘Umwelt’ based on its sensory organs, which will determine and 
restrict what parts of the world an animal can perceive. Hence, each species lives in a different ‘Umwelt’ (von 
Uexküll 1909). 
112 In comparison, dogs possess a great capacity for olfaction and sensing different odors (Galibert et al. 2016; 
Rongxing et al. 2016). Some birds, in contrast to humans, can see ultra violet light (Rajchard 2009). 
113 The dog might not be aware of the value of its life in the same manner as a human, but awareness of the 
value is not necessarily determining the magnitude of the value. A dog needs its life as much as a human does 




human life more fully, or can pursue more opportunities.114 However, the judgment here is based on 
concepts of what it means to be human and what it means to live a fulfilling human life. Of course 
some disabilities are so severe that some might speak of a ‘life not worth living’ (cf. DeGrazia 
2002:77) because it might be associated with severe suffering, or because some human beings have 
lost or never possessed the ability to successfully interact with their surroundings. The death of a 
human being with such severe impairments might be considered a relief from inevitable suffering 
instead. Such cases, however, cannot be reasonably compared to healthy animals and their 
experience of the world. 
Our concepts of humanity and a fulfilled human life cannot be considered appropriate measures to 
evaluate other forms of flourishing. To define cognitive abilities (such as language or rationality) in 
their – more or less – human embodiment, as the ultimate measure of value of life, is a deeply 
anthropocentric approach.115 In the words of nature writer Beston (1967:25): 
 
The animal shall not be measured by man. In a world older and more complete than ours 
they move finished and complete, gifted by extensions of the senses we have lost or never 
attained, living by voices we shall never hear. 
 
The capabilities we value in humans might be important to human flourishing and lives, but they are 
not necessarily crucial to the flourishing of other forms of life, despite our shared characteristics. 
 
7.2.4 THE EQUAL MORAL VALUE OF LIFE  
When talking about the moral significance of life and differences between lives, we shall start by 
thinking about what life is. Life or living beings are commonly distinguished from dead or non-living 
beings based on seven characteristics: organisation, homeostasis, metabolism, growth, response, 
reproduction and adaptation (Schulze-Makuch and Irwin 2008:7–8). Hence, what all living beings 
have in common are those characteristics, but beyond those and their significance for flourishing, 
species will differ. Specific flourishing and the traits important to that flourishing will then depend on 
the ecological niche to which particular animals are adapted. Perspective matters here. 
One could imagine that from the evolutionary and ecological ‘perspective’ of plants, species 
belonging to the animal kingdom might be grossly inefficient and inferior as they cannot utilise the 
                                                                 
114 Yet, as Nussbaum (2006:96 et seq.) argues, disabled human beings might very well enjoy their lives and 
might not feel that they are missing out on important aspects of being fulfilled. Our preference here might be 
more emotionally felt rather than constituting a rational judgment, as we cannot necessarily assess the lived 
experience of another disabled person. 
115 Other authors also have criticised the ‘identity approach’ (i.e. moral status is granted based on the animals’ 




energy of the sun through photosynthesis for their survival and reproduction. Predators, for 
example, are dependent on a finite (rather than virtually infinite) source of energy. From the 
metaphorical perspective of genes, success is determined by being able to survive through constant 
reproduction, ideally in great numbers (Dawkins 1989). The more genes can reproduce, the less 
likely are they to go extinct and the greater their survival and hence, evolutionary success is. From 
this perspective, humans are far from being a successful species, compared to bacteria, insects such 
as ants, and even chickens, which all exist in greater number on this world than humans (The 
Economist Online 2011). Our cognitive capacities have helped us to survive, despite the existing 
competition for resources. They have helped us to establish ourselves against other species, in 
particular against other vertebrates, but we are still competing with invertebrates (for example, with 
those that are vectors for diseases, or those that are considered pests) or bacteria, which are 
numerically dominant despite not having advanced cognitive capacities.116  
Whether capacities for personhood, rationality or deep relationships are important to the value of 
life depends on the perspective one takes. Humans value those because they are important to 
human life and because they give meaning to our lives. Yet, it should not be forgotten that this is an 
anthropocentric and a subjective view. Based on the above, it appears that there are no objective 
measures to compare the value of different lives – at least none that I know of. In this sense, a tree is 
a pig is a human.117 Thus, if humans value their lives – and it can be reasonably assumed that we do – 
so should we assign value to other forms of live.  
We might also imagine a scenario of aliens evaluating the planet earth and the species living on it. 
These aliens could potentially be a non-carbon-based life form, so different to any life form on the 
planet that they apply very different criteria to assigning value to the different forms of life on earth. 
Perspective is crucial (also Clune 1996:179). However, there is and needs to be a caveat to granting 
equal value to trees, pigs and humans based on one capacity: the ability to feel, perceive and 
experience; also called sentience (cf. Broom 2014). 
 
7.2.5 SENTIENCE AS MORAL MARKER  
Sentience is the morally significant trait for moral consideration of animals within animal ethics 
literature (be it welfare, utilitarian, or rights theories), for activists, and most likely even the wider 
public which is, for example, reflected in sentience forming the basis for legal protection in modern 
Animal Welfare Acts (e.g. in European countries). Supposedly unnecessary killing can result in public 
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aims to show that, depending on perspective, other factors might be more important. From the metaphorical 
‘perspective’ of genes, numbers indeed count.  





moral outcry, as was the case when a Scandinavian zoo killed a giraffe and fed it to lions (Eriksen and 
Kennedy 2014). It is unlikely that the cutting down of a tree would elicit the same outrage. Protest 
might be inspired by the ecological importance of a particular plant species, or the wider 
environmental issues around deforestation, soil degradation and so forth that accompany the 
destruction of plants. Yet, opposition to killing of such forms of life is based on crucially different 
arguments and sentiments than opposition to the killing of sentient animals. Objections to animal 
suffering arise because of what it means to the animal rather than who the animal belongs to or 
because of its dehumanizing effects (Francione 2010). Waldau (2011:23) similarly argues that talking 
about killing (sentient) animals is morally charged in contrast to talking about ‘“killing” germs or 
using antibiotics.’ 
Sentience marks an important ‘threshold for membership’ in the circle of beings with moral standing 
(Nussbaum 2005:309), and denying sentience is ‘the easiest way to show that animals are worth 
nothing morally’ (Garner 2005a:25). Serious discussions arise over how we ought to treat animals 
with respect to their flourishing and their deaths because sentience – the capacity to consciously 
experience the world (Cochrane 2012:21; Allen and Trestman 2016) – signifies the possession of an 
individual welfare118 (Cochrane 2012:24–25). It is also a defining factor for talking sensibly about 
moral issues concerning the flourishing of living beings.119 It appears counter-intuitive to consider 
whether the flourishing of a hedge is restricted by trimming it. From an evolutionary perspective, it 
might be in the interest of the hedge to grow and spread out as much as possible to ensure its own 
survival and reproduction of genes. Yet, whether the hedge can spread or not does not matter to the 
hedge, in contrast to many animal to whom it matters subjectively whether they can roam around or 
not (cf. Singer 1993:57). For the latter, this has a clear impact on wellbeing.  
While wellbeing or welfare is not necessarily the only concept that ethics is concerned about, it 
undoubtedly is a central concern (Cochrane 2012:24–25). Our value systems are built around those 
things that are good or bad for us (Korsgaard 2013:643), and they aim at ensuring that ‘people’s lives 
fare better rather than worse’ (Cochrane 2012:24–25), i.e. that they flourish. 
Even the aforementioned aliens, presumably, would recognise a difference between conscious and 
unconscious life, as they themselves must possess some sort of consciousness in order to 
conceptualise different life forms and assign value to them. At least, my human imagination is too 
limited to envision an alien form of life so different to humans, that there are no similarities in 
consciousness.  
                                                                 
118 Individual welfare includes physiological, psychological, emotional, social and intellectual wellbeing (Regan 
2004 [1983]:90) . 
119 Defenders of the difference-based approach, i.e. those who reject the identity approach, also seem to agree 






7.2.6 RIGHTS TO FLOURISHING AND PREVENTION OF HARM: THE FIVE FREEDOMS 
Although species, and indeed individuals, differ in their needs and interests that are crucial to their 
flourishing, some conditions will apply to a greater or lesser extent to all sentient animals. The Five 
Freedoms might provide a starting point to think about those fundamental conditions necessary for 
flourishing (table 3, p. 159) (Farm Animal Welfare Council 2009b). The five freedoms constitute an 
appropriate framework for the following discussion as they define ‘ideal states’ for welfare, meaning 
an animal should be ‘as free as possible’ from negative states. Analogous requirements can be found 
in other frameworks such as the Declaration of Human Rights (The United Nations General Assembly 
1948) or the capabilities approach by Nussbaum (2005:314–17). For example, article 25 in the 
Declaration of Human Rights refers to ‘the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of’ humans which could be considered the equivalent to freedom from hunger and thirst, 
and partly from discomfort. The Declaration of Human Rights is more specific as it does not state a 
right to be free from pain and suffering, and instead mentions a right to medical care or a right not 
be tortured. It is acknowledged that humans cannot live without pain and suffering but that society 
should make efforts to remedy any harms incurred. This applies to animals as well, as pain and 
suffering will always be a part of any sentient animal’s life. Species will prey on each other, disease 
and illness are inevitable, and life for wild animals is a daily struggle for survival. Moreover, states of 
pain and suffering are warning signals to all animals (including humans) that their life or bodily 
integrity (including psychological integrity) are under threat (cf. DeGrazia 1996:107). They might also 
constitute important learning experiences in this regard, i.e. learning to avoid the sources of pain 
and suffering. Sometimes pain and suffering are part of the healing process of an injury encouraging 
rest and guarding behaviour;120 or may be an unavoidable side-effect of a medical intervention 
aimed at restoring wellbeing in the long term. In other cases, an animal might take a risk of being 
exposed to pain and suffering while engaging in certain behaviours associated with potential 
rewards, for example territorial fights.  
Indeed, Mellor (2016a, 2016b) mentions that the five freedoms have been sometimes 
misinterpreted as absolute or completely achievable, and as rights. As pointed out above, negative 
states cannot be eliminated, only minimised. As Mellor correctly states, negative states are 
important motivators for animals to engage in life-sustaining behaviour, such as foraging and eating, 
which themselves might be a rewarding experience for animals (also Keeling et al. 2011:18; 
Kyriazakis and Tokamp 2011:44). Based on this shortcoming and the lack of attention given to 
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positive states within the five freedoms, Mellor proposed the five provisions (Mellor 2016a),121 and 
the five domains model (Mellor 2016b),122 as a better approach to assessing animal welfare. While 
the five domains and provisions models are certainly an important update to the contemporary 
discussion on animal welfare management, a focus on the five freedoms as necessary conditions for 
flourishing within these chapters suffices. The five freedoms can here be considered essentially 
broader terms for the necessary, but not absolute, requirements for flourishing across sentient 
species. An individual that is suffering from excessive hunger and thirst; discomfort; pain, injury or 
disease; fear and distress; and/or cannot express normal behaviour, is not well,123 and it is 
fundamentally restricted in its flourishing.  
 
TABLE 3 THE FIVE FREEDOMS (FARM ANIMAL WELFARE COUNCIL 2009B)* 
 Freedom By 
1 From hunger and thirst ready access to water and a diet to maintain health and 
vigour. 
2 From discomfort providing an appropriate environment. 
3 From pain, injury and disease prevention or rapid diagnosis and treatment. 
4 To express normal behaviour Providing sufficient space, proper facilities and 
appropriate company of the animal’s own kind. 
5 From fear and distress Ensuring conditions and treatment which avoid mental 
suffering. 
*The five freedoms create a framework to assess animal welfare, implying both fitness and wellbeing of 
animals.  
 
While Webster (2016), who was part of the Farm Animal Welfare Council when it developed the five 
freedoms, agrees with Mellor’s criticism, he, too, points out that the five freedoms never attempted 
to provide a complete picture. Moreover, he argues in his opinion letter that adding details to 
strengthen a case can, in some cases, highlight the incompleteness of an argument. Hence, the five 
freedoms should be understood according to their original meaning: to be as free as possible from 
                                                                 
121 The Five Provisions address good nutrition, good environment, good health, appropriate behaviour, and 
positive mental experiences. They are aligned with animal welfare goals, and aim at being easily 
understandable for and accessible to non-specialist audiences (Mellor 2016a). 
122 The Five Domains include the physical/functional domains of nutrition, environment, health (as survival-
related factors), and behaviour (as a situation-related factor); and the affective experience domain of mental 
state (Mellor 2016b).  
123 The term ‘to be well’ should allow for a broad interpretation, similar to, and potentially even broader than, 
the World Health Organization’s (2005) definition of health. The organisation defines health as ‘physical, mental 
and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.’ Thus, ‘being well’ connotes not only 




negative states, or to have as much freedom as possible to experience positive states. They are 
based on timeless principles which are ‘intended as no more than a memorable set of signposts to 
right action’ (Webster 2016). 
Those right actions mean – at the very least – refraining from negative interference affecting the 
flourishing of others. In other words, the focus lies on harms that are deleterious to flourishing 
(Garner 2013:41). In particular, the emphasis will lie on the right to be free from pain, suffering and 
death, inflicted by other moral agents (which will be briefly discussed and defended in the next 
sections). So, there might be other positive duties to ensure positive states for animals which are 
better encompassed within the five domains; however, this needs an in-depth discussion that lies 
beyond the scope of this chapter.  
 
HARMS INCLUDING PAIN AND SUFFERING 
Anatomical, physiological, and evolutionary arguments124 along with behavioural evidence indicate 
that at least mammals, but potentially all vertebrates and some invertebrates, such as cephalopods, 
are sentient, and hence, can feel pain and can suffer (Bekoff 1994; Garner 2005a:29; Duncan 2006; 
Cochrane 2012:21–24). Many species feel or are likely to consciously experience positive and 
negative states, such as pain,125 other forms of suffering,126 or happiness (DeGrazia 1996:126; Palmer 
2010:11–20). In some situations, humans potentially suffer more because they are able to conceive 
the helplessness, doom, or far-reaching implications of a situation to a greater extent (Mill 
1879:chapter II; DeGrazia 1996:239). In others, however, other animals could experience more 
intense emotions, as they might not be able to anticipate the relief of pain and suffering (Sapontzis 
1987:219; Singer 1993:58–59; DeGrazia 1996:239). Whatever differences there are, they are of 
limited relevance as there are no reasons to believe that other animals suffer overall less (or more) 
                                                                 
124 Some other animals are anatomically and physiologically similar to humans, and show comparable 
physiological and behavioural responses to pain. Given the anatomical and physiological resemblances, it is 
more likely that sentience is an evolutionarily continuous trait rather than one developed only in humans. 
Furthermore, natural selection will favour the ability to experience pain as animals will then be more likely to 
avoid tissue damage (e.g. Garner 2005a:29).  
125 Pain is an ‘unpleasant or aversive sensory or emotional experience usually associated with actual or 
potential tissue damage’ (DeGrazia 1996:107), or described in terms of such damage (in cases of humans who 
are able to communicate). The inability to communicate verbally, however, does not imply that pain is not 
experienced. Hence, Molony (1997:293) defines animal pain as ‘an aversive sensory and emotional experience 
representing an awareness by the animal of damage or threat to the integrity of its tissues … it changes the 
animal’s physiology and behaviour to reduce or avoid the damage, to reduce the likelihood of recurrence and 
to promote recovery.’ The definition of pain puts particular emphasis on the subjectively felt sensation, in 
order to distinguish it from nociception (a sensory system responsible for detection and alerting an individual 
to potential damage, which will elicit avoidance of the damaging stimulus) (Sneddon et al. 2014). However, 
pain could also be psychological or psychogenic, and occur in the absence of potential or actual tissue damage.  
126 Suffering is used to refer ‘to animals who may be experiencing adverse psychological and mental states 
such as pain, discomfort, fear, distress, frustration, boredom, torment or grief’ (Morton 1998:329). Hence, 




than humans (Garner 2013:125–26). Being free from – at least moderate to severe – pain and 
suffering, is crucial to wellbeing and flourishing, both for humans and non-human animals. Mellor 
(2016b) also points out that significant levels of survival-critical negative affects (including pain and 
suffering) inhibit an animal’s motivation to engage in other, potentially rewarding, behaviours. In the 
absence of relevant differences, all sentient beings prima facie have an equally strong claim to not 
have (at least moderate to severe) pain and suffering inflicted on them by others.  
 
THE HARM OF DEATH 
One necessary condition for flourishing is missing within the five freedoms: the freedom from death. 
The Declaration of Human Rights asserts in article three the right to life (The United Nations General 
Assembly 1948); and the first item on the capabilities list is the entitlement to life, even without a 
conscious interest (Nussbaum 2005:314–17). Without life itself, there is nothing that could flourish. 
Being alive is crucial to having a good of one’s own; it is a precondition (as is sentience) to talk about 
the moral significance of being harmed. 
The problem with death as a harm is that as long as a being is alive, it is not yet harmed by death, 
and that once dead, there is no living being capable of being harmed (Epicurus 341-270 B.C., cf. 
Kaldewaij 2008:59). This might be the reason why some animal welfare advocates assume that 
death cannot be considered a welfare issue (cf. Yeates 2009:229). Other theories, discussed earlier, 
argue that death deprives us of opportunities, or that it thwarts the desire to stay alive (also 
Kaldewaij 2008:59). However, a gradation of value of life, based on the arguments that animals have 
less opportunities or less of a desire to stay alive, needs to be rejected, as (1) humans cannot 
objectively assign value to opportunities of other living beings (that will be foreclosed by death) and 
their (subjective) significance to those living beings, and (2) the beings in question do not need to be 
aware of a right/value/opportunity in order to have a moral right to it. Even if it was to be accepted 
that animals do not possess a concept of life and death, and thus have less of an interest in 
continued life (Garner 2013:14–15, 129), their death would foreclose the pursuit and satisfaction of 
all other interests (Rowlands 2002:94). In this sense, Ferry (2004:148) and Godlovitch et al. 
(1971:171) argue that it would make little sense to morally care about inflicted suffering, while at 
the same time neglecting the value of life of those beings. 
Life is necessary to be able to flourish (cf. Sapontzis 1987:175), and some might consider being alive 
the most fundamental condition for flourishing, or the most important interest (Cochrane 2012:66). 
Yet, as some interviewees expressed: there are lives that are not worth living because of inevitable 
and severe pain and suffering (caused by incurable diseases). In those cases, the quality of life or the 




majority of people would not agree that a ‘life is so sacred that it should be preserved even at the 
cost of a great deal of suffering or lack of quality.’ Similarly, the Farm Animal Welfare Council 
(2009a), and building on their contribution, Green and Mellor (2011) introduced a scale to assess the 
quality of life as ranging from a good life to a life not worth living. A life not worth living, in their 
approach, is a life that is characterised by negative experiences greatly outweighing positives states, 
and as a severe situation that cannot not be remedied. Hence, euthanasia is considered the only 
humane alternative. The problem with such scales, as Webster analyses (2016), lies in trying to 
quantify the lived experience of other beings, and whether one positive state can offset the impact 
of a negative state. Webster accurately states:  
The conclusion as to whether or not the life of a domestic farm or pet animal is worth living 
is something that we humans will make on behalf of the animal, based on how we think it 
feels when experiencing a physical and social environment largely dictated by us.  
The requirements of being alive, and being free from (at least moderate and severe) pain and 
suffering are both profoundly significant to flourishing, and shall be regarded as similarly important. 
Whether one requirement trumps another in cases of conflict will most likely need to be decided 
based on contextual factors.127 
 
FOCUS ON BEING FREE FROM PAIN, SUFFERING AND DEATH 
The claim to life and the freedom from inflicted pain and suffering (as an amalgam between the 
freedom from discomfort; pain, injury and disease; and fear and distress) bear particular prominence 
within discussions on human-animal relations. While a good quality of life is important, most 
concerns regarding our practices appear to revolve around death, pain, and suffering, as reflected 
within the interviews. While it is unclear what flourishing means for each species and each 
individual, bodily integrity and the prevention of harm are conceptions of the good that everyone 
might reasonably aspire to (Waldron 1989:74–75; Garner 2005b:90, 2013:41; Wise 2005:30).  
The focus in this chapter, on a right to life and to freedom from inflicted pain and suffering cannot 
provide moral guidance for each and every human-animal relation. Nevertheless, they constitute a 
minimal requirement to ensure the wellbeing of animals. Our moral duties towards animals might go 
beyond the moral duties to not kill, and to not inflict pain and suffering; but these would need to be 
subjected to further discussions. Certain harms, for instance, are not associated with pain and 
suffering (Regan 2004 [1983]:99). The breeding of blind chickens constitutes such a moral 
controversy in the sense that it could improve the welfare of chickens farmed intensively in 
restricted environments (Davis 2003), but also restricts animals from living a normal life to the 
                                                                 




extent possible (Regan 2004 [1983]:177).128 A similar example includes the emphasis on autonomy, 
i.e. a right to make choices and to be free from human control, particularly for companion animals. 
This right is contested, as some would argue that companion animals have better and longer lives 
under the care and custodianship of humans (cf. Sunstein 2005:10), which could be considered to be 
in the interest of the animal, enabling flourishing to a greater extent.   
Another difficulty is highlighted by Cochrane (2012:10–11), who argues that animals are not entitled 
to the same rights as humans, in particular to the ‘right never to be used, owned, and exploited by 
human beings.’ He stipulates that humans and other animals differ with respect to their capacities to 
‘frame, revise, and pursue their own conception of the good.’ Hence, animals do not necessarily 
possess an intrinsic interest in liberty. Except for animals like Great Apes and Cetaceans, that have 
been described as persons (Singer and Cavalieri 1996; White 2007:155–84), animals are not harmed 
by being used, but through pain, suffering, and death (Cochrane 2012:12). Garner, similarly, 
proposes that animals do not have a right to liberty as it is not necessarily the use itself that harms 
them, but the pain and suffering associated with how they are used (Garner 2013:2–3, 124). To 
argue that, for example, captivity harms an animal’s right to freedom, could be considered an 
anthropomorphic leap that is not justified, depending on the species in question. In Garner’s words: 
‘It is like saying that animals are harmed if they don’t have a right to education or to vote’ (Garner 
2005a:142–43). 
While it can be reasonably claimed that many animals are sentient and can suffer, it is more difficult 
to sustain a position that argues in favour of equally strong rights for animals, which arise out of 
humans’ complex psychological characteristics (Garner 2013:128). Therefore, the rest of this chapter 
will focus on the right to life, and to not have pain and suffering inflicted, as these constitute the 
least contested and most (but not necessarily the only) fundamental requirements for flourishing, 
and were also the most frequently mentioned concerns of interviewees.  
 
7.3 ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL BUT SOME ANIMALS ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS129 
So far, I have tried to argue from a neutral point of view130 about whether animals and humans, and 
indeed all life, can be considered equally valuable; and I have concluded that it depends on 
                                                                 
128 Overcrowded conditions in farms cause stress in chickens which negatively affects their welfare and 
productivity (Rosales 1994; Gomes et al. 2014). A proposed solution is the breeding of blind chickens as it 
appears that their stress levels are reduced when they are unable to see, and hence, their welfare is improved 
(Davis 2003; Regan 2004 [1983]:177). 
129 From the book Animal Farm (Orwell 2008 [1945]:90).  
130 It is questionable that a neutral point of view can actually exist. However, I argue from what I believe to be 





perspective. The safest guess probably would be to assume that all sentient life is equally valuable, if 
we aim to be objective.  
I now must turn to the second part of the chapter focused on human-animal conflicts that threaten 
the translation of theoretical equality of moral significance, into equal treatment or equal protection 
of rights. Abolitionist approaches, or species egalitarian positions as Garner calls them, deem all 
animal use by humans inherently wrong (Garner 2013:121), and unjust. This approach, however, has 
already been challenged  by acknowledging Garner’s and Cochrane’s contributions that animals are 
not necessarily harmed by being used (Cochrane 2012; Garner 2013).131 The realisation or violation 
of the fundamental rights to life, and to freedom from suffering (including pain), constitute the most 
important guiding measures to assess the rightness or wrongness of human-animal interactions; and 
many interactions do not necessarily involve an infringement of said rights. However, many current 
practices also seem to be inherently based on thwarting rights to life and to freedom from suffering, 
such as animal farming, or animal experimentation. If animals have equal rights, does it follow that 
humans must refrain from those practices, even if it meant neglecting their own fundamental 
interests crucial to flourishing?  
Abolitionism does not provide answers to questions concerning conflicts. Regan, in contrast, 
provides some guidance by introducing six principles that help resolve conflicts (see ‘Literature 
review’), but also assumes that institutionalized forms of animal use always constitute a violation of 
animal rights (Regan 2004 [1983]:334). This view, however, neglects the continual conflicts between 
humans and other animals, and that moral theories concerning justice cannot be separated from 
questions about constraints, such as ‘social, economic, or historical circumstances, moral 
disagreements or human nature’ (Garner 2013:13).  
With increasing social security, prosperity, food security and self-sufficiency in terms of quantities of 
food (including lower costs for consumers, achieved through industrialised agriculture) (Marie 2006; 
Lengwiler 2015), and automatization (substituting working animals), those conflicts and constraints 
have decreased. However, there are still conflicting matters to be resolved, such as the risk of illness 
and disease transmitted through animals (e.g. rats) (Sunstein 2005:12), or the dependence of some 
humans on meat, for example, the need for hunting and bushmeat of desperately poor miners in 
some African countries, versus the survival of chimpanzees (Sunstein 2005:295). In the following 
part, it will be proposed that those situations might rather be considered moral tragedies occurring 
in a moral storm, which need to be resolved in a just manner based on a different approach to 
simply stating that rights ought not to be infringed (see also chapter eight). 
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7.3.1 MORAL TRAGEDIES AND MORAL CORRUPTION 
A moral tragedy is a conflict of fundamental entitlements (Nussbaum 2000:1036). Such conflicts are 
about more than clashes of trivial interests, but about issues that go ‘to the heart of that person’s 
being’ (Nussbaum 2000:1014). In other words, they concern fundamental requirements for 
flourishing. For some those might be human rights as outlined in the respective Declaration (The 
United Nations General Assembly 1948); for Nussbaum (2000:1021–22) it is the capabilities list; and 
across species we might refer to the five freedoms (Farm Animal Welfare Council 2009b), the five 
domains (Mellor 2016b) or the five provisions (Mellor 2016a).  
Following Aquinas, Nussbaum divides these dilemmas into dilemmas secundum quid (caused by 
one’s own fault) and simpliciter (no-fault). Moreover, the latter can be further divided into dilemmas 
that are corrigible by rearranging the circumstances versus those that are not (acknowledging the 
difficulty of discerning between the two) (Nussbaum 2000:1016). She also argues that moral 
tragedies are potentially to some degree a ‘structural feature of human life’ but one that might be 
more often caused by habit and tradition, rather than natural necessity (Nussbaum 2000:1013, 
1015). Hence, such tragedies raise the question of where society has gone wrong, and the remedies 
that are to be taken, as the costs of moral tragedy are especially burdensome and should be avoided 
if possible (and lamented if not) (Nussbaum 2000:1020). 
Human-animal relationships and their associated moral issues are, however, more than a moral 
tragedy; they are also ethical failures caused by what Gardiner terms a perfect moral storm. In his 
metaphor the perfect moral storm is characterised by several factors (or storms) coming together 
and impeding the ability to behave ethically (Gardiner 2011:7). Each storm interferes with the course 
of ethical action, contributing to an increasing ‘moral vulnerability’ (Gardiner 2011:6–7). The 
convergence of all factors causes the perfect storm which pressures us to ‘distort our moral 
sensibilities.’ The resulting moral corruption facilitates the continued exploitation of – in Gardiner’s 
book – the environment (Gardiner 2011:8). 
The analogy of the perfect moral storm, and its three individual storms morally corrupting 
discussions and actions concerning climate change (cf. Gardiner 2011:7), can be easily transferred to 
our dealings with animals. The first storm concerns an asymmetry of power which is clearly 
applicable to human-animal relationships, as there are numerous possibilities open to humans to 
take ‘undue advantage of’ other animals (Gardiner 2011:7). Moreover, many of these possibilities 
greatly serve our own interests. The second one is an interspecies (rather than intergenerational) 
storm. Human actions interfere with the lives of other species, while the actions of other species 




communicate with us in the way other humans do; they cannot claim rights like humans. Just 
treatment is very much a matter of altruism from the human side (cf. Garner 2005b:42), contributing 
to the interspecies storm. The third storm is of a theoretical kind as there is no consensus on what 
framework we ought to use, as the different theories conflict with each other (compare the welfare 
versus rights debate), and as they all have limitations. 
The mechanism to avoid real engagement with environmental issues, outlined by Gardiner, also 
seem somewhat familiar in our dealings with animal welfare/rights matters.132 For example, buck-
passing occurs in our human-animal relationships when consumers expect the industry (or 
government) to ensure proper standards, while the industry might point to consumer choice.  
This moral vulnerability and the pressures of the storm exert a strong force on our dealings with 
moral questions concerning animals. The occurring moral corruption is best described, in Gardiner’s 
words (2011:307), as:  
a tendency to rationalize, which casts doubt on the validity and/or strictness of moral claims, 
by seeking to pervert their status and substance, and in doing so aims to make those claims 
better suited to our wishes and inclinations, and destroys the characteristics in virtue of 
which we respect them. 
I believe there are at least two important ways in which this moral corruption occurs with regards to 
animals. Firstly, in cases of true conflicts (i.e. moral tragedies), the most just solution might be to 
make some humans worse off rather than individuals of another species (cf. Regan 2004 
[1983]:305). However, I would imagine that such a conclusion would not be widely accepted, and 
that humans will tend to favour their own fate over those of other species (issue one). Indeed, as 
reviewed earlier, authors like Singer or Regan, who are in favour of species equality, also argue for 
anthropocentric favouritism in such cases. Secondly, many of our practices concerning animals might 
not be necessary as such, and instead serve interests other than those associated with fundamental 
claims. Yet, most people seem to struggle to adopt new ways of thinking and ethically improved 
behaviour, and instead tend to rationalise and defend their current behaviour (issue two). Human 
nature, in particular psychological mechanisms, constitute a powerful source of corruption. 
 
7.3.2 HUMAN NATURE AND BEHAVIOUR CHANGE 
Moral corruption appears to lie in our human nature, influencing our decisions and behaviour on 
both aforementioned issues. It exerts particularly strong forces with regards to issue two: human 
                                                                 
132 Those mechanisms include distraction, complacency, selective attention, unreasonable doubt, delusion, 
pandering, hypocrisy (Gardiner 2011:45), or disputing the application of the moral claim, arguing that 
compliance will have unintended bad consequences, reducing the magnitude of the moral demand, 





behaviour change. This is the case as behaviour often influences our attitudes rather than the other 
way around, leaving us vulnerable to rationalise rather than scrutinise our own behaviour. For 
instance, Coleman (2010:79) demonstrated that pig-farmers substantially improved their attitudes 
and behaviour after a cognitive-behavioural intervention, i.e. after having changed their actual 
behaviour first, rather than just being exposed to an awareness-raising campaign that aims at 
changing attitudes.  
Humans can make rational decisions, but more often than not, they are influenced and also 
somewhat constrained by psychological mechanisms (Kahneman 2012), their habits (Duhigg 2013), 
and context (Thaler and Sunstein 2009). Even when people hold sympathetic attitudes, their 
behaviour can be influenced by external circumstances. For example, in an experiment, seminarians 
attended a workshop on being a good Samaritan and were then told to go to another meeting. The 
simple cue of learning that they were running late, made them less likely to stop and help another 
person in need (who was an actor for this study) (Gladwell 2013). 
Various authors discuss the attitude-behaviour gap, i.e. that attitudes, values or knowledge are not 
directly linked to behaviour, including discrepancies between concerns for animals and the 
environment and actual consumer choices (Marteau and Lerman 2001; Levitt 2003:24; Cooney 
2011:50-51; de Bakker and Dagevos 2012).133 While attitudes certainly play some role, social 
pressure and to some extent perceived behavioural control (one’s belief about how easy or difficult 
performing a certain behaviour is) might also impact one’s intentions and actual behaviour (Chan 
1998). Inconsistencies between attitudes (e.g. believing that animals should have good lives) and 
behaviour (e.g. buying animal products from farming systems that did not provide a ‘good’ life) are 
common-place. Hence, some researchers argue that the current focus on awareness raising and 
expecting subsequent behaviour change (cf. Garner 2005a:164) is a rather ineffective way to 
achieving change (Diekmann and Preisendörfer 1998; Marteau and Lerman 2001; Barr 2003; Cooney 
2011:130; Gardiner 2011:308; Ito 2017:83).  
Moreover, people tend to interpret new information in line with their own experiences, meaning 
that they will only act on it if it fits within their pre-existing conceptions (Diekmann and 
Preisendörfer 1998:82; Barr 2003:228). Barr (2003) provides an extensive list of other factors that 
might further influence how people react to, process, and act on critical information. These include 
not only values (such as biocentrism versus anthropocentrism), but situational factors (such as 
access to goods and services; sociodemographic make-up, knowledge and experience of relevant 
behaviours), different types of knowledge (abstract versus concrete), psychological variables (sense 
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of altruism, intrinsic motivations, subjective norms), perceived impact of own actions, logistics, and 
whether decisions have been made democratically (i.e. including oneself) or by others. In particular, 
(in-)convenience134  is flagged up as crucial to whether people will change their behaviour, e.g. 
maintain their vegetarian/vegan lifestyles, or recycle (Barr 2003:237). Barr (2003:238) concludes that 
certain behaviours (waste minimization in his example) are restricted to those who are already 
intrinsically motivated by their values to engage in the desired behaviours (to some extent). 
Awareness raising campaigns might reinforce their commitment but fail to target the sectors of 
society who are not yet engaged (and who might or might not already have the right values in place).  
One difficulty that in particular vegetarian or vegan campaigns (or any campaign aiming at changing 
people’s individual attitudes and behaviour) face, is that the culprit of the grievance is the person 
targeted (cf. Cooney 2011:41). Campaigns aiming at eliciting outrage over an issue external to the 
target audience (e.g. a particular badly managed farm) might be able to more easily and successfully 
reach out to people (Mika 2006). However, messages supporting veganism indirectly point to the 
wrongness of one’s past and current dietary practices and associated beliefs. This threatens people’s 
sense of self-worth (as do many issues every day) and activates a ‘psychological immune system’ in 
many people (cf. Sherman and Cohen 2006:183–84).135  
A variety of mechanisms exists to protect (or enhance) self-integrity136 in the light of such threats. 
They can be considered adaptive responses to ensure mental well-being, but become maladaptive if 
they impede learning and development (Sherman and Cohen 2006:184–85). Those responses 
include acceptance of the threat (and subsequent change of attitudes and behaviour), amelioration 
(downplaying the importance of the threat), or defence and rejection (Festinger 1957; Sherman and 
Cohen 2006:186). Diekmann and Preisendörfer (1998:79–93) describe similar mechanisms that 
reconcile inconsistencies between attitudes and behaviour. For example, their attention-shifting 
strategy equals amelioration as people shift attention to other ‘more important’ aspects in their 
lives, that might show them in a more positive light. At the same time, people might then more 
strongly point to the negative aspects of the attitudes and behaviours they would like to resist 
                                                                 
134 Various studies on environmentally friendly behaviour, and especially recycling, concluded that increasing 
the ease of recycling is one of the most effective ways to increase participation (Mrema 2008; O’Neill 2016:29 
and references therein). Similarly, while citizens might recognize the benefits of certain environmentally 
friendly practices, they are less likely to engage in them if they are inconvenient (Ito 2017:86). Marketing 
research also showed that even those concerned about animal welfare were not willing to sacrifice 
convenience and the preferences of their families (Ball 2015). 
135 This issues has also been raised by one animal rights campaigner who argued that Greenpeace can more 
easily reach out to the public by asking people for donations in order to help the environment, in contrast to 
animal rights groups which ask people to become vegan in order to help animals. 
136 Self-integrity, as defined by Sherman and Cohen (2006:185–86), refers to thinking of oneself, on the whole, 




adopting.137 Similarly, Hills (1993:124) found relatively high levels of ambivalence in attitudes 
regarding the treatment of animals in her study, but also pointed out that people assigned their 
values concerning animals lesser importance, compared to other concerns. Another mechanism is 
the so-called low-cost strategy, meaning that people will behave differently (or environmentally as in 
Diekmann and Preisendörfer 1998:89) if the change is not associated with high costs, such as 
inconvenience, hassle, or social stigma. Lastly, people might apply the subjective-rationality strategy, 
meaning that they rationalise their behaviour and conclude that it is in their disadvantage to behave 
in a particular way. This could be the case if the system is organised in such a way that engaging in 
different behaviour is associated with more costs.138 Alternatively, they might feel that either their 
individual actions would not have enough impact, and thus it makes no sense to engage in the 
behaviour in question; or enough other people are already engaging in particular behaviours, 
effectively resolving the problem (free-rider problem) (Diekmann and Preisendörfer 1998:93).  
None of these factors justifies wrong behaviour and transgression of ethical principles. However, 
they pose real and powerful hurdles to overcome for advocates of ethical theories. This struggle is 
exemplified in the abolitionist position, as it condemns any form of campaigning that does not 
directly aim for the ideal ethical state, at the expense of neglecting the influence of moral 
corruption. Ideal ethical theories are not well suited to advise animal advocates in their everyday 
work, as they prescribe principles that are to be implemented immediately. They theorise the best 
course of action in a neutral setting, but one in which such contingent constraints do not apply; and 
without reflection on whether solutions are feasible or achievable (Gardiner 2011:399). Hence, a 
non-ideal theory might be better suited to cater for the needs of activists, who also often referred to 
non-ideal real world circumstances in the interviews. 
 
7.3.3 NON-IDEAL THEORIES  
Non-ideal theories acknowledge moral tragedies and constraints of moral corruption to some 
extent. These constraints are important as a theory of justice should not be divorced from its limiting 
factors, such as aforementioned ‘unsympathetic social, economic, or historical circumstances, moral 
disagreement or human nature’ (Garner 2013:13). A non-ideal theory can acknowledge those 
constraining factors and aid the transition from the current status quo towards the ideal aim, by 
conceptualising and justifying intermediate steps (Gardiner calls non-ideal theories 'ethics of 
                                                                 
137 For example, younger people who do not recycle, might not do so because they do not possess and cannot 
afford a car. As part of an attention-shifting strategy, they then might point to the negative environmental 
impact of cars. However, it is the convenience factor that influences their behaviour in this case. 
138 For example, lower prices of non-ecological products contribute to people buying those rather than their 




transition,' 2011:400; also Garner 2013:12), which may also help to slowly overcome moral 
corruption.  
Critiques of non-ideal theories regard them as moral ‘sell-outs’ that justifies the status quo (cf. 
Garner 2013:10–11). Moreover, critiques might consider current institutions as seriously flawed, 
resulting in their rejection and the demand to ‘radically reconceptualise’ them (rather than gradually 
changing them) (Gardiner 2011:453). However, while non-ideal theories concede certain aspects of 
the status quo, they ought to still substantially challenge it in order to be valid. Secondly, even if 
current institutions would need to be overthrown to change the status quo, a transformation 
overnight is still unlikely. Non-ideal theories could then hold important positions, for example one 
which aims at preventing injustices from worsening (Gardiner 2011:463). To some extent, it is 
unclear what factors differentiate valid from invalid non-ideal theories (Gardiner 2011:463; Garner 
2013:12). Gardiner (2011:463) mentions that the difference between ideal and non-ideal might be a 
matter of degree rather than kind. Rawls holds that non-ideal theories should enable courses of 
action that are (a) in line with moral requirements, (b) politically possible, and (c) effective (Rawls 
1999 [1971]:215–18; Garner 2013:12). However, those requirements can conflict, as Garner 
(2013:12) points out.  
The framework proposed in the next chapter should also be considered such a non-ideal theory, as it 
acknowledges the influence of moral corruption, causing humans to favour their own fate over those 
of other species. Hence, the framework stipulates an equal status of animals with regards to claims 
to their lives and claims to be free from inflicted suffering and pain. However, in cases of moral 
tragedy, it allows favouring the lives of humans or the prevention of suffering and pain to humans 
over those of animals (addressing issue one). Moreover, it takes moral corruption into account, and 
hence argues that some proposed solutions to animal rights issues, which fall short of fully realising 
fundamental animal claims, might be accepted, as long as they are an intermediate step for society 
to move closer to the ideal state (addressing issue two).  
 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter argued in favour of acknowledging that humans and animals have equally strong claims 
to their lives, and to freedom from at least moderate to severe forms of pain and suffering inflicted 
by other moral agents. However, the chapter then proceeds by arguing that little attention has been 
paid in animal ethics theories (in particular in animal rights) to resolving conflicts, which were 
conceptualised as moral tragedies here. Secondly, their ideal theory character has rendered them 
difficult to implement within the work of animal advocates, at least concerning those campaigns that 




needed, as part of intermediate steps towards a society where animal rights gradually become more 
and more recognised. Nevertheless, to infringe on another beings’ rights should never be taken 
lightly, and needs to undergo scrutiny with regards to why and how such infringement is justified (cf. 




CHAPTER 8: THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN A NON-IDEAL WORLD 
Trying to establish the superiority of utilitarianism over deontology, or vice versa, will not settle 
ethical questions around other animals – those matters have not been agreed on for humans either. 
Instead it might be more fruitful to look at how human ethical questions are resolved, despite 
widespread disagreements and conflicts of values, norms, and principles. This might be particularly 
useful as this thesis aims to be applicable and relevant to animal activism and society beyond the 
‘ivory towers’ of academia.  
Thus, this chapter proposes the principle of proportionality, also called means-end testing, as an 
approach to resolving human-animal conflicts in a manner that acknowledges their assumed equal 
moral status. It assesses the legitimacy, suitability, necessity and proportionality (in the narrow 
sense) of practices in which (fundamental) conflicts occur. It will be argued that unequal treatment 
and the neglect of an animal’s fundamental claim is only justified if the principle of proportionality 
has been rigorously applied. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the proposed 
framework is to be considered a non-ideal theory. Thus, it also acknowledges our prevalent moral 
corruption (cf. Gardiner 2011) leading humans to favour their own fate over those of other species, 
and somewhat hindering us from behaving fully ethically towards other sentient animals.   
This essentially rights-based approach, however, makes some concessions to, and resonates partially 
with, utilitarian and welfare theories for at least three reasons. Firstly, it questions the assumption 
that animals necessarily have rights to liberty and that they are necessarily harmed by being used, 
implying that their use is not always morally wrong, as discussed previously (cf. Cochrane 2012; 
Garner 2013). Secondly, in cases of conflicting fundamental claims, it allows for balancing (speaking 
to utilitarians, and welfare interviewees who referred to weighing interests in their ethical 
deliberations). Thirdly, based on these considerations, the approach does not call for immediate, 
unambiguous and unequivocal abolition (cf. Francione 1996:2), which was also rejected by all 
participants in this research.  
The first part of this chapter will provide arguments in favour of using the proportionality approach, 
and a definition of the principle. The second part considers two examples (animal farming and 
experimentation), which will provide a sketch of how the framework might be applied in practice.  
 
8.1 COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS VERSUS PROPORTIONALITY FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
It has been argued so far that – in the absence of any convincingly objective measure to claim 
otherwise – animals have equally strong rights compared to humans, to at least freedom from 
(moderate to severe) pain and suffering, and death. If animals can be harmed like humans, and if we 




harm being inflicted on animals. It would be unjust to do so. However, not all things are equal, and 
salient moral corruption hampers ethical behaviour. Furthermore, there are exceptions when we are 
prepared to harm other animals, including humans. During states of (extreme) scarcity, war, or 
potentially self-defence, one might need to engage in acts that would be considered inappropriate if 
the circumstances were different. Some of those situations might be considered moral tragedies (cf. 
Nussbaum 2000; Gardiner 2011).  
Conflicts are inevitable for various reasons, such as a lack of sufficient resources. In other cases, 
inequality will arise as some humans are more creatively and cognitively able to appropriate a 
greater proportion of resources. Out of that, the virtue of justice is born, to ensure fairer distribution 
and treatment, so that all or at least a greater number of humans may be able to fulfil crucial needs 
(Hume 2012). 
If resources are, however, so scarce that they can only sustain a small number of beings, questions 
of justice seem difficult, if not impossible, to answer, if all involved parties share an equal moral 
status and possess equally strong claims to those resources and to fair treatment. Such conflicts are 
of particular concern today, given the increase of land use, deforestation and subsequent 
decimation of various species populations, and eventual extinctions. How much land can humans 
claim for themselves and how much ought we leave to wild animals? How should we structure our 
societies and our lives in order to accommodate the needs of various sentient species? And what 
degree of concessions to other species should be considered too much? How do we balance our own 
claims to flourishing against those of other species? 
One possible way of resolving conflicting claims is a cost-benefit analysis which, however, is often 
(but not necessarily) utilitarian in nature. Prominent criticism of utilitarianism and of the cost- or 
harm-benefit analysis has been reviewed in chapter two (‘Literature review’). One critique highlights 
counter-intuitive outcomes, for example, that utilitarianism potentially could justify the killing of an 
innocent person based on accruing benefits from such an act. Another critique, that has not yet 
been raised, stems from Nussbaum (2000:1032). She argues that a cost-benefit analysis does not 
distinguish between infringing fundamental entitlements and others. In other words, it does not 
divide the different options into classes where ‘serious ethical wrongdoing occurs’ and those where 
it does not. It considers all entitlements as being of the same kind but of different weight. Hence, it 
neglects the ‘moral tragedy’ that occurs when fundamental claims conflict, and fails to ask the 
question of whether society has gone wrong somewhere (Nussbaum 2000:1036, 1032).  
In comparison to utilitarianism, deontological approaches would respond that consequences should 
not be the measure used to establish the right or wrongness of such actions. Deontological 




harming a sentient being. Yet, there are cases where one might need to harm another sentient being 
in order to fulfil one’s own fundamental claims; in which cases one might need to weigh those 
claims. Deontological objections to weighing, however, fail to acknowledge that conflicts between 
fundamental rights are unavoidable.  
If we chose not to use a balancing approach, a hierarchy of rights would need to be established to 
resolve those conflicts. Yet, such a hierarchy would inevitably fail, as the intensity of infringement 
and context are crucial to determining which right should be realised at the expense of another. 
Alexy (2003:136) provides examples to demonstrate this; one concerns a conflict between freedom 
of expression and the protection of personality. In this example, a court ruled that a magazine had 
the right to free speech, even when it meant insulting a person in the case of calling someone a 
‘born murderer.’ In contrast, calling the same person a ‘cripple’ was considered unjustified as it was 
clearly associated with humiliation and disrespect, and the infringement of a paraplegic’s personality 
rights. The freedom of expression, in the latter case, did not weigh as much as the protection of 
personality. Therefore, in some cases, it might be freedom of expression taking precedence, while in 
others the protection of personality weighs more heavily. In cases of euthanasia of animals, freedom 
from suffering and pain outweighs the right to life. A hierarchy of different rights would be unable to 
provide guidance in each and every context, and would fail to provide flexibility depending on the 
intensity of infringement. Some sort of weighing needs to occur in such situations, and one 
important potential method is the principle of proportionality. 
This principle is widely used today to decide matters of conflicting interests within the law, including 
conflicts between the state or public, and fundamental individual rights. According to Engle (2012:1–
2) it is used worldwide and across millennia, having its foundation in Aristotle’s theories. Others 
suggest that the principle of proportionality was included even earlier in the Code of Hammurabi 
(Babylonian law code, 1795-1750 BC; Lillian Goldman Law Library 2008b) which stated: ‘an eye for 
an eye’, and ‘a tooth for a tooth’ (Lillian Goldman Law Library 2008a). In contrast, Engle (2012:2) 
considers the principle of proportionality a ‘legal rule that state action must be a rational means to a 
permissible end, which does not unduly invade fundamental human rights.’ In more general terms, 
proportionality is fulfilled if the means are appropriate to the ends, i.e. ‘the measure must not 
exceed in intensity what was required by the pursued objective’ (DJGHK 2013:1). 
The principle has been heavily implemented, starting in Prussia at the end of the nineteenth century 
from where it spread across the globe to different jurisdictions (Engle 2012:6; DJGHK 2013:1), 
including most prominently within the Western context of this thesis: the Treaty on European Union 
(European Union 2009). The principle is exemplified in laws governing self-defence (in which victims 




laws concerning crime and punishment (with the latter ideally being proportionate to the committed 
crime). Within EU treaties as well as internationally, this became the dominant method of global 
legal convergence, according to Engle (2012:10).  
The principle of proportionality should not be confused with interest evaluation and balancing of 
alienable rights. Rather the principle is used to resolve conflicts between fundamental norms, or 
what Engle (2012:2) calls inalienable, universal, or natural rights. Natural rights, or valid claims as 
referred to in this thesis, do not include conditions that aim at maximizing flourishing; rather they 
are minimum requirements to give an individual being the chance to flourish within its environment 
and based on its capacities (cf. Nussbaum 2006). One might consider the Declaration of Human 
Rights a statement of minimum requirements for the human species (The United Nations General 
Assembly 1948), and some of those claims are also encoded in legislative rights.139 
Although human rights are considered universal and inalienable in the Western world, it does not 
follow that they are absolute in the sense that no trade-off is ever possible. Indeed, human rights of 
different individuals, or between society and individuals, can come into conflict in various ways (see 
DJGHK 2013). Fundamental rights might constitute the highest protection that can be granted in the 
Western world, and they protect individuals against others’ claims of lesser significance to 
flourishing. However, when conflicts between those fundamental rights arise, the principle of 
proportionality gives guidance on dealing with those conflicts in a manner that will limit the moral 
damage, and that will be more just. Nevertheless, full justice cannot be achieved in a situation of 
moral tragedy. 
Today, Western societies and their industries are heavily dependent on animals for resources such 
as food, clothes, or drugs, and animal-derived by-products are often used in many other goods such 
as cosmetics, fertilizer, dyes, lubricants, bank notes, paper, musical instruments, cleaning and 
polishing compounds, and so forth (Klinkenborg 2001; Wise 2005:20). Some might argue that we 
encounter a fundamental conflict in several of those cases, as not only fundamental animal, but also 
human claims, are at stake. Farmers might maintain that animal farming is necessary to feed an 
ever-growing population (cf. Foer 2010:96). We also, as mentioned earlier, face conflicts over 
resources, especially land use. Hence, I propose to assess and discuss human-animal relations, or 
practices using animals, within a framework guided by the principle of proportionality, as a non-ideal 
theory (i.e. acknowledging moral corruption).  
The principle of proportionality within its legal context concerning humans would most likely 
acknowledge some fundamental rights as firm boundaries, meaning that certain practices are ruled 
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out absolutely (for example, imprisonment without trial, or torture of prisoners, at least in European 
countries). In contrast, the killing and suffering of animals is not fully ruled out within the proposed 
framework, based on the earlier discussed anthropocentric concession and non-ideal character of 
the approach. However, such violations ought to be minimised to the fullest extent possible; and any 
course of action falling short of full realisation of rights, needs to be defended thoroughly. One 
argument could be that full realisation is not achievable at this point in time, but that the proposed 
solution might move society closer to achieving this in the long term. 
The following part of this chapter will introduce the principle in more detail, and will explain when 
and how to apply it. The chapter’s second part will discuss the principle with regards to animal 
farming and animal experimentation to illustrate how it might be applied as non-ideal theory (i.e. 
acknowledging limitations caused by moral corruption). Lastly, some limitations and objections will 
be raised, but it will be concluded that the principle of proportionality would be the most just 
framework, for situations in which full justice cannot be achieved, and if moral corruption could be 
overcome.   
 
8.2 DEFINITION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY 
The proportionality principle consists of three elements which have been developed by the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany, and have been adopted in a similar manner by others, such as the 
European Court of Human Rights (Alexy 2003:135; DJGHK 2013:2). The three elements include: 
(i) Suitability  
(ii) Necessity  
(iii) Proportionality (in the narrow sense)  
Suitability refers to the measure being suitable for achieving the desired aim. Necessity means that 
no other less restrictive mean could have been used to achieve the same end. Proportionality in the 
strict sense appeals to the intensity of the measure, which ought not to be disproportionate to the 
objective (DJGHK 2013:1). In some cases, a fourth step is added (cf. Engle 2012:8) which aims at 
ensuring that the pursued aim is legitimate. Alternatively, this step might be subsumed within 
suitability (cf. DJGHK 2013:6–7). For example, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal assumes that 
identical treatment should be accorded to comparable situations (cf. principle of justice in DeGrazia 
1996:50; Regan 2004 [1983]:128; Wise 2005:30). Nevertheless, exact equality is not necessarily 
required if there are good reasons to justify differential legal treatment. It needs to be shown that 
the differential treatment pursues a legitimate aim; and ‘for any aim to be legitimate, a genuine 




To reiterate, such balancing within the principle of proportionality only applies if costs are 
unavoidable (Alexy 2003:136) with regards to fundamental claims to flourishing. They might 
constitute minimum requirements but ought to be realised to the ‘greatest extent possible, given 
the legal and factual possibilities’ (Alexy 2000:47, 2003:135). The principle helps to find a fair balance 
between the demands of society or a community and the protection of an individual’s fundamental 
claims (DJGHK 2013:1), and also between individuals (Alexy 2003:131, 134; Engle 2012:5). 
The difference between the principle of proportionality (means-end testing) and interest balancing 
(cost-benefit analysis) is crucial, and sometimes these two approaches are confused (Engle 2012:9). 
Proportionality always concerns fundamental and inalienable rights or claims; while interest 
balancing concerns claims other than fundamental ones (Engle 2012:8). Proportionality seeks to 
maximise the fulfilment of all fundamental rights, while trying to minimise their invasion. For 
example, the scenario discussed earlier in this thesis, about whether it is justified to torture a person 
(or an animal) for entertainment in order to make other people happy, could be justified in the 
utilitarian calculus if it could be shown that the benefits exceeded the costs. Applying the principle of 
proportionality, however, would lead to the conclusion that this would be unjustified, because a 
claim to entertainment is not on a par with claims concerning freedom from pain and suffering.140 
Additionally, the principle acknowledges that being happy or being entertained could be achieved by 
other means (element of necessity).  
Some interviewed activists, particularly those campaigning for animal welfare, also called upon the 
principle of proportionality, without realising it. The questions of why and how are inherent to the 
principle. When it is asked why an animal should be used, this constitutes a question about the aim 
and its legitimacy. If fundamental claims to flourishing are at stake for the animal, the aim can only 
be legitimate if crucial needs of humans also need to be served. Suitability, necessity and 
proportionality in the narrow sense speak to how we are using an animal, i.e. ideally with the least 
invasive method that fulfils the pursued objective. 
 
8.3 A SKETCHED APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE 
In the following part, the principle will be applied to two different practices involving animals: animal 
farming and animal experimentation. These two areas were extensively discussed within the 
interviews and concern conflicts of fundamental claims, as opposed to companion animal keeping 
which does not necessarily pose a conflict, if no harm is inflicted on the animal. These shall therefore 
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be used as practical examples to apply the proportionality principle. The two cases will be evaluated 
against the extended version of the principle (i.e. including four instead of three elements), and the 
limitations caused by moral corruption will also be considered. Thus, the extended version includes: 
(i) Legitimacy (fundamental claims are at stake)  
(ii) Suitability (the measure is suitable for achieving the aim) 
(iii) Necessity (the measure constitutes the least restrictive means) 
(iv) Proportionality in the strict sense (the measure is proportionate to the pursued end) 
(v) Moral corruption 
 
8.3.1 ANIMAL FARMING 
Freedom from hunger and thirst, or in terms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘the right 
to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being […], including food,’ constitutes a 
fundamental claim.141 Malnutrition, hunger and famines have been a constant part of human history, 
and probably constituted an essential struggle for humankind throughout our existence. The human 
struggle for food has always led to conflicts with other animals, either through direct competition for 
food sources, or by appropriating the animals themselves as a resource.  
Those dynamics have shifted in recent centuries as humans have managed to reduce direct 
competition (e.g. through direct persecution, see Breitenmoser 1998), and through increasingly 
industrialised animal agriculture after World War II (Marie 2006). This led to an unprecedented 
increase in meat and dairy consumption (Sans and Combris 2015; WHO 2017), and practices causing 
suffering and pain to animals became common place in intensive farming (see for example Harrison 
et al. 2013). The animals’ rights to freedom from death, suffering and pain conflict with the 
fundamental claim of humans to food. Hence, animal farming constitutes a matter that can and 
arguably should be evaluated using the principle of proportionality.  
 
LEGITIMACY 
As the need for food is crucial to flourishing, animal farming is prima facie connected with a 
legitimate aim, even though it might conflict with fundamental claims of animals. However, as some 
rights activists pointed out: agriculture has become agribusiness, and its purpose has shifted away 
from feeding the human population, to also making money. Lassen et al. (2006:1003) also suggest 
that the principle of proportionality (which they suggest ought to be applied to biotechnology) 
entails a more demanding notion of usefulness, one in which mere profit does not justify ethical 
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transgressions. Yet, it is questionable if individual, and in particular small-scale farmers – regardless 
of whether they focus on animal farming or on crops – have high revenues. Instead they might need 
to focus on money (potentially at the expense of animal welfare) to stay economically viable. 
Competitive markets cause lower food prices, while price instability is created by speculators 
(Collinson 2010). The latter is especially concerning as financial institutions enter the realm of 
agriculture with the intention to speculate and make money, rather than feeding the world. While 
those developments could potentially be ethically worrying regarding their impact on animal 
welfare, for the purpose of this argument it shall be assumed that animal farming primarily serves to 
provide food.  
 
SUITABILITY 
Animal-derived food products are a suitable measure to fulfill the need for food, but only to some 
extent. Access to food is a crucial requirement for wellbeing, but not all products are equally suitable 
to contribute to wellbeing (i.e. health, here). Arguably, many food items one finds in today’s 
supermarkets, whether they contain animal-derived ingredients or not, are not necessarily healthy, 
due to high contents of sugar, salt, or fat. Unhealthy products, derived from practices that infringe 
others’ fundamental claims, need to be considered unsuitable as they do not fulfill the objective of 
sustaining flourishing. Conversely, if an unhealthy food item is produced in an ethically 
unproblematic manner, its consumption might not raise such ethical concerns.  
Secondly, overconsumption of great amounts of certain animal-derived products is linked to health 
risks (e.g. Campbell and Campbell II 2006). For instance, red and processed meats increase the 
chance of bowel cancer (International Agency for Research on Cancer 2015). Studies also link 
vegetarian diets or diets containing little meat to decreased risks of cardiovascular diseases and 
other cancers (Walker et al. 2005:349; McEvoy et al. 2012; Orlich and Fraser 2014; Westhoek et al. 
2014; Dinu et al. 2017). Therefore, meat is suitable to meet the claim to food, but only in small 
amounts, for example, no more than 500g of red meat per week, and less or no processed meat, as 




The principle of proportionality also requires that we ask if it is necessary to use a certain measure to 
reach an objective, or whether there are less restrictive means available. Indeed, vegetarian and 




to life, and freedom from suffering and pain.142 Assuming that vegetarian and vegan diets can sustain 
health and wellbeing (Walker et al. 2005:349; McEvoy et al. 2012; Orlich and Fraser 2014; Westhoek 
et al. 2014; Dinu et al. 2017), the element of necessity, all things being equal, is not met (as also 
animal rights and some welfare participants pointed out).  
However, the principle does not prescribe vegetarianism nor veganism as compulsory for at least 
four reasons. Firstly, in-vitro or laboratory-cultured meat using animals as cell donors (cf. Garner 
2013:136; Singer 2013) in a way that does not interfere with an animal’s fundamental rights, would 
be justified within the proportionality approach. Secondly, some animals are not considered  
sentient, such as invertebrates, meaning that their consumption would not raise ethical concerns.143 
Thirdly, we might imagine – as some interviewees did – that farms could be set up in which the full 
flourishing of the animals is guaranteed. For example, humans might consume eggs, assuming the 
chickens are well taken care of, could live natural lives, that removing eggs causes a minimum of 
interference with animal wellbeing, and that they would not be slaughtered. Similarly, some milk 
might be taken from lactating cows, if they live flourishing lives, are not separated from their calves, 
and the retrieval of the milk does not overly negatively impact on the calf.144 Similar scenarios have 
been suggested by some welfare interviewees. Yet, it should also be noted that such production 
systems probably would be economically unviable if those requirements were met. 
The fourth reason questions the assumption that vegetarian and vegan diets are possible for 
everyone. Animal rights activists assume that everyone can thrive on such a diet, and they might be 
prima facie right. However, one welfare advocate in this study called this into question. Indeed some 
people report health struggles on a vegan or vegetarian diet, despite attempting to eat a balanced 
diet, and mention health improvements after reintroducing meat, dairy and/or eggs (Herzog 2011; 
Ebelthite 2015; Waters 2017). Health issues that are potentially related to a lack of animal products 
include anemia, vitamin B12 and protein deficiency. They can either stem from rare enzyme or 
biochemical deficiencies, or from an unbalanced diet. However, well-planned vegan and vegetarian 
diets can usually provide all necessary nutritional components  (BDA 2016; Greger 2016). 
Furthermore, it should also be noted that other less restrictive measures to improve health should 
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land, and accidentally (e.g. during crop harvest) or purposefully (pest control) kill animals in the process.   
143 However, recent scientific studies have challenged this assumption with regard to insects, arguing that they 
might possess sentience, at least to some degree (e.g. Klein and Barron 2016a, 2016b). Moreover, some 
interviewees were concerned about killing insects, as they extended their moral concern beyond vertebrates, 
i.e. those species for which sentience is widely accepted. 
144 Naturally, cows would not produce more milk than is needed for the calf. However, cows have been bred 
for bigger udders to increase productivity. There might be a possibility of allowing the calf to feed from the 
mother, while also retrieving some milk. The question that then needs to be answered, however, is whether 




be adopted first before opting for animal-derived products, for example through nutritional 
supplements. Moreover, high meat intake does not necessarily prevent anemia (Jamieson et al. 
2008; Kunitsugu et al. 2012), and a variety of plant-based iron sources are available without the 
potential negative side-effects of meat, related to health, animal welfare, and environmental impact 
(Agarwal 2013). Nevertheless, there might be a part of the population that struggles to access all 
necessary nutritional components or the necessary information or advice in order to overcome such 
deficiencies (for example, for economic reasons). The consumption of some animal products for this 
part of the population might then be necessary in order to maintain health. However, the 
proportionality approach would also call on society to increase the availability and access to 
nutritionally sound diets and information on these (potentially including free advice from physicians 
on how to overcome deficiencies). 
Other health-related problems that might lead to a necessity to eat meat are avoidant or restrictive 
eating disorders. Those who suffer from such an eating disorder are not able to consume certain 
food items based on the food’s appearance, taste, texture, and so forth. Consumption of certain 
foods might lead to feeling of sickness and regurgitation (Fisher et al. 2014). For some, this could 
mean that food choices are already severely restricted and that eliminating another (potentially 
animal-derived) product from the diet could decrease health and wellbeing further. Yet, it should 
also be acknowledged that therapy might be a solution to overcome avoidant/restrictive eating 
disorder. If therapy, however, were to prove unsuccessful, the requirement of necessity would be 
fulfilled.  
 
PROPORTIONALITY IN THE NARROW SENSE 
Assuming that legitimacy, suitability, and necessity have been met for at least some parts of the 
human population, animal farming needs to be assessed regarding its proportionality, i.e. whether 
the practices do not exceed the invasiveness required to achieve the goal. Intensive farming, at least, 
it could be argued, is out of proportion to the goal of feeding the human population animal products 
– a view which all but one participant supported. It seems out of proportion because of the harm it 
causes to animals, but also the environment, and even in certain ways, to humans.  
While some might claim that intensive farming is needed to feed the population, this is in fact 
untrue. While malnutrition still poses a serious problem, with some 840 million people being 
undernourished, agricultural industry produces enough to feed the entire current population (FAO 
2002, 2003).145 More people today are overweight and obese than malnourished (NCD Risk Factor 
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Collaboration 2016); and a significant part of produce is wasted.146 Indeed, malnutrition and famines 
are not caused by a lack of production, but rather by failures of distribution, wars, and other reasons 
(Sen 1982; Federico 2005:1). The inequality in food production, distribution and quality is affecting 
developing countries in particular, as they face a so-called ‘double-burden’ of both malnourishment 
and obesity in the population (FAO 2006b). Food production, the way we eat and how it impacts on 
other humans, is in many ways also a human rights issue. The environmental impact of animal 
farming (cf. FAO 2006a) and zoonotic risks (exacerbated through the increased use of antibiotics, 
and crowding of animals in intensive farming systems) (Gilchrist et al. 2007), will also potentially 
affect poorer communities more strongly.  
Furthermore, it is possible to farm animals in less invasive ways, and painful husbandry practices like 
the castration of piglets without anesthesia appear unnecessary to the overall end goal. To take it 
one step further, society could discuss whether subsistence hunting, rather than farming, would be 
more suitable to feed the (most likely very small) part of the population that can legitimately claim 
to need meat. Hunting might constitute a less restrictive measure than farming, assuming that 
skilled hunters kill their prey painlessly and instantaneously. As for other animal products such as 
dairy and eggs, proportionality could be met if benign forms of farming as described above could be 
implemented. Considering those issues, proportionality of animal farming overall is not met in the 
case of intensive farming systems. Only the least invasive farming methods or potentially 
subsistence hunting might meet this requirement. 
Based on the principle of proportionality, it needs to be concluded that meat should only be 
consumed by those who genuinely require it for health reasons (and cannot sustain their health 
through other means); and certain animal-derived food items might be consumed in small amounts 
by the wider population. In both cases, however, the least restrictive farming system needs to be 
guaranteed, ensuring freedom from inflicted animal pain and suffering. 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF AND LIMITATIONS CAUSED BY MORAL CORRUPTION  
While it certainly seems appropriate to say that the above scenario is where society should be 
moving to, it does not follow that it is also currently feasible and realistic. It neglects socioeconomic 
and human behaviour change constraints (i.e. sources of moral corruption) that prevent people from 
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Resource Action Programme 2013). The latest report on food waste states 7.3 million tonnes for 2015 (The 
Waste and Resource Action Programme 2017). With regards to animal-derived products, Davis and D’Odorico 





living up to ideals. The following part will briefly review socioeconomic factors, but more importantly 
will argue that it seems unreasonable to expect the majority of the public to adopt a vegan diet 
immediately at this point in time.  
  
Socioeconomic factors  
Economic factors play a role in this discussion,147 as a reformation of current farming and food 
production practices will have far-reaching consequences and arguably needs to be realised slowly 
and over time. The development of feasible economic arguments might even be a stepping stone 
towards a more pronounced and sustainable change. Social change movements seem to achieve 
their goals more easily when coupled with economically achievable steps.148 
Socioeconomic factors can also potentially affect whether someone is more inclined or able to live 
well on a vegan diet, as some interviewees pointed out. A certain socioeconomic level might 
facilitate concern for animals, and also veganism, as high-quality plant-based products are more 
easily available to particular people. A person living in a less well-off neighborhood might not have 
the same access to such goods (cf. Sholl 2015).  
  
Human behaviour change constraints 
Human behaviour constraints might be even more decisive factors for limiting the implementation 
of widespread veganism, and substantial reduction of the consumption of animal products – as also 
pointed out in the interviews. This is not to say that it cannot be realised, but highlights the 
difficulties in achieving such a goal. This seems particularly true, if the issue of eating animal 
products in itself is conceptualized as a moral storm. Factors like habits, tradition, convenience or 
taste all can contribute to an ethical vulnerability regarding food choices (cf. Nestle et al. 1998; 
Shatenstein and Ghadirian 1998; Gibson and Brunstrom 2007; Just et al. 2007; Foer 2010:32, 194, 
263; Zur and Klöckner 2014). While some (interviewed) activists might assume that it is not difficult 
to change your diet, statistics suggest otherwise (also see Cooney 2014). A substantial number of 
                                                                 
147 For example, Waldau (2011:40) discusses the costs of animal farming to rural America; which could be a 
strong argument from an economic perspective. Later in his book, he also mentions that the ban on whaling – 
while causing some loss of jobs – also created more sustainable jobs through whale watching (Waldau 
2011:126).  
148 For example, Davis (2014:145) argues that the anti-slavery movement was more successful in Britain than in 
America, as slavery was less enmeshed in the local economy, but occurred mostly in remote colonies. 
However, financial compensations for planters was still needed to enable the cessation of slavery (Davis 
2014:269–70). Another example is given by Posner (2005:68) who argues that changing attitudes (with regards 
to the emancipation of women, or homosexuality) were due to material forces, rather than ideological ones. 
Although it is debatable that philosophical arguments have no or little influence in changing attitudes, as 
Posner argues, moral arguments might also be important in other ways. For example, people might like to 
think that their actions are motivated by good intentions rather than self-serving interests, as Thogersen and 




vegetarians (75% based on Herzog 2011; 86% according to Green 2014) and vegans (70% according 
to Green 2014) return to eating animal products after some time. Green (2014) concludes that two 
percent of the US population currently define themselves as vegetarian or vegan, but ten percent 
have done so at some point.  
Initial reasons to quit meat predominantly include health concerns, and ethical issues regarding 
animal farming; and to some extent environmental reasons; aversion to (the taste of) meat or 
animal products,149 or social pressure from others (Maurer 2002:10; Herzog 2011; Green 2014; 
Herzog 2011). The strongest factor causing people to reintroduce animal products into their diet was 
health (Herzog 2011; Green 2014; Ball 2015), followed by logistical difficulties (e.g. finding high 
quality food, preparation time), social stigmatisation, irresistible urges, and shifts in moral thinking 
(Herzog 2011; Green 2014; Ball 2015). Research from the Eller Business School of the University of 
Arizona concluded that veganism was considered impossible, and vegans annoying, by the general 
public; and that people would go out of their way to avoiding dealing with a vegan (Ball 2016). This 
finding resonates with the somewhat negative image that is associated with animal rights, as 
reported by interviewees. Negativity surrounding vegan or vegetarian products also impacts the 
perception of food by consumers who preferred food that was not labelled vegan or vegetarian (Ball 
2015). 
Indeed, the negative association with animal rights and veganism constitutes another aspect 
hampering ethical behaviour. Veganism sometimes is portrayed as an ‘all-or-nothing’ lifestyle: you 
are either a vegan or you are not; meaning that you either consume or never consume animal 
products. However, such a definition might be considered impractical.150 This binarity is sometimes 
also associated with a contest for purity (i.e. going above and beyond to abstain from animal-
products or from supporting companies and institutions that are associated with the use of animals) 
(Garner 2005a:164; Sholl 2015, and also reported in the interviews). As a consequence of this 
negative image and the difficulties of living up to such an ideal, some people might decide not to 
identify with veganism, but rather with flexitarianism (Frizzell 2017), or not to bother at all (cf. Ball 
and Friedrich 2009:55–60; Jacobsson and Lindblom 2012:49). One should also not forget that it is 
impossible to avoid being complicit in some animal use, given how deeply enmeshed it is within our 
society (Wise 2005:20). 
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considered a vegan if eating a vegan diet for a prolonged time but gives in to an ‘irresistible urge’ once? The 
Vegan Society (2017) provides a clarifying definition: ‘Veganism is a way of living which seeks to exclude, as far 





It could be argued that as more people become vegetarian and vegan, issues like logistical difficulties 
and social stigmatisation will be reduced, making it more likely for people to stick to their new diet 
and to identify with it more readily. After all, the Vegan Society (2016) reported a 350% increase of 
vegans in the UK since 2006; and meat consumption is declining in Europe (Scott-Thomas 2014). 
However, comparing the actual number of vegans (at least 542,000 according to The Vegan Society 
2016) to the number of the UK population in 2016 (65.6 million according to the Office for National 
Statistics 2017) paints a more modest picture. Furthermore, the decline in meat consumption might 
be driven by so-called flexitarians or reducetarians,151 rather than (just) vegetarians and vegans 
(Scott-Thomas 2014; Frizzell 2017). Conversely, Crawford (2015) argues that the growth of vegan 
products can be traced back to those who are reducing animal products, rather than eliminating 
them. Interestingly, the flexitarian movement is not driven by animal welfare or rights concerns 
alone, but also, for example, by rising meat prices, environmental impact and health risk awareness 
(Scott-Thomas 2014).  
 
CONCLUSION  
These psychological, habitual, and contextual barriers need to be taken into account; and in the light 
of this discussion I am slightly pessimistic about the ability of people to easily change their attitudes 
and behaviour. This should not be considered an excuse or easy way out of behaving fully ethically. It 
should only highlight the difficulties of doing so and remind us that a request for immediate, 
absolute and utopian visions are to some extent unreasonable. It should remind us that a step-by-
step approach, and certain concessions to those barriers, are inevitable. And it is a plea; the same 
one that Cavell (2008:123) makes in the book Philosophy & Animal Life when he explains his 
inconsistencies in values and behaviour towards animals: ‘What I would like to say is simply, “I am 
human” – but to whom can this plea be directed?’ 
For the application of the principle of proportionality within a non-ideal theory, this means that we 
might accept the limitations on fully ethical behaviour; in particular a limitation on expecting people 
to become vegan immediately. This does not hinder us from arguing that veganism is the ideal 
ethical behaviour. However, by switching focus to the limitations, we might look for intermediate 
steps that address those barriers. For an individual that might mean reducing the consumption of 
meat (instead of complete cessation) and not buying products derived from intensive farming 
practices. For society, it could involve decreasing the social stigma surrounding vegetarian- and 
veganism; and increasing the availability and affordability of plant-based products in supermarkets, 
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restaurants, cafes, and canteens in companies and public institutions (i.e. decreasing the factors of 
inconvenience and hassle), as also pointed out by one rights campaigner. Society and activists might 
also focus on those practices that cause proportionally more harm and suffering than others, and 
aim at abolishing those (for example intensive farming practices). All of these measures would be 
ethically acceptable within a non-ideal theory centred around the principle of proportionality, as 
firstly, they acknowledge moral corruption (and vulnerability). Secondly, they aim at reducing the 
infringement (or increasing the realisation) of animal rights, which is the primary goal (Alexy 
2000:295).  
 
8.3.2 ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION  
127 million non-human vertebrates were conservatively estimated to be used in scientific 
procedures worldwide in 2005 (including those used for provision of experimental tissues, 
maintaining established genetically modified strains, and breeding for laboratory use but killed as 
surplus to requirements) (Knight 2008). In 2016, 3.94 million procedures were conducted in Great 
Britain, of which 2.02 constituted experimental procedures, and 1.91 million were related to the 
creation or the breeding of genetically altered animals (not used further in experimental procedures) 
(Home Office UK 2017).  
Animal experimentation is conducted for a variety of reasons, for example, to test cosmetics 
(although such testing is now banned within the European Union), or to find cures, treatments and 
drugs for medical problems. Those experiments often violate the animal’s rights to freedom from 
death, pain and suffering, while serving human interests and claims which might or might not be 
fundamental ones. In order to establish whether these practices are in line with the principle of 
proportionality, different purposes need to be examined separately. The enquiry here shall be 
restricted to testing for cosmetics, fundamental research (i.e. the pursuit of general knowledge 
without any obvious social application), and testing for medical purposes.  
 
COSMETICS 
Cosmetics are to some extent important to emotional and mental wellbeing as they might help to 
improve appearances and attractiveness, which in turn could be important to, for example, self-
esteem. However, the claim to wellbeing obtained through cosmetics is unlikely to be as crucial to 
flourishing as claims to not have death or suffering inflicted. Opinions might diverge on this question 
as some people could argue that they suffer without cosmetics.152 The benefit of the doubt shall be 
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applied for now. It also needs to be considered that testing for cosmetics can only be a legitimate 
aim if it serves primarily the purpose of improving wellbeing, rather than being solely aimed at 
making money. 
Suitability is given if the product in question indeed improves wellbeing. However, it is questionable 
whether cosmetics in all cases lead to an actual increase in wellbeing. A more sophisticated analysis 
would have to take place of how the product in question would fulfill the desired aim. Furthermore, 
less restrictive means to improve wellbeing, i.e. existing and already tested cosmetics, are available 
and affordable. Yet another cosmetic product is unlikely to increase wellbeing, and thus testing is 
unnecessary. Lastly, the improvement in wellbeing, by wearing another new mascara, seems out of 
proportion to any suffering or death inflicted on animals. Animal experimentation for cosmetic 
testing, therefore, does not fulfill the principle of proportionality because of its questionable 
legitimacy and suitability, and the failure to meet necessity and proportionality in the strict sense.  
 
FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH 
Basic research for the sake of knowledge itself does speak to a human interest (i.e. fulfilment of 
curiosity about the biological world), however, not one that is a crucial requirement for flourishing. It 
would then constitute an illegitimate aim. Some might argue that such research can give surprising 
insights with unexpected benefits that contribute to a decrease in deaths and suffering, and an 
increase in wellbeing of humans. Again, the specific research study would need to be scrutinized for 
its potential benefits, whether it could be conducted using less restrictive measures (e.g. through 
alternative methods), and whether the 3Rs153 are implemented thoroughly. For proportionality (in 
the narrow sense) to be met, basic research findings would need to considerably contribute to 
improved wellbeing, as the stakes for animals are high – something that is difficult to prove. Indeed, 
if a clear benefit could be demonstrated, such a study would not fall under the category of 
fundamental research, but applied research.154 Hence, it needs to be assumed that fundamental 
research is conducted based on insufficient, vague aims that might not be achieved, implying that 
the requirements of legitimacy, suitability and proportionality in the narrow sense are not met. 
Necessity might be the only criterion that is fulfilled, if it can be demonstrated that no other 
methods could lead to the desired insights. Nevertheless, fundamental research needs to be 
opposed based on the principle of proportionality, as all requirements must be satisfied. 
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reduction (i.e. reducing the number of animals used), and refinement (i.e. improving handling and housing of 
animals) (Russell and Burch 1959). 
154 Should said research classify as applied research, the proportionality assessment might look similar to the 





Illnesses, diseases and injuries impact flourishing, in some cases crucially, and therefore claims to 
medical treatments are a fundamental right. This also includes aims that seek more affordable and 
effective treatment. Testing for medical purposes, therefore, is a legitimate aim (if the aim is to cure 
diseases rather than making money). Secondly, some animal experimentation is also – although 
certainly not in all instances – a suitable measure to introduce treatments, cures and drugs that 
improve wellbeing. Each study would have to be rigorously scrutinized for its benefits, even more so 
than under current ethical reviews (e.g. Hansen et al. 2012; Russell 2012). Thirdly, animal 
experimentation could be considered necessary to find treatments for diseases where no alternative 
methods of testing are available. Those diseases, however, would have to fulfil criteria such as (1) 
the disease cannot be effectively cured or managed through other treatments, (2) available 
treatments have strong negative side-effects, or (3) the treatments are unaffordable to all but the 
wealthiest in a society. However, this should not give outright approval to unrestricted testing. 
Efforts should also be made to making cures affordable through other means; and to reduce risk 
factors for certain diseases. Some medical issues, in particular increasing cardiovascular diseases and 
many cancers in Western societies, could be alleviated or even prevented by lifestyle changes and 
healthy living, for example, through switching to a plant-based diet (Walker et al. 2005:349; McEvoy 
et al. 2012; Orlich and Fraser 2014; Westhoek et al. 2014; Dinu et al. 2017). Resources might be 
more effectively used for preventative healthcare campaigns, rather than animal testing; in which 
case the principle of proportionality errs on the side of prevention, as it constitutes a less invasive 
measure for the animals.  
Assuming that legitimacy, suitability, and necessity were established for certain studies using animal 
experimentation, proportionality is met if the disease under question has a severe impact on the 
wellbeing and flourishing of people, and if the 3Rs are implemented rigorously. If the animal 
experiment is conducted to find treatment for a rather benign health issue that does not impair 
quality of life drastically, the measure would be out of proportion to the aim, given the suffering, 
pain, death or functional impairment of the animals.   
The principle of proportionality, therefore, would allow certain animal testing for grave medical 
issues. However, it would not relieve society from its responsibility and duty to extensively search 
for alternatives. Transgressions of fundamental rights should never be taken lightly. The principle of 
proportionality is based on the assumption that transgressions should be minimised and the 
fulfilment of crucial claims optimized (Alexy 2000:295). As well as acknowledging doubts over animal 




invasive alternative constitutes a moral duty towards the animals that is inherently part of the 
proportionality principle.   
 
THE INFLUENCE OF AND LIMITATIONS CAUSED BY MORAL CORRUPTION  
One might ask, however, given that equal moral significance of fundamental claims of animals 
compared to humans has been established earlier in this chapter, why one would choose to 
experiment on the less effective animal models rather than humans. Prima facie, there is indeed no 
moral difference between choosing an animal or a human model (except for humans making better 
models for human diseases). This implies that we ought to treat animals and humans equally (badly 
or well) with regards to experiments. However, at the moment the standards are rather different 
when animals are used in experiments, compared to those applied when humans are used in clinical 
trials. If those standards were aligned, much of current animal experimentation would cease to exist. 
Moreover, it might be restricted to testing new drugs on patients for whom no other successful 
treatment is available, and to patients who are volunteered by guardians representing their 
interests; as is or should be the case for consenting humans or their consenting guardians.  
Yet, I assume that many are not prepared yet to abolish animal experimentation in its current form. 
As described earlier, one interviewee pointed out that she disagreed with the pain and suffering 
caused by animal experimentation, while also acknowledging that if it could save the life of a loved 
one, she would probably be less conflicted. Hypocrisy is a common human fault, as some 
participants mentioned, and health struggles can be considered a strong force increasing ethical 
vulnerability, and empowering moral corruption. Indeed, attitudinal research from 2016 shows that 
65% of British people accept the use of animals in medical research where there are no alternatives 
(although 26% favour an outright ban). The majority also supports scientific research, but considers 
other types of studies, in particular non-medical chemical testing, less acceptable.  
Nevertheless, 74% of the public agree that more focus needs to be placed on the development of 
alternatives (Clemence and Leaman 2016). This indicates that public opinion might actually support 
more restriction of animal experimentation, rendering the limitations caused by moral corruption 
less salient compared to dietary issues. Instead, major opposition might stem from institutions or 
companies with vested interests, which could be required to change their modus operandi in 
substantial ways. Their inertia and attempts to cling to the status quo might be the real moral 
hurdles to overcome here.  
Moreover, the issue of animal experimentation is slightly different to the question concerning diet. 
Individuals might cause severe damage to their own health and wellbeing (and depending on the 




not be available to them. The proposed framework should acknowledge the moral tragedy and 
ethical vulnerability here to its fullest extent, given the severity of the issue and given the strength of 
the claim to health and wellbeing. Nevertheless, it also urges society to take on greater responsibility 
ensuring the wellbeing and health of its members (so as to prevent diseases as much as possible) 
while also working harder on restricting animal testing and on developing viable alternatives.  
 
8.4 CONCLUSION 
The proposed framework combines elements from utilitarianism, welfare and animal rights. It grants 
equality and protection of fundamental requirements for flourishing, which are, at the very least, the 
freedom from inflicted death, pain and suffering.155 It does so by acknowledging that no objective 
rationale convincingly establishes differing ethical significance between those claims of humans and 
of other animals, as all proposed traits used to justify such claims are anthropocentric and/or 
perfectionist. Furthermore, the proposed approach takes on board the insight of welfare activists: 
that using and consuming animals sometimes is inevitable. It conceptualises cases of fundamental 
conflict as moral tragedies (sometimes accompanied by a moral storm), rendering humans ethically 
vulnerable to moral corruption. This corruption hampers our ability to behave fully ethically when 
such tragedies occur, and need to be taken into account as real (but not absolute) limitations. The 
proposed approach, therefore, is to be considered a non-ideal theory that allows for some of the 
commonplace inconsistencies in our dealings with human-animal issues (and in activism, see chapter 
nine). However, it also constrains this concession as it establishes a duty to carefully assess the 
proportionality of measures and ends when infringing an animal’s fundamental rights, and to ensure 
their best possible treatment and least violation of rights through our practices.  
A critique by rights theorists, that has also been raised by Habermas, could concern a potential 
watering down of rights (Alexy 2003:134). Fundamental rights are supposed to give absolute 
protection; and should not be overridden even if benefits would accrue by doing so. They need to be 
upheld regardless of the consequences; and balancing, one might say, reduces their protective 
power. However, to assume that the principle of proportionality reduces the normative power of 
fundamental rights is to confuse it with economic balancing (i.e. cost benefit analysis, cf. Engle 
2012:9). The principle of proportionality does prima facie not allow the balancing of fundamental 
rights against claims that do not concern crucial conditions for flourishing. It seeks to provide 
guidance in cases of conflicting fundamental claims, in which costs are unavoidable. In the proposed 
approach, its normative power might appear reduced as it is adopted as a non-ideal version. It is 
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important to note, however, that its ethical principles are still to be upheld. Nevertheless, some 
courses of action and concessions (which might not completely fulfil the proposed ethical principles) 
can be made, if it can be demonstrated that they are not feasible or achievable at this point in time, 
and that the course of action might contribute to greater realisation of principles in the long-run.156   
Furthermore, Alexy (2003:137) argues that objections, like those of Habermas, assume that 
judgements about intensity of infringement, degree of importance, and their relationship to each 
other, cannot be assessed rationally. However, the earlier discussed example of a court ruling on the 
freedom of expression versus the protection of personality, demonstrated that intensity of invasion, 
degree of importance, and their relationship can indeed be assessed, if the context in which those 
conflicts occur is known. 
The principle of proportionality is widely used to resolve human rights conflicts. In the past decades, 
various animal ethicists have convincingly argued that those fundamental conflicts do not just arise 
within our species, but also with other sentient animals. Applying the principle of proportionality to 
our conflicts with other species does not mean discriminating against them. On the contrary, it 
means taking their moral status seriously, and asking whether our practices are legitimate, suitable, 
necessary and proportional to the infringements of other animals’ claims. The proposed 
proportionality approach acknowledges fundamental claims of all parties involved and aims at 
finding fair and just solutions to conflicts. It also urges us to think about all different considerations, 
and to listen to different voices and opinions concerning the matters at stake, including the plea to 
take the limitations of our own humanity into account (i.e. ethical vulnerability and moral 
corruption). In some cases, it can be justified to eat animals, or to introduce them to our homes as 
companions; it depends on the context, and the measure (i.e. the how) and the ends. The 
proportionality approach, however, also urges us to minimise conflicts and to reconstruct society, so 
that those difficult decisions will not need to be made. As Nussbaum (2005:317) correctly argues: 
conflicts between rights (or capabilities) ‘is a sign that society has gone wrong somewhere,’ and that 
we should focus on securing all rights (or capabilities) for all citizens.  
This approach asks for an open and in-depth discussion of our practices and about what should be 
considered legitimate, suitable, necessary and proportionate (in the narrow sense). It does not 
assume absolute and universal answers, but seeks input from all involved parties,157 looks at all the 
available options and finds context-dependent solutions. This seems particularly important given the 
criticism of dogmatism by some interviewees and within the literature (e.g. Fraser 1999:174–76; 
Sunstein 2005:296). De-contextualisation of ethical dilemmas (as is the norm within analytical 
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philosophy) limits the morally relevant factors, invites simple solutions, while neglecting real 
ambiguities, and thus, cannot provide the necessary guidance (Light and McGee 1998:5; Levitt 
2003:23). Fraser (1999:174–75) in particular criticises the focus on individualism, trumping all other 
concerns (e.g. species, population); and the emphasis on single simplistic principles, neglecting 
conflicting principles equally worthy of consideration. Furthermore, he argues that many 
philosophers fail to acknowledge the importance of balancing; and the importance of the variety of 
practices using animals. The latter, according to Fraser (1999:176), are lumped together under broad 
headings (such as animal farming), and ‘extremely general remedies’ are advocated for ‘extremely 
complex situations’. Moreover, the public discriminates between different species and engages in 
various practices involving animals for different reasons (Jasper and Nelkin 1992:166; Coleman 
2010:75), which needs to be taken into account to some extent. The principle of proportionality can 
act as a ‘higher order moral principle’ to balance those divergent positions (cf. Garner 2013). It 
allows for contextualisation, can be applied to individual practices or a broader context, and takes 
more than one consideration into account.  
Western societies are still hugely reliant on animals and animal-derived products. Some of those 
practices might be justified under the principle of proportionality given the lack of alternative 
options, or are at least better approached when the limits posed by our own moral corruption are 
acknowledged. Yet, as we seek a better world for humans in which their fundamental rights are 
realised as fully as possible, this goal should also be pursued for animals. The animal protection 
movement is working towards this objective. The implications of the proportionality approach for 





CHAPTER 9: ANIMAL ETHICS IN ACTION – ETHICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS 
REGARDING ANIMAL ACTIVISM 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
In previous chapters (four to six), data has been presented suggesting that animal welfare and rights 
activists differ in important ethical, strategical, and personal ways (but so do animal activists 
compared to each other, regardless of a welfare or rights background). Nevertheless, a consensus 
emerged regarding the need for a variety of strategies, and activists acknowledged positive sides of 
all forms of campaigning except violent ones. 
As the goal of this thesis is to propose solutions to at least some of these controversies, chapters 
seven and eight developed a new approach to dealing with animal ethics, which aims at being 
appealing to both camps: animal welfare and rights. The proposed framework acknowledges an 
equal moral status of other sentient animals, given the absence of convincing objective measures to 
establish the opposite. Moreover, it introduces the principle of proportionality as a means to resolve 
conflicts between humans and other animals when fundamental claims (i.e. those that are crucial to 
flourishing) are concerned. However, the theory is to be considered non-ideal because it concedes a 
certain anthropocentric favouritism, as our ethical behaviour is effectively limited (though not 
absolutely) by our own moral corruption. 
The questions that this chapter seeks to answer concern the implications of the proposed approach 
for animal activism. It seeks to discuss and (hopefully) resolve some of the controversies surrounding 
strategic and tactical approaches. The main question is whether activists ought to campaign solely 
for the ideal state prescribed by the ethical theory they espouse. This question is inspired by the 
abolitionist argument that complete abolition of animal use and ethical veganism is the ideal state, 
and that it follows that all campaigns not aiming at abolition and not promoting absolute and 
immediate veganism are ethically wrong and strategically ineffective. 
The first part of this chapter will focus on rejecting the three major abolitionist arguments (a) that 
the animal protection movement is unsuccessful, and (b) that the legal property status of animals 
and (c) inadequate campaigning strategies and tactics are to blame. In a second step, it will be 
argued that a moral duty to campaign in a particular way, as prescribed by abolitionism, cannot be 
reasonably established. This part of the chapter will also introduce the concept of moral tragedy to 
animal activism and the decisions activists face. Moreover, it will be demonstrated how the principle 
of proportionality as non-ideal theory can accommodate for these difficult situations. Thereafter, the 
focus will lie on strategic arguments, highlighting problems of adopting just one campaigning 




be argued that the existence of radical groups alongside moderate ones can be beneficial, if 
polarization triggers positive rather than negative radical flank effects (cf. Haines 1984). Lastly, a few 
suggestions for future directions of animal activism with regards to both animal welfare and animal 
rights will be proposed. 
 
9.2 REJECTING ABOLITIONISM 
Abolitionists, following Francione’s approach and Francione himself, are currently the main 
defenders of a unified approach to animal activism. His main points are that (a) the animal 
protection movement is rather unsuccessful in improving the lives of animals; and that (b) the 
reasons for that are the legal property status of animals, preventing them from being adequately 
protected; and (c) inadequate campaigning strategies and tactics by all organisations, but in 
particular by animal welfare activists, and the use of single issue campaigns. He then proposes that 
the only morally acceptable and strategically effective approach is vegan grassroots education (e.g. 
Francione 1996, 2004, 2008, 2010, 2016; Francione and Garner 2010). While I agree with Francione’s 
premise, that humans and other animals ought to have equal moral status, the three 
aforementioned points have been heavily criticised in the literature. This criticism – to which we 
shall turn now – implies that abolitionism needs to be partially rejected.158 
 
9.2.1 SUCCESS OF THE ANIMAL PROTECTION MOVEMENT 
The first point raised by Francione implies a problem in the animal protection movement as allegedly 
little progress in favour of animals has been made. To underpin this statement, Francione then 
points, for example, to the ban of battery cages for laying hens, replaced by enriched cages in 
Europe in 2012, being only a minimal improvement (Francione and Garner 2010:243). Sometimes he 
mentions fur campaigns (failing to stop people from wearing fur) or the UK ban on fox hunting 
(which is not properly enforced, openly violated, and risks being repealed) as examples of ineffective 
campaigning (Francione and Garner 2010:241). Furthermore, if the aim is to ban one particular 
practice or one particular type of animal product, Francione claims that people would end up buying 
and consuming more of other animal products (cf. Francione 2015:42). 
Indeed, to some extent the situation might have worsened for animals. For example, the number of 
animals used in experimentation has increased over the years; and despite the progress made in 
legislation protecting the welfare of animals, that protection is minimal when commercial profit is 
involved (Hollands 1979:203–4; Waldau 2011:108–9). Garner (2013:91) also concedes that welfare 
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has been co-opted by those with vested interests in the continued use of animals, rendering the 
concept less meaningful regarding its effectiveness in preventing suffering. Some of those problems 
might be overcome with a stronger focus on promoting veganism, but this neglects (a) the difficulty 
of encouraging the public to consider veganism (see chapter seven and eight), and (b) the successes 
the animal protection movement had in the past, in raising public concerns for animals. For example, 
in 2015, 94% of all EU citizens considered the protection of farmed animals as important, and 82% 
stated they would like to see an improvement in the aforementioned (TNS opinion & social 2016); 
constituting an increase in concern compared to a similar 2006 survey (in which 77% of participants 
called for improvements) (TNS opinion & social 2007). 
Other successes, apart from heightened awareness and concerns, were also made. Examples include 
felony-level penalties for cruelty to other animals in 46 states in the US; a ban on experiments on 
non-human apes in Austria in 2005; the granting of legal rights to non-human great apes in Spain in 
2008; and the prohibition of using wild and domestic animals in circuses in Bolivia in 2009 (Waldau 
2011:107–8). Despite Francione’s criticism, campaigns against fur led to a decline in sales of 75% in 
Britain and Switzerland in the early eighties, and Harrods stopped selling fur coats (Jasper and Nelkin 
1992:153; Garner 1993:186–87). An interim increase in the fur trade could also be ascribed to a 
decline in media coverage and awareness over the issue, and an industrial push to raise sales and 
profits. Having said that, the fashion brand Gucci recently announced that it would phase out fur by 
2018 (France-Presse 2017). Also, campaigns against animal testing for cosmetics have had various 
successes in the past, with Colgate reducing their animal use by 80% in six years; and Avon and 
Revlon having phased out animal testing completely (Jasper and Nelkin 1992:109–10). The European 
Union’s ban on animal testing for cosmetic purposes can also be considered another milestone. 
It cannot be demonstrated whether those developments are primarily attributable to one or more 
organisations, the sum of pro-animal campaigning, or instead to independent economic and other 
social developments. Neither can abolitionists convincingly argue that any of their interventions 
would be more successful. Indeed, Garner (2005a:157) argues that so far individual choices to 
become vegetarian or vegan have not clearly impacted or harmed the meat industry. 
Francione’s argument on the lack of success of the animal protection movement is at best weak. 
Moreover, the limited success and impact of many campaigns might instead be due to the nature of 
human behaviour and behaviour change, which abolitionist interventions also fall victim to. Even if 
activists manage to change attitudes, the desired behaviour does not necessarily follow (see chapter 
eight). For all we know, animals could be worse off if animal protectionists did not intervene. An 
increase in animal suffering is not the result of growing animal protection, as Francione implies; 





9.2.3 THE LEGAL PROPERTY STATUS OF ANIMALS 
Various authors have commented on Francione’s argument that their legal property status 
effectively prevents animals from being protected, as the interests of the owner will always prevail 
over the interests of the animals. However, as Garner (2005b:47) states, ‘being property does not 
equate being poorly protected’ as animal welfare protection legislation can override property rights 
(also Sunstein and Nussbaum 2005:11; Waldau 2011:100–101). While Garner concedes that the 
property status of animals will need to be abolished eventually, this will not be a sufficient measure 
to achieve full protection, and nor does the current property status prevent meaningful 
improvements (Garner 2005b:160). Furthermore, if animal welfare legislation was significantly 
better established and enforced, abolishing the property status of animals would not make much of 
a difference in terms of their wellbeing and protection (Garner 2005b:53).159 Moreover, economic 
and political change eventually needs to accompany the liberation of animals (Garner 2005a:102). 
Another critiqued point is Francione’s assumption that being a sentient animal means having similar 
or equal rights. However, as McCausland (2014:660) puts it: ‘belonging to a kind in which some 
members have an interest in not being owned does not confer the same quality to all members of 
this kind.’ While it certainly makes sense that animals should not be made to suffer because of their 
ability to experience those negative states, not all sentient species necessarily suffer or have any 
other form of interest in not being owned (also see chapter seven and Cochrane 2012; Garner 2013). 
The more convincing argument could stem from a pragmatic abolitionist perspective, which assumes 
that giving businesses such power over (powerless) individuals is corrupting (McCausland 2014:93). 
Hence, only abolishing the property status of animals can eventually grant full protection to them.  
Yet, even the abolition of this property status would not necessarily stop the violation of animal 
rights. Indeed, wild animals are usually not considered property, but their rights are also not 
sufficiently established or protected (Garner 2005b:43–45). Moreover, some control over animals is 
needed. Just as parents exert control over their children, humans need to do the same with regards 
to domesticated animals (Sunstein 2005:11–12).160 Abolishing their property status could then also 
require introducing new concepts, to ensure that the duty of care is assigned to a capable agent. 
                                                                 
159 Similarly, Garner (2005a:102) argues that if the societal consensus on the moral status of animals reaches a 
point where it is high enough to lead to sufficient protection, granting formal rights will be more of a symbolic 
act. In a similar manner, Chiesa (2016:580–82) points out that abolition of animal use as a formal act might not 
need to happen or will only happen, once economic factors have led to the cessation of most or almost all use 
of animals anyway (for example, when or if laboratory grown meat can substitute factory farms). 
160 Francione suggests that we should not continue breeding domesticated animals and let them cease to exist. 
In this scenario, questions about the duty of care would not be applicable anymore. However, it appears to be 





9.3.3 CAMPAIGNING STRATEGIES AND TACTICS 
The last of Francione’s main arguments concerns campaigning strategies and tactics by all animal 
protection groups, but in particular those of welfare organisations and single-issue campaigns. He 
argues that single-issue campaigns or those that do not promote veganism as ‘moral baseline’ and as 
the ideal state we all ought to adopt (ideally immediately), are morally wrong because they hinder 
the eventual liberation of animals. They reinforce the status quo (i.e. that is morally acceptable to 
use animals) and soothe the conscience of the public, according to Francione. The latter is, for 
example, achieved by pointing to and resolving one particular issue that causes suffering (e.g. 
battery cages), while neglecting to inform the public that suffering is not just restricted to this one 
practice. It is also argued that those measures do not in fact reduce suffering and might even cause 
more suffering as they delay abolition. However, this empirical claim is not backed up by any 
evidence; and such evidence is probably impossible to obtain. All that might be available to those 
studying the effects of activism on society are trends and correlations, but rarely certainty of 
causation. 
The variety of campaigns and media items covering animal issues, but also those promoting the 
consumption of animal products, the difference in media exposure of individuals, the existence of 
not just one but various audiences (on which media items will have different effects) and so forth, all 
complicate such research. One (limited) study on media impact on meat demand found a small but 
statistically significant hampering effect of increased media coverage on animal issues with regards 
to the demand for pork and poultry, but not beef (Tonsor and Olynk 2010). 
No conclusive answers can be provided to the question of what kind of effect animal welfare 
campaigns have on the public. However, what appears obvious is that animal welfare campaigns (in 
some but not necessarily all cases) reduce current suffering of animals. A pig that is not confined to a 
gestation crate, or a hen that lives free-range or at least in an enriched cage compared to a battery 
cage, surely must have a better quality of life, even if the improvement is minimal. To then argue 
that those improvements should not be taken because they might delay an uncertain future 
abolition opens a whole new philosophical debate about the rights of current versus future 
generations. 
However, the main problem remains that it cannot be conclusively shown that those measures 
indeed delay abolition. It is very likely an overstatement to argue that all animal welfare and many 
animal rights campaigns have such an effect. There might be particular strategies and tactics that are 
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less effective in reducing suffering, both now and in the long-term, or that somehow negatively 
impact on the movement; but it cannot be convincingly argued for the majority of activism. 
Assuming that some welfare campaigns reduce suffering and do not delay the cessation of animal 
use, supporters of abolitionism enter what Chiesa (2016:557) calls the ‘abolitionist dilemma.’ Either 
abolitionists care not only about future but also current suffering of animals, which would mean they 
ought to embrace animal welfare campaigns to some extent. Or they disregard current suffering and 
are willing to sacrifice the rights of current generations of animals for the aforementioned uncertain 
future abolition (Chiesa 2016:557–58). Other authors also criticise abolitionism for promoting a 
‘pure philosophical position,’ while neglecting a moral obligation to take actions that reduce 
suffering, and for being politically and legally unrealistic (Favre 2005:236; Phelps 2007:286). Indeed, 
as abolitionism is an animal rights/deontological approach, it would constitute a moral tragedy to 
reject welfare reform (that reduces current suffering, and thus, encourages the realisation of the 
right not to have suffering inflicted) based on its potential consequence of hindering future 
reduction of suffering (i.e. future realisation of this right) (cf. Regan 2008). 
Maybe it would be more sensible to see those campaigns as intermediate steps which are necessary 
for long-term change, some of which might be more useful and effective in driving change, than 
others. Other successful social change movements demonstrate just that (e.g. Davis 2014:315). For 
example, the emancipation of slaves in Britain and British colonies relied on several steps, beginning 
with a focus on the slave trade, then reform of slavery to an apprenticeship system, to abolishing 
this system, and eventually focusing on the international slave trade and other domestic oppression 
issues (Davis 2014:315). Also the British emancipation bill required a long time to be settled, and was 
eventually compromised (Davis 2014:262). 
Abolitionists at that time might very well also have argued that those steps were wrongfully focusing 
on only one issue of slavery, or were only reinforcing the status quo by improving the conditions 
(because of the switch to an apprenticeship module). However, they were crucial to changing the 
structure of society, so that emancipation could become feasible. Nevertheless, emancipation did 
not result in an egalitarian society (Davis 2014:289–90) and much work needed to be done, and still 
needs to be done, to overcome racial inequalities and prejudice. Similarly, the abolition of animal 
use might not necessarily result in a species-egalitarian society, without species bias, in which 
animals are fully protected. 
 
9.3 ON MORAL DUTIES AND INTERMEDIATE STEPS IN ANIMAL ACTIVISM 
Abolitionism has some interesting criticism to offer but its arguments cannot be generalised to the 




abolitionist approach into question. This part of the chapter will discuss in more general terms on 
moral duties concerning campaigning, intermediate steps, and what ought to be done based on the 
earlier proposed proportionality approach. This section will be guided by the questions of whether a 
positive duty can be established regarding what one ought to campaign for, and how one ought to 
do this. These questions will not be fully answered. Instead, I would like to only raise a few thoughts, 
and conclude that any such attempt to provide complete answers would probably remain futile. 
Some general statements concerning one’s duties as an activist were made in the interviews, and 
can also be found in the general animal ethics literature. These include for example: 
(a) One ought to engage in actions that help animals (interviews, p. 125). 
(b) One ought not to harm others in the process (interviews, p. 108-112). 
(c) One ought not to engage in actions that harm the animal protection movement and its goals 
(e.g. by creating negative publicity and a backlash for the movement) (e.g. Garner 2013:14; 
Francione 2015). 
(d) One ought to remove the gravest injustice first (Garner 2013:17–18). 
The duty to help animals through campaigns is not a controversial one, as this is the very motivation 
driving activists in their work. The second duty above is also widely accepted as the majority of 
activists condemned violence on ethical grounds, and all of them opposed it based on strategic 
considerations. Both of those duties are also endorsed in the proportionality approach which seeks 
to minimise rights infringements and maximise the realisation of rights, of all involved parties. 
Hence, all non-violent campaigns that reduce suffering (i.e. minimise violation of a right to freedom 
from inflicted suffering) or prevent and reduce the killing of animals (i.e. realise the right to life) are 
prima facie permissible within this approach. 
The third duty of not hindering the overall progress of the movement is a more complex question, 
especially when campaigns aimed at minimising specific rights violations are in conflict with the 
overall goal of total rights realisation. Other authors also argue, with regard to non-ideal theories, 
that removing one injustice should not impede the realisation of the end-goal ( Rawls 1999 
[1971]:216–18; Garner 2013:14). As already argued, there is no conclusive evidence that a particular 
kind of campaign, strategy, and tactic hinder the progression of the ideal state. However, even if that 
could be demonstrated, it does not necessarily follow that not removing the smaller injustice in 
order to achieve the end-goal, is the best course of action.161 
Let us consider a scenario where the population of a village is starving because of infrastructural and 
political insufficiencies. A group of activists has a small budget at its disposal to help those villagers. 
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Either they buy and distribute food in the village (solution one) but have to accept that the villagers 
might starve again in the future; or they launch a (most likely arduous and uncertain) campaign that 
aims at overcoming these insufficiencies, helping future generations (solution two) but let current 
villagers starve to death. Activists in solution one might very well acknowledge the underlying 
systemic issues, but feel the urge to help the villagers immediately or do not feel capable of working 
to change political and infrastructural realities. Alternatively, they might have received their 
donations in order to implement solution one. As they were given the money for this particular 
purpose, a moral and potentially even legal obligation could be stipulated to not divert the money 
from its intended use.162 To do so might also hinder their efforts to successfully call for donations 
later on. Alternatively, the donations could stem from donors with vested interests in the status quo, 
who might withdraw the money if the activists engaged in a more critical form of campaigning. Yet, 
if they did not take the donations, they would not be able to help at all. This scenario could be easily 
translated in various situations concerning animal issues and activism. The core of the problem with 
such activism is its moral tragedy; that any course of action in such situations is associated with 
wrongs, but also rights. It is difficult to find a straightforward solution to such dilemmas, but what 
should be clear is that the proportionality approach is better suited to take such contextual factors 
into account. 
The last mentioned duty prescribes campaigning on the gravest injustices, as, for example, Garner 
(2013:17–18) stipulates. For him, the gravest injustice is the violation of the right not to suffer, 
which, however, gets him into muddy waters. It then needs to be decided what kind of species or 
what type of practice is causing the most suffering, in order to establish what to campaign on. There 
is some difficulty associated with establishing how much a being is suffering through particular 
practices, and in comparing that to others (although this is not necessarily impossible). For example, 
Garner (2013:57–58) states that a focus on companion animals might not be adequate as it is not 
necessarily furthering the cause (people will often have pets and also eat meat),163 and because pet 
keeping is not necessarily associated with suffering.164 Similarly, it could be argued that the current 
focus of animal rights groups on terrestrially farmed animals is misguided as fish are killed in much 
greater numbers. Yet, some issues might be more easily won than others, and if they do not hinder 
overall progress (if that can be established) it is difficult to see why they should not be pursued. 
                                                                 
162 Indeed, the Humane Society of the United States was criticised for not spending enough of its money on 
sheltering animals (Cooney 2015:74–75). 
163 However, Garner also acknowledges that sometimes the concern for one’s pets can then extend to other 
animals.  
164 On the other hand, research studies argue that especially children bonding with companion animals score 
higher on measures relating to empathy (e.g. Poresky 1990; Daly and Morton 2015). As also interviewees 
pointed out (see p. 89 et seq.), empathy is considered vital within animal protection for acknowledging animal 




Furthermore, all suffering and all killing is morally charged, and society should work to reduce all of 
those, regardless of whether it is a dog in a family home, or a cow on a farm. To ban intensive 
farming practices and/or convince people to eat less meat does not necessarily impact on the 
situation of companion animals (in particular if they suffer because of their owners’ ignorance about 
proper care). Thus, for those who value species equality, all suffering should matter. 
 
9.3.1 MORAL DUTIES IN ANIMAL ACTIVISM BASED ON THE PROPORTIONALITY APPROACH 
The principle of proportionality embraces a variety of welfare reforms and animal rights goals. 
Welfare reforms tend to pursue the reduction of suffering, which appeals to the claim to being free 
from inflicted suffering and pain. Animal rights campaigns speak to both postulated rights: the right 
to be free from inflicted death, and from inflicted suffering and pain. If a non-violent approach or 
campaign in some way contributes to an increased realisation of fundamental claims (i.e. lessens 
suffering, or the number of deaths), it is prima facie on a par morally speaking compared to other 
approaches or campaigns.165 Even if it does potentially hinder progress, but also lessens the 
infringement of rights (i.e. being a moral tragedy), it remains difficult to establish moral superiority 
of one approach over the other, given context specific factors that have been discussed earlier. 
The proportionality approach also accommodates political, social, economic and human behaviour 
constraints that impact on campaigning strategies and tactics. Hence, it makes perfect sense for 
animal welfare groups not to campaign for a right to life, as they work with governments and 
industries. The framework acknowledges that it is unrealistic at this point in time to expect any of 
these stakeholders to implement such a right. Hence, for welfare groups to campaign on it might be 
considered a waste of money and time by many, and most likely would also be a diversion of 
donations from their intended use. Instead, campaigns might be justifiably pursued that seek meat 
reduction, as this would normally reduce suffering, and furthermore would help people to gradually 
change their habits, potentially making it easier for them to stop eating meat in the long term. Those 
steps might be considered non-ideal, but they are accommodated as the proportionality approach 
here proposed is a non-ideal theory. 
                                                                 
165  One might argue that issues, causing greater numbers of animals suffering, might be more worthy of 
attention as compared to issues concerning less animals. This consideration might be valid, and no element of 
the principle of proportionality prescribes nor contradicts this argument. However, given context specific factors 
and matters discussed later in this chapter concerning activist recruitment and public appeal might speak against 
a focus on numbers and on one single issue only. Matters concerning greater numbers of animals might not be 
as easily changed as those involving fewer, depending on the kind of change one seeks. Moreover, on the one 
hand, widespread support and pressure from the majority of activists, focusing on one particular problem, might 
help to build enough pressure for achieving change. On the other hand, it can be considered not the best use of 
resources if all activists focus on the same issue, effectively duplicating each other’s work (as also pointed out 




Moreover, its acknowledgment of ethical vulnerability and moral corruption based on the nature of 
human behaviour (see chapter eight) adds more depth to judging actions. For example, my diet is 
approximately around 90% plant-based, and I make this choice for ethical reasons. However, 10% of 
the time, usually when I am invited elsewhere or eat out, I struggle to choose either just a salad or to 
not eat when no vegan options are available.  Abolitionist theory is blind to those struggles, and sees 
no difference between my diet and that of somebody who does not choose his/her diet based on 
any ethical considerations. However, the proportionality approach accommodates those barriers. It 
does not claim that there are no wrongs associated with those 10% of my diet, but it appreciates the 
difference compared to eating ethically questionable products all the time. One constitutes a lesser 
infringement of rights than the other. It also means lesser harm to the animals overall, especially if a 
greater proportion of the population would eat primarily plant-based. Fortunately, animal advocacy 
groups realise those constraints and ethical differences. This is the case when they ask people to buy 
free-range instead of making ethically blind decisions about what products to choose; when they ask 
them to reduce their meat consumption; not to eat meat on Mondays; or to eat vegetarian, but 
ideally vegan.166 
Intermediate or non-ideal steps are also important to social change, if we aim for a society that 
embraces developments, making it sustainable change. Otherwise, segments of society might rebel 
and resist, as is the case in Nordic countries (like Sweden) where hunting has become an act of 
resistance to imposed laws, and where rural populations celebrate the hunters (von Essen et al. 
2014; von Essen and Hansen 2015; von Essen et al. 2015; von Essen 2017; von Essen and Allen 
2017a, 2017b). At its worst, social change is forced upon society through revolution and war, which 
come at grave costs including the violation of fundamental human rights. 
Lastly, I believe that we usually think of various human causes of similar worth or similarly laudable 
to pursue for activists. Campaigns aiming at equal pay for women, those working to end human 
trafficking, or those trying to help starving children, are all valuable in their own right; even if they 
do not clearly state that their campaigns aim at realising human rights to their fullest extent. I fail to 
see why one would then not consider campaigns aimed at reducing the plight of animals (although 
they cannot end it) as similarly valuable in their own right, either (cf. Garner 2013:90). 
Establishing a moral duty to campaign on one particular issue should also be considered 
controversial, as we then need to factor in all issues that are worth campaigning for, such as human 
rights, or environmental issues. While we all have a duty not to harm others, establishing a duty to 
help others (i.e. a duty of assistance) in one particular way is more difficult. It also raises the 
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based on ethical considerations) seem to be more willing to reduce their meat consumption and/or go 




question of what lengths one need to go in order to help others, and what is considered beyond the 
‘call of duty.’ The safest approach would most likely be one that does not prescribe how one ought 
to approach (animal) activism, only what one ought to not do; i.e. not harm the movement 
(acknowledging the difficulty of demonstrating such a consequence, and potential moral tragedies 
associated with this duty). 
Assuming that somebody managed to provide a convincing account of the best approach to 
campaigning, and a moral duty to follow this approach (if one chooses to become an activist),167 this 
might eventually matter little to campaigners. In other words, such an attempt is not bound to be 
widely implemented, given human nature and the varying opinions and concerns (that potential and 
current) recruits might hold, that motivate them to become advocates in the first place. 
 
9.4 A STRATEGIC JUSTIFICATION FOR CAMPAIGNS NOT AIMED AT THE IDEAL ETHICAL STATE 
Strategic questions cannot be divorced from their ethical dimensions. As an ideal theory of justice 
should be judged on its feasibility, similarly, effectiveness needs to play a role in activism, but needs 
to be limited by other moral considerations and values. Hence, a movement should be aiming to 
‘win over the hearts and minds’ of people (in the words of one interviewee), rather than imposing an 
ideal vision on others. For example, violent or military tactics could potentially be very successful in 
creating social change, but their effectiveness does not necessarily justify their use.168 In this part of 
the chapter, I will argue that there are two main strategic (and inevitably also normative) problems 
associated with arguing that only one particular approach to animal activism is valid: the difficulty of 
appealing to (potential) recruits, and of appealing to different target audiences. 
NGOs, advocacy, or activist groups need to appeal to a variety of people in order to form a 
successful movement, including potential and current recruits, supporters, target audiences, and 
other stakeholders. Indeed, Francione argues that the need to appeal to more than just the public, 
but also donating supporters, contributes to the ineffectiveness of animal groups. According to 
Francione, big animal organisations in particular will claim any success as victory (even when only a 
rather minor improvement) in order to continuously attract donations from supporters (e.g. 
Francione and Garner 2010; Francione 2015). The more donations they receive, the bigger groups 
get; eventually they will spend the donations primarily to keep the group up and running, rather 
than putting the majority of money into actual activism. I do not doubt that this could be indeed the 
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engage and work for social causes, i.e. become a campaigner, is a discussion beyond the scope of this thesis. 
168 Garner (2005a:161) also mentions that any activist’s tactics in a democratic society should not impose a 
minority view on a disagreeing majority. However, some acts, such as civil disobedience, can in some cases be 




case for some organisations, potentially even smaller groups.169,170 Such criticism should give rise to 
serious reflection on the potential of restructuring charities and organisations to be more efficient.171 
However, to suggest that the solution is to only engage in grassroots activism, implying that we 
ought to let go of all formally set up groups (e.g. Francione 2015) is to throw out the baby with the 
bathwater. 
Other successful movements have not been the result of grassroots mobilization only, but also of 
formally organised groups that engaged in more traditional forms of political action (Gamson 1990; 
Rootes 2013). For example, the feminist movement experienced conflicts between its older, more 
conservative and more formally organised, and its younger, more loosely arranged branch. However, 
as Freeman (2015:15–16) states, this complementarity eventually turned out to be a strength of the 
women’s movement. Similarly, British slave emancipation eventually resulted from more pragmatic 
political negotiations (Davis 2014:262), which were presumably led by people with experience in 
traditional approaches to advocacy. Moreover, Rootes (2013) argues that several local 
environmental campaigns (e.g. anti-airports campaigns) initially failed because those who were in 
decision-making positions were not local. Their concerns were heard once they could be taken 
beyond the local to the national level, with either the help of NGOs, or non-local allies, or by 
appealing to the national concern about the emerging global issue of climate change. Local 
opposition was necessary but not sufficient (Rootes 2013). 
Hence, it should be safe to assume that a movement needs to mobilise a variety of stakeholders to 
be successful. More grassroots oriented advocates or groups will do important work on the ground, 
reaching out to the public. More formally organised groups often have access to important 
stakeholders in the industry or government, but also will rely on donations to keep up their work. 
Hence, managing to appeal to a variety of stakeholders needs to be included in discussions about 
the effectiveness of a movement. 
 
9.4.1 APPEALING TO (POTENTIAL) RECRUITS 
Let us first examine the potential problems that could arise concerning appealing to potential and 
current recruits, if it was decided that all animal groups, advocates, or activists should engage in only 
                                                                 
169 For example, in 2016 the RSPCA (2016) spent the vast majority of its expenditures (£123.0m) on field animal 
welfare (including hospitals, the inspectorate and prosecutions; amounting to £81.4m), and a major part on 
raising funds (£22.3m). For other areas, such as campaigns, communication, publications;  science, or education, 
expenditure did not exceed more than £3.0m in each. This might be interpreted by some as focusing on keeping 
the organisation running, and treating symptoms rather than root causes (such as a lack of education).  
170  While such criticism is often focused on big organisations, smaller groups, which are not registered as 
charities, are actually more difficult to evaluate, as they are not obliged to publish financial statements.  
171  Indeed, such criticism has led to evaluation and ranking of charities based on their transparency and 




one particular approach to animal activism. This section here will also partially reflect on appealing 
to supporters for donations, assuming recruits and supporters already hold similar worldviews, and 
that both need a sense of success in order to keep working for, or donating to, a group. 
At least three objections can be raised against the argument that only one approach to campaigning 
should be used. The first objection has already been discussed, concerning the difficulty to establish 
a positive duty on what (and how) one ought to campaign for. Two additional objections concern the 
fact that (a) people hold different opinions and concerns, and will not be recruited if those do not 
match; and that (b) people have different skills, which are better used in some campaigns than 
others.172 
 
(A) PEOPLE HOLD DIFFERENT OPINIONS AND CONCERNS 
As the interviews demonstrated, activists became part of animal protection organisations through a 
variety of pathways and concerns (p. 127). Some were initially engaged in animal-related studies or 
jobs; some were drawn in after having met other activists, or by being informed about particular 
issues (e.g. animal experimentation) and then kept on learning more about other animal rights 
infringements. Moreover, some campaigners indicated that, despite their acknowledgment of the 
importance and severity of a wide range of issues, they were particularly passionate about specific 
areas. It seems unlikely that all those activists could be compelled by one approach only, as the 
interviews demonstrated. To prescribe just one approach might take away the very passion that 
motivated activists to engage in the first place. On the other hand, it could be a natural reaction to 
reject new approaches, as they indirectly raise a criticism of one’s strategies and tactics to date 
(compare to the earlier discussion on the psychological immune system in chapter eight). Hence, the 
very act of prescribing that one ought to do one thing over another risks alienating a portion of any 
population (also Jasper and Nelkin 1992:154–55). Having said all that, it needs to be reiterated that 
no one approach is likely to be free of criticism in any case. 
Moreover, apart from engaging existing campaigners, any activist group needs to attract new 
recruits simply in order to get the work done. Some interviewees pointed to the difficulty of 
recruitment; and one indeed argued that the movement is not successful, not because of the way 
activists campaign, but because it fails to attract more recruits. A wide array of academic literature 
on engagement and recruitment for social causes, also highlight the difficulty and elements that 
eventually enable recruitment. Most commonly mentioned are biographical availability,173 
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173 Biographically availability depends on one’s constraints and responsibilities in daily life, related to work, 
family, friends and so forth (McAdam 2015:73). However, someone who is sympathetic to the cause but not 




ideological compatibility (i.e. matching activism frames and identities), and social network ties 
(Goodwin and Jasper 2015:54; McAdam 2015:72; Viterna 2015:85). 
Social network ties haven been emphasised as the most important factor for successful recruitment 
(McAdam and Paulsen 1993:644; Goodwin and Jasper 2015:54; McAdam 2015:72; Viterna 2015:85). 
This is especially the case as attitude changes depend on sender credibility (Aronson et al. 1963; 
Druckman 2001:1059) (which might be higher if close social ties are established) and social pressure 
(Whittaker and Meade 1967) (exerted through close relationships). Indeed, here abolitionism could 
fare well with its focus on grassroots education, as it puts emphasis on individual, local interactions. 
However, personal contacts are also effective because they allow alignment of the messages or 
frames with the target audience, and achieve a common definition of a social problem that 
resonates with the views and experience of the target (Goodwin and Jasper 2015:55). Hence, 
abolitionism might fare worse as it allows for little deviation of its message and adopts a rigid 
approach (potentially making senders less likeable) (Moskowitz 1996; Cooney 2011:125, 147). 
The communicated frames are important as they are a way to organize issues so that they appeal to 
potential recruits and/or the broader public (Mika 2006:915; Goodwin and Jasper 2015:6). Frames 
also help to create or emphasise a collective identity, which keeps people engaged in the movement 
(Goodwin and Jasper 2015:102). In order to be effective, frames targeted at recruits need to activate 
or create a collective identity, which ideally already resonates with a highly salient identity (e.g. as a 
Christian, feminist, etc.) (McAdam and Paulsen 1993:658). To identify those identities and 
appropriate frames, however, is difficult enough and would be even more so if only one approach 
were identified as legitimate. Indeed, Viterna (2015:84) states that the same frames that promote 
mobilisation in one part of the population can inhibit it in another (Jasper and Nelkin 1992; Connelly 
and Knuth 1998; Mika 2006; Goodwin and Jasper 2015). 
One example of a highly successful frame was the slogan of Occupy Wall Street (‘We are the 99%’) 
which attracted very different parts of the population (Milkma et al. 2015:31). A broad array of 
concerns brought them to contribute to the campaign, as its lack of specificity allowed them to 
interpret their own concerns into it (Milkma et al. 2015:32, 37, 41). However, the question remains 
of what the campaign really has achieved in the long run, other than igniting a wider public 
discussion around social inequalities. Groups might then decide to emphasize a more exclusive 
identity in order to be more politically effective.  
The more radical branch in the feminist movement seems to have experienced these issues too. 
Whittier (2015:119–21) reports those developments within the feminist movement with regards to 
one branch holding a more narrow conception of feminist activism, which it eventually abandoned, 




that narrow identities might weaken the movement later, as these ignore important differences 
between its participants. 
 
(B) PEOPLE HOLD DIFFERENT SKILLS 
One further concern regarding recruitment revolves around the skills different people bring into the 
movement. Activists are motivated to engage and stay engaged in particular activities if they are 
associated with a strong sense of efficacy and with having an impact (McAdam and Paulsen 
1993:644–45; Hirsch 2015:106).174 It seems reasonable to assume that some people will fare better 
in vegan outreach than others; while others are more skilled in, for instance, political lobbying. Some 
activists might feel more comfortable engaging behind the scenes, by writing articles, reports or 
informative material, rather than working in more outwards-facing ways, such as trying to educate 
members of the public. Not necessarily everyone feels comfortable engaging in vegan grassroots 
education. Not everyone necessarily will be effective in convincing others to switch to a vegan diet. 
Moreover, it is likely that the rate at which one is able to convince others to become vegan is rather 
low, meaning that one’s feeling of impact and success might be low too, at least after some time. 
Hence, abolitionism might risk failing to attract many supporters because of its narrow conception of 
what one ought to do, both in terms of one’s individual behaviour and one’s advocacy/activism. 
While it might be successful in mobilising a small population of dedicated activists, and moral 
idealists, they are less likely to appeal to the wider population. Hence, there is also an argument to 
be made that the abolitionist approach, or any approach trying to establish itself as superior to 
others, could harm the movement as it alienates potential recruits, and the wider public. 
 
9.4.2 APPEALING TO THE WIDER PUBLIC 
Similar considerations to those that apply to recruiting activists, are also relevant to attracting public 
support. One frame or message that might appeal to and evoke support in one part of a population, 
can have the opposite effect in another (Jasper and Nelkin 1992:43; Mika 2006:938; Goodwin and 
Jasper 2015:55, 213; Viterna 2015:84). Any movement aiming for change faces this dilemma, which 
grows bigger the more fundamental the demanded change becomes. As Kurzman (2015:79) argues: 
groups either need to ‘water down their message to attract popular support or maintain a pure 
vision and mobilize a relatively small cadre.’ Activism is accompanied by various such dilemmas, as 
goals and actions need to become less coherent, the more a group expands. Moreover, 
organisations need to decide whether to reaffirm their collective identity, or fulfil their goal of 
reaching out to a wider public (Jasper and Nelkin 1992:43). Reaching out to those who are already 
                                                                 




part of a movement or sympathetic to it needs a different approach than aiming for the uninitiated 
(Mika 2006:939). 
Messages and demands by any social change movement are more likely to succeed in attracting 
large numbers of people if they resonate with widely held beliefs, concerns, and salient identities 
(Goodwin and Jasper 2015:12). This activist dilemma also extends to dealings with the media. The 
presentation of problems and proposed solutions needs to be pitched according to the audience, in 
order to be discussed within the media (Clifford 2015; Ron et al. 2015:322–23), and to find public 
support. The more widely accessible and appealing a message or demand of social change groups, 
the easier it is to get publicity for a cause, and to effect change (Jacobsson and Lindblom 2012:45). A 
society that values, for example, democracy, will be more open to change with regards to practices, 
where this ideal has not been achieved yet. 
Jacobsson and Lindblom (2012:45) also point out that, if a movement fails to ‘translate and 
externalize their ideals into norms,’ and breaches key societal norms, they will be perceived as norm 
transgressors and will not receive widespread support. The authors also describe the activist’s 
dilemma in terms of purity versus pragmatism. In order to be successful, they need to downplay the 
importance of their norm breaking, which might conflict with their ideals. If they fail to do so, they 
will be considered as deviant and alienating towards the public (Jacobsson and Lindblom 2012:47). 
While welfare groups in particular excel at externalising their norms (to an extent, some might 
consider too much), groups at the other end of the spectrum, i.e. abolitionists, fail to do so. To point 
out that animals ought not to suffer unnecessarily is widely accepted.175 In contrast, to say that we 
ought not to use animals for our purposes, be it food, clothes, or drugs, means breaking societal 
norms. Some norm breaking seems inevitable if a movement wants to effect change, rather than just 
sanctioning the status quo. However, its transgression of norms needs to be balanced, for the sake 
of winning over new recruits and public supporters and advocates. 
The example of the Plowshares in Sweden, an anti-violence, war, and weapon group, demonstrates 
how radical groups can run the risk of failing and slowly erasing themselves. Jacobsson and Lindblom 
(2012:56) report that the group’s activities decreased, until they reached a state of terminal crisis, 
mainly because they failed to generalise their ideals for the wider public. Furthermore, their concern 
with purity led them to focus on the group itself, rather than being outward reaching. One 
interviewee in this study also explained that the decrease of activities of radical groups, like the ALF, 
was due to their resistance to welcoming new recruits. Furthermore, the Plowshares’ messages did 
not appeal to nor engage audiences, as their meaning was construed by the activists, rather than 
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negotiated with the public (Jacobsson and Lindblom 2012:56). This also seems consistent with 
anecdotes provided in the interviews in this thesis. In particular animal welfare campaigners 
criticised the lack of genuine negotiation on the side of animal rights advocates. 
 
9.4.2.1 HUMAN BEHAVIOUR AND HUMAN BEHAVIOUR CHANGE 
However, even if a movement and its more radical groups succeed in winning over public support, it 
is no guarantee that behaviour change will follow. The moral case alone is often not enough, in 
particular if it conflicts with human interests (Garner 2005a:165). Some academic literature on the 
value-action gap has been reviewed and discussed in chapter eight, and will not be reiterated here. 
However, it might be important to point out again, that even if certain values do not conflict with 
human interests, and would indeed be in our interest, behaviour is not solely decided based on an 
economic cost-benefit analysis. Environmentally friendly behaviour could be considered to be in the 
interest of society and individuals. However, individual recycling behaviour can be better predicted 
by the convenience factor, rather than by eco-conscious attitudes. Even potential health risks do not 
necessarily influence motivation to change behaviour (Marteau and Lerman 2001). 
There is no clear manual on changing human behaviour, but previously mentioned factors important 
for successful recruitment might also play a role in behaviour change. Those could include 
convenience (rather than biographical availability), a social network already engaged in the desired 
behaviour (i.e. prevalent social norms), and tapping into salient identities (i.e. pre-existing values). 
This means that any movement might need to consider tapping into existing networks and identities, 
rather than trying to create new ones. This has also been suggested elsewhere with regards to 
aiming for support from social groupings and ideological traditions, such as religious circles (Garner 
2005a:165; Mika 2006:929). Garner (2005a:164) also suggests that, based on the history of social 
reform, attracting wide public support is insufficient; instead ideas become more successful if 
associated with social groupings. 
All that, however, does not imply that every group in the animal protection movement should aim to 
translate and externalise their ideals, at the expense of a tight collective identity. While it certainly 
should be happening to some extent within the movement, many of the aforementioned reasons 
can be similarly applied to argue that a group seeking a tight collective identity and a more radical 
approach would be right to do so. This might be the case because a duty to campaign in one 
particular way cannot be established, or because the more radical collective identity encourages 
those activists’ engagement in the first place. Moreover, there might be a substantial advantage (but 
also potential disadvantage) associated with the existence of more radical alongside more 





9.4.3 THE ADVANTAGE (AND DISADVANTAGE) OF POLARIZATION 
Besides the importance of a variety of existing organisations and groupings in order to reach out and 
appeal to different audiences, polarization can be both benefit and curse to a movement. From the 
viewpoint of more radical groups, the system is dysfunctional, and hence, fundamental demands 
and disruptive activities are believed to be more effective than compromising with targets (Derville 
2005:529). Instead of restraining resentments and having to cope with compromised (and 
potentially disappointing) results, heated discourse and confrontational tactics convey a feeling of 
empowerment and increase collective identity – even if no actual aims are achieved (Derville 
2005:530–31; Hirsch 2015). Hence, a radical group’s primary target audience can be considered its 
own members, with its activities aimed at enhancing their collective identity and providing a sense 
of fulfilment and impact. Their controversial approaches can to some extent spark public attention, 
the attention of their opponents, and can potentially discourage supporters of their opponents 
(Derville 2005:523). Moreover, undercover activities might cause extra costs for the industry, as it 
responds by sharpening security, and as share prices fall due to uncovered information and 
reputational damage (Garner 2005a:159–60). Radical organisations might also receive greater 
popular support if governments or industry react with ‘crushing force’ to the perceived threat 
(Klumpp 1973; Derville 2005:531). The positive effects of public attention and potentially even 
support, however, might only occur if alienation caused by disruptive activities is kept to a minimum. 
In particular, violent occurrences tend to garner media attention. Yet, the attention will then focus 
on the violence rather the cause, and the public becomes less likely to take the activists’ demands 
seriously.176 The public might then also rather support a government or industry that reacts with 
force to stop such activities, instead of siding with the norm breakers (Derville 2005:531).177 
Some disruptive activities and (seemingly) unreasonable demands on behalf of radical organisations 
might reflect negatively on the movement, and could potentially also affect the work of its moderate 
branch. As interviewees reported, organisations usually have to distance themselves from radical 
groups in order to be heard by important stakeholders (pp. 104-112). However, the existence of 
more controversial branches might be the reason that stakeholders will listen to moderates in the 
                                                                 
176 The media might focus on controversial and angry confrontations between protesters and supporters, 
rather than the actual cause, even if no overt violence occurs. This was for example the case with regards to 
protests against a competitive pigeon shoot event in Pennsylvania. Initially the protestors received little public 
support, until they adopted a new form of peaceful civil disobedience, in 1996 (Dillard 2002:55). Afterwards, 
the activists did not appear at the shootings anymore, but pursued cruelty cases in court and lobbied for 
changes in legislation. The shooting stopped in 1999, after ten years of protest (Dillard 2002:60). This is also 
another important example of how legislative change needs to accompany awareness-raising tactics for long-
term success (cf. Garner 1993:188). 




first place. Radical organisations redefine moderate positions by moving the ends of the spectrum. 
They create a niche for moderate voices, that is more likely to be respected by stakeholders such as 
government, policy makers and the industry (Munro 2005:81). This so called ‘radical flank effect’ 
(Haines 1984:32; Munro 2005:81; Goodwin and Jasper 2015:380) can either be positive or negative. 
Negative effects could entail tainting the moderates with the same brush as the radicals178 (Munro 
2005:81); undermining general public tolerance for the campaigns; portraying demands as 
undesirable; and leading to suppression of the whole movement by authorities (Goodwin and Jasper 
2015:380). The positive flank effect, however, describes the strengthening of moderate positions 
through radical activities, helping moderates to be considered reasonable, with authorities granting 
them concessions or power (to effectively undermine the radicals) (Jasper and Nelkin 1992:173; 
Derville 2005:531–32; Goodwin and Jasper 2015:380). This happened, according to Munro 
(2005:81), in the US Congress in response to protest by PETA.179 
Moreover, radical groups enable or force mainstream organisations to react to issues they used to 
ignore (Derville 2005:531) (either for strategic reasons, failure to consider the ethical problems 
raised by an issue, or simple ignorance of its existence), by creating a perception of crisis and 
focusing public attention on a set of issues (Derville 2005:523; Goodwin and Jasper 2015:380). For 
example, Jasper and Nelkin (1992:61-62) argue that pressure from the radical animal protection 
movement led welfare groups to campaign in favour of legislation banning the use of pound animals 
in research in the 1970s. Conversely, they pressure their targets to work and compromise with 
moderate activists (Derville 2005:531).180 It has also been referred to as the ‘good cop, bad cop’ 
strategy, when animal welfare groups can get their foot in the door because of animal rights 
pressure (Derville 2005:531; Cooney 2011:145). 
                                                                 
178 This was the case in the media’s reaction to peaceful protest against live animal export in the UK in the 1990s 
(Munro 2005:81). 
179 More specifically, Munro (2005:81) describes that amendments to the Animal Welfare Act in 1985 passed 
because protest from PETA shed a more positive light on moderate organisations (as offering better solutions), 
helping them to successfully negotiate with US Congress.  
180 Abolitionists argue that animal welfare organisations should not engage in their work as it would further 
justify the status quo and make animal exploitation more efficient (e.g. Francione 1996, 2015). However, 
government and industry are likely to make animal welfare concessions (rather than making animal rights 
concessions) to animal rights pressure, whether or not they are developed with the help of animal welfare 
groups. At least, animal welfare organisations can be assumed to have a more genuine interest in animal 
wellbeing than industrial stakeholders who might be morally corrupted by vested interests. Hence, 
compromises developed in association with welfare activists might still be better overall, than solutions that 
are presented by industry stakeholders only. Foer (2010:73) also points out that animal rights groups like PETA 
have achieved welfare rather than rights goals, for instance, by managing to have fewer animals per cage 
introduced, less cramped transport, or better-regulated slaughter. Companies also sometimes change their 
welfare standards quietly, so as not to be targeted by PETA campaigns, that would give rise to negative 




Polarization is sometimes viewed as unfavourable because of its potential negative effects on the 
success of the movement, but also because of its impact on people within the movement. For 
example, Hirsch (2015:106) notes that ‘each side sees the battle in black and white terms’ (which 
has also been pointed out by interviewees, p. 137), and develops distrust and anger towards 
opponents, who might even be members of the movement. Polarization then can make compromise 
and negotiation less likely and original goals might be lost from sight, according to Hirsch (also Jasper 
and Nelkin 1992:174, 176). While the affirmation of collective identity and consciousness-raising are 
important for any movement, too rigid and exclusive group boundaries also cause a loss of 
supporters (Hirsch 2015:106), and might be an indicator of a movement in decline (Whittier 2015). 
Both radical and moderate groups are important to success in a movement. The former branch can 
be crucial to raising awareness, building pressure, and – as is the case with abolitionism – 
scrutinising the modus operandi of current groups. However, radical activists should also be wary of 
their potential negative effects on the movement. Moreover, even if their tactics do not overtly 
alienate the public or other potential stakeholders, it needs to be acknowledged that fundamental 
change does not occur overnight, that legislative change is also needed, and that it will not happen 
based on public pressure alone (Garner 2005a:160). Moderate organisations, in comparison, are able 
to work on some achievable change, as a result of the pressure from radical flanks. Both branches, 
radical and moderate, within a movement, need to balance the positive against the negative impacts 
of polarization. Achieving an – almost cooperative – positive polarization could make their co-
existence highly strategic, and potentially more successful than having a moderate-only or radical-
only approach. 
 
9.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
In the last part of this chapter, I would like to propose a few important strategic and tactical 
considerations that the animal protection movement could take on board to increase its future 
success. Some of these should have become apparent in the previous discussion about the 
difficulties of appealing to various audiences, and possible benefits of polarization. As pointed out 
earlier, the success of any social change movement lies in its ability to translate and externalize its 
messages, to adapt and integrate them into existing societal norms. What is easily stated, however, 
is far more complicated to implement in practice. This is particularly the case as movements might 
benefit from groups that support an idealised norm, and only the idealised norm. The big problem 
within the animal rights versus welfare debate in my opinion, however, is that, while polarization 
successfully strengthened collective identities, it has also effectively caused barriers to negotiation 




approaches is more likely to eventually further the cause, rather than just one. They might also need 
to learn to say, as best put by one interviewee: ‘That’s right for you to do it that way, this is right for 
me to do it this way. You do it your way, I’ll do it my way. Let’s not criticise each other, let’s have 
dialogue but let’s not criticise each other, especially not publicly.’ 
 
9.5.1 ANIMAL WELFARE LIMITATIONS 
For animal welfare organisations, this might mean being more supportive of vegetarian or vegan 
campaigns, and clear opposition to intensive farming practices. Even if one does not agree with 
species equality, changing our diets seems a moral requirement and a necessity for the wellbeing of 
current and future generations, given the abundant animal welfare, environmental, health, and 
human rights issues associated with intensive farming. Many of these problems would be effectively 
addressed if the majority of the human population adopted a(n) (almost) vegetarian or vegan diet. 
However, animal welfare organisations might rightly state that vegetarian and vegan education 
campaigns are outside their remit. 
Furthermore, while welfare organisations sometimes get media publicity and hence raise awareness 
for certain issues, they need to be aware that this sort of consciousness-raising is probably not 
enough. Once their proposed solutions are implemented, the public has little reason to pay further 
attention to animal issues. For a more fundamental change in terms of public opinion and how 
society treats animals, welfare reform alone is unlikely to suffice. This is particularly the case as 
welfare groups working with industry and organisations probably seek less public engagement, and 
hence, lack the necessary social ties to spread their messages and change popular attitudes.181 
Welfare organisations also need to be wary of pitching their campaigns towards the industry or 
government in terms of more efficient industrial practices. A knock-on or spillover effect from one 
campaign to other animal issues, and raising awareness more generally, is less likely to occur if the 
campaign appeals to financial or other anthropocentric motivators, rather than genuine concern for 
animal welfare (Thøgersen and Crompton 2009). 
Lastly, welfare reform overall might have little impact on other factors influencing behaviour, such as 
convenience. Animal welfare friendlier products are often more expensive than their less welfare 
friendly counterparts. Another example includes eating out in restaurants, where people might feel 
uncomfortable asking for welfare friendly or plant-based food, if these are not clearly designated. 
These aspects could be pursued more strongly by welfare organisations. Nevertheless, as long as a 
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welfare group aims to reduce suffering and does so successfully, it constitutes an important 
contribution to reducing the infringement of the right to not have suffering inflicted. 
 
9.5.2 ANIMAL RIGHTS LIMITATIONS 
For animal rights organisations, greater acceptance of other approaches might mean being more 
welcoming of welfare reform. Rights interviewees already demonstrated a greater appreciation of 
welfare approaches, compared to welfare campaigners who were more critical of animal rights 
groups. Animal rights interviewees considered most measures aiming at the reduction of suffering as 
worthwhile. If they were concerned about activities of welfare groups, it mostly related to specific 
groups or campaigns. 
Furthermore, animal rights groups might be able to learn from the local outreach methods of 
welfare activists who aim to improve animal welfare within communities. While animal rights groups 
tend to be more focused on reaching out to the public, the interviews conveyed the impression that 
local outreach was decreasing at the expense of stronger national campaigns, in particular 
awareness-raising/advertising campaigns (cf. Kotler and Zaltman 1971:5). While national campaigns, 
aiming at nationwide awareness raising, can surely inspire public debate and can be the first step 
towards behaviour change, they are also severely limited, for several reasons. 
Firstly, behaviour change is most likely dependent on several factors and a more continuous 
exposure to the issues. Hence, Kotler and Zaltman (1971:6) suggest a stepdown communication 
process for social marketing campaigns182 in which national media communications are 
supplemented by other means, such as local or face-to-face engagement. The message is then 
discussed in a more familiar setting, tapping into social ties and increasing its likelihood of 
influencing behaviour change. The previously suggested affiliation to other social groupings indeed 
seems a promising approach, as it means utilising existing social networks for local engagement. 
Moreover, the more cross-cutting ties exist, the less incompatible or contradictory the different 
identities, ideas, values or interests between different groups will be; and disagreements will appear 
to be more easily resolvable through dialogue and compromise (Lalich 2015:131). 
Secondly, in the case of mass media communications, public debate might be stimulated, but this 
does not necessarily influence the direction of debate (Maibach 1993:219), and the mass media also 
conveys ‘counter-propaganda,’ as it has been put (Kotler and Zaltman 1971:5–6; Garner 2005b:69). 
Thirdly, national campaigns are more likely to adopt a top-down approach, focusing on the message 
and the behaviour that people ought to adopt. This is criticised by some authors, like Maibach 
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(1993:210–11) or Brulle (2010), who argue that many campaigns focus on selling their message, 
rather than on the target audience’s orientation and enticing dialogue and discussion, making them 
less effective. The authors suggests using a bottom-up approach, for example through pro-social 
communication strategies and tools that include developing trust, answering questions, empowering 
local populations, and developing mutually acceptable solutions (Maibach 1993:210). However, the 
absolutist rhetorical style of some animal rights activists (cf. Jasper and Nelkin 1992:3), in particular 
abolitionists like Francione, can also discourage a bottom-up approach, i.e. inhibit discussion and 
negotiation. Animal rights activists should be aware that seemingly powerful rhetoric, for example 
comparing animal suffering with the holocaust, might positively inspire those who already are 
sympathetic to animal rights. Other audiences, however, will react to such metaphors rather 
vehemently, as they might be considered to ‘dangerously defy accepted categories’ (Jasper and 
Nelkin 1992:7). 
Besides the communication elements of a campaign, other factors should also be considered. In 
particular, convenience plays a crucial role in determining whether people will engage in certain 
behaviours or not. The current focus on awareness-raising alone might frustrate and alienate 
potentially sympathetic members of the public, who experience an interest overkill through 
saturation campaigns but lack channels to engage in the desired behaviours (Kotler and Zaltman 
1971:9). Hence, the promoted cause needs to be made desirable for the ‘consumers,’ while also 
being accompanied by various tangible ‘products and services’, ideally at a low ‘price’ (including 
monetary, opportunity, energy and psychological costs) (Kotler and Zaltman 1971:9). Price is 
particularly important, given the previously discussed discrepancy between values and actual 
behaviour, that might be influenced by such factors. Raising awareness alone is not enough (cf. 
Singer 1998:185–86) 
 
9.5.3 PRACTICAL ADVICE 
Given the considerations above, three strategies will be proposed in the following that ought to be 
given greater prominence, if the animal advocacy movement is to be as successful as possible. 
 
(A) PROMOTING VEGANISM BUT NOT ONLY VEGANISM 
Promoting veganism is an important tool for long-term sustainable social change with regards to the 
treatment of animals. However, this also applies to vegetarianism and reducetarianism, and even 
more so as several people reducing their consumption of animal products probably has more impact 
than one person adopting a plant-based lifestyle (Ball 2015). Indeed, if reduction or vegetarianism is 




vegan cause. Widely known activists like Nick Cooney, Melanie Joy, Tobias Leenart, or Matt Ball 
speak out in favour of the reductionist paradigm, rather than the all-or-nothing approach, given the 
many barriers that keep people from changing. This make sense, given that veganism is viewed as 
more difficult than vegetarianism and that 51% of non-vegetarians in a marketing study were open 
to reducing their meat consumption (Ball 2015). 
However, in order to actually encourage better behaviour, more needs to be done in terms of 
convenience and building channels for ethical behaviour. For example, the Eating Better campaign 
surveyed seventeen retailers, and could only identify 17 sandwiches out of 620 as plant-based 
(O’Neill 2015). Such a restricted selection is likely to quickly become boring to anyone who relies on 
these retailers for lunch options. Vegan options for cakes and pastries at cafes might be even more 
limited. Hence, the Humane League Labs183 advise activists to encourage people to remove all animal 
products other than dairy first, as milk products are the most difficult to avoid for people (see Ball 
2015). 
Convenience is important in several ways, as pointed out by Wellesley et al. (2015). Structural 
factors not only make vegetarianism and veganism difficult, but they effectively support meat 
consumption, in terms of cost and ease of access. Secondly, cooking skills, time allotted to cooking, 
and awareness of food production have all decreased with the rise of convenience food, (Dibb and 
Fitzpatrick 2014; Wellesley et al. 2015). This combination of factors pose strong barriers to adopting 
a plant-based diet (cf. Cooney 2014). Hence, increasing the availability and affordability of plant-
based products seems paramount, which would make it easier for people to choose better options. 
This could mean campaigns aimed at improving plant-based selections in a variety of outlets, but in 
particular, in chains that are heavily frequented by customers. This should be accompanied by so 
called ‘nudges,’ which can have a significant impact on consumers to make better or worse choices. 
There is no neutral design, as Thaler and Sunstein (2009:3) explain. Retailers encourage or nudge 
people to buy sweets while queuing at the till, or to buy duty-free alcohol while waiting for their 
plane (Wellesley et al. 2015). A similar approach could be adopted to channel better behaviour as 
part of a bigger social change. 
At the same time, however, vegan or vegetarian food labels had a negative impact on food 
perception (Ball 2015; Crawford 2015). While labels are important for concerned and sympathetic 
consumers to make better choices, it might be better to use less prominent labelling techniques, and 
to use the word ‘plant-based’ rather than ‘vegan’ (Crawford 2015). Additionally, free food samples 
might aid in changing perceptions of plant-based foods (Ball 2015) and Meatless Mondays could help 
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to reduce conscious or unconscious aversions to vegetarian and vegan meals. Kim et al. (2015:4) 
states that reducing meat only one day a week is unlikely to suffice in terms of climate change (i.e. 
avoiding a rise of temperature over 2° C). However, it might be an important first step towards an 
urgently needed dietary change, and as such could be an effective tool to reduce consumption (cf. 
Ball 2015). 
 
(B) CONSUMER CHANGE IS IMPORTANT, BUT SO IS LOBBYING 
While legislation, legal actions and political lobbying surely cannot resolve all problems, they remain 
an important tool for long-term, sustainable change, alongside the consumer strategy. As Garner 
(1993:188) points out to those who disagree: ‘how many people would wear seat belts or crash 
helmets – an issue, remember, involving self-interest and not the altruism required in the case we 
are discussing – if it were legal not to do so.’ 
However, potentially more important changes than banning or imposing certain practices through 
legislation, concern, for example taxation or subsidies. The higher prices of plant-based compared to 
animal products can sometimes be explained based on those issues. In Germany and Austria, for 
instance, animal milk is taxed less than milk alternatives.184 Subsidiaries also play an important role, 
particularly with regards to animal agriculture. 40% of the entire EU budget is used for agricultural 
and fishery subsidies, according to Vinnari and Tapio (2012). Chemnitz and Becheva (2014) also 
report on substantial government subsidies for animal products, for example up to 40% of the costs 
for new animal housing (Chemnitz and Becheva 2014:21). Animal protection organisations could 
potentially positively intervene where subsidies promote intensification and welfare-unfriendly 
practices. Moreover, they could pursue a more open and transparent policy-making process with 
stakeholders, to reduce adverse influence of vested interests. The British anti-vivisection groups’ 
move to challenge secrecy around animal experimentation might be a profitable approach in this 
regard, as Garner (2013:139) remarks. 
 
(C) DO NOT TREAT PEOPLE AS PASSIVE RECIPIENTS, BUT AS MORAL AGENTS AND ACTORS 
Lastly, the animal protection movement might benefit from social marketing strategies that utilise a 
bottom-up-approach (as briefly discussed earlier). This means empowering the public as moral 
agents and actors to make positive changes in their lives and in society (however small they are 
initially), rather than trying to indoctrinate them with what a group of activists thinks is right. Ryan 
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and Gamson (2015:141)185 correctly point out that people cannot be transformed. They need to 
transform themselves ‘through reflection, critique, dialogue, and the development of relationships 
and infrastructure,’ which constitutes a major reframing effort. Radical groups, like abolitionists, 
contribute important input to those reflections and discussions. Presenting the ideal vision of how 
things ought to be, alongside realistic alternatives, is important in attempts to work together and in 
solving problems collectively (Singer 1998:188 et seq.). A participatory communication model (Ryan 
and Gamson 2015:139) is needed for widely acceptable solutions and policies to be developed. The 
earlier proposed proportionality approach should be based on such a model, as it ought to invite 
different viewpoints and concerns into a discussion. Such an approach is also required for 
democratic reasons (Jasper and Nelkin 1992:176) and for successful, sustainable social change. 
 
9.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter aimed at achieving three objectives. Firstly, it rejected the abolitionist position as the 
only valid approach to campaigning, but has established it as one important contribution amongst 
several. Francione’s abolitionist position and critique highlights important issues concerning 
campaigning strategies and tactics, and also moral issues. It identifies the property status of animals 
as a strong barrier to better treatment, and it is surely right in doing so, but the property status is 
not the only barrier. Moreover, Francione makes some largely unfounded claims about the lack of 
success of animal protection groups, and about welfare and single-issue campaigns hindering the 
progress of the movement. 
Even if it could be conclusively demonstrated that a particular kind of intervention is impeding 
greater social change, not helping current generations of animals in order to achieve an uncertain 
better future for others, would constitute a moral tragedy. Either way, rights and wrongs occur. 
Moreover, not everybody in animal protection is necessarily working for the same idealized vision of 
social change. Establishing a duty to campaign in one particular way, is at best a rather difficult task. 
Beside the moral complications of arguing in favour of one approach only, strategic considerations 
are no less important to this discussion. Social movements need to be able to appeal to a variety of 
audiences, such as (potential) recruits, the wider public, and stakeholders, including governments or 
industry. Its success depends on translating and externalizing its messages, so they can be 
incorporated into and transform existing social norms. As each mentioned target audience consists 
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that they use a top-down approach, which is what Ryan and Gamson (2015) criticise. Social marketing 




of specific identities, no one message will appeal to all (cf. Cooney 2011:172). Diverse organisations 
communicating a variety of solutions are more likely to be able to speak to a greater part of the 
population. Consequent polarization within a movement consisting of diverse groups is inevitable, 
but can further the cause, as it can strengthen collective identities, expand the spectrum of positions 
and alter what people consider moderate, and put pressure on moderate organisations and 
stakeholders. These positive effects, however, will only occur if radical groups manage to avoid 
alienating themselves from the rest of the movement, and the public. 
Social marketing and participatory communication models combined might eventually be best suited 
to bring about the desired social change. National awareness raising is important, but it needs to be 
accompanied by structural improvements, and by further reflection and discussion on a local level. 
No one group would be able to accomplish all of these different steps. Therefore, the necessary co-
operation between radical and moderate branches could be based on their similar – although not 
necessarily identical – moral sentiments. However, competition over resources (i.e. supporters) 
(Jasper and Nelkin 1992:69) is often a barrier to such cooperation – a problem that is beyond the 





CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION 
Social change movements can become divided into moderate and more radical branches, which 
question each other’s values and approaches (e.g. Davis 2014; Whittier 2015); the animal protection 
movement is no exception. Those disagreements raise important questions about the morally 
correct and most strategically effective approach. In animal protection, this has been subsumed 
under the term ‘the animal rights versus welfare debate.’ In particular, the abolitionist position has 
fuelled this debate in recent decades, claiming that there is one morally superior and more effective 
approach to animal advocacy, and that all other positions are a hindrance to the movement. 
Those disagreements appear substantial and have supposedly weakened the movement (Garner 
1993:48; Ryder 1998). Ethical and strategic disagreements might prevent fruitful co-operation, 
potentially leading to inefficient use of resources. They might further weaken the inner cohesion of a 
broad movement, while strengthening resolves and identities of smaller and splinter groups, causing 
stronger feelings of separation and alienation (Jasper and Nelkin 1992:43; Derville 2005:530–31; 
Hirsch 2015:106; Whittier 2015). The latter might also occur with regards to the public and other 
stakeholders when polarization causes a negative flank effect, meaning that the whole movement 
loses its credibility and hence influence, because of the actions of a few (Haines 1984:32; Munro 
2005:81; Goodwin and Jasper 2015:380). 
This thesis aimed at exploring and engaging in a discussion over how to resolve these disputes, 
rather than fuelling them, so as to strengthen the animal protection movement. Chapter one has 
argued why this might be considered an important goal. The animal protection movement works to 
realise heightened animal protection based on moral duty, but it also serves self-interests. A moral 
duty stems from our own values that animals at least should not have unnecessary suffering 
inflicted. Currently, even the least progressive values are not fully upheld (i.e. the moral orthodoxy 
approach), given the abundance of animal welfare problems (e.g. Singer 1995 [1975]; Foer 2010; 
Harrison et al. 2013) and practices causing suffering and pain, that in many cases are not strictly 
necessary. Protecting animals and furthering the cause of various animal protection organisations is, 
however, also a human self-interest, given the negative impact of, for example, intensive animal 
farming on the environment and human rights (e.g. Baroni et al. 2007; McMichael et al. 2007; JRC 
2010; UNEP 2010; Foley et al. 2011; Sutton et al. 2011; Thornton et al. 2011; Tukker et al. 2011; 
Bouwman et al. 2013; FAO 2014). 
Existing literature on the debate as a whole is scarce. Most animal ethics theorists focus on 
establishing their own theory as superior to another, and little has been said about conflict 
resolution. Moreover, the focus mostly has been on analytical philosophical theorising, and little 




explore the animal welfare versus rights debate through philosophical and sociological enquiry, and 
(b) emerging out of the findings, to develop a framework aimed at resolving the conflict (at least 
partially). 
 
10.1 THESIS SUMMARY186 
Part I introduced the problem, the existing literature, and the methodology used in this thesis. The 
exploratory part of this thesis then focused on the following question: which aspects divide activists 
within the animal protection movement, and what common ground do they share? (Part II). Data was 
obtained through fifteen semi-structured interviews with activists from a variety of organisations, 
both welfare and rights. The major point of agreement concerned the greatest possible reduction of 
suffering; and indeed all, except for three, interviewees held views quite closely aligned with animal 
rights, in particular concerning species equality (chapter four). Hence, most campaigners did not 
disagree greatly with regards to ethical opinions, but differed more with regards to their preferred 
strategic and tactical approach. Animal welfare activists tended to be more critical of animal rights 
campaigning, and all disagreed with the abolitionism-only approach. Interestingly, animal welfare 
campaigners felt that animal rights activists had few tangible results to show, and vice-versa. 
Welfarists were worried about the negative impact of rights approaches on the movement, causing 
alienation of important stakeholders, including the public (see discussion of negative flank effects in 
Jasper and Nelkin 1992:43; Derville 2005:530–31; Hirsch 2015:106; Whittier 2015); while rights 
supporters were concerned that welfarists were overly moderate, to the extent that they might not 
effect actual social change. Overall, however, all interviewees demonstrated some appreciation of 
other strategic approaches and their potential to further the cause of the animal protection 
movement (chapter five). The results also yielded interesting differences on an interpersonal level, 
and identity differences between activists, which further fuel conflicts (chapter six). 
As only one member of each of the fifteen groups was interviewed, and given the limited number of 
interviews, the results cannot necessarily be generalized to the wider population of activists. This 
limitation is particularly important with regards to the abolitionist position, as no contact with 
potential interviewees adopting this approach, both theoretically and strategically, could be 
established. Hence, their representation here relies on available literature and other sources such as 
online blogs. Moreover, given the interpretative, constructionist approach of this thesis, the results 
cannot make a claim to universality. However, it should also be noted that various observations and 
findings are supported by other studies and authors. 
                                                                 




In part III, the thesis developed a framework aimed at bridging the ethical gap between animal 
welfare and rights, by taking on board key considerations and insights of both camps, as obtained in 
the interviews (chapter seven and eight). Key findings from part II that influenced chapter seven and 
eight included that (1) moral species equality was accepted by the majority of activists, but that (2) 
equal treatment is not always possible. Similarly, (3) animal rights as a concept was accepted overall, 
although disagreements arose over its actual meaning. Furthermore, in particular welfare activists 
pointed to (4) the need for a communicative, bottom-up approach; and (5) non-ideal world 
constraints on ethical behaviour and social change, in particular human behaviour change, affecting 
activism (as pointed out by welfare and rights campaigners). The main research question here 
concerned how those insights can be integrated into a framework that bridges welfare and rights 
concerns, creating a space for ethical discussion and collaboration. 
Hence, chapter seven discussed the concept of species equality and concluded that, at the moment, 
no convincing arguments exist against species equality, with regards to fundamental claims to 
flourishing, i.e. the claims to life, and to be free from (at least moderate to severe) pain and other 
forms of suffering inflicted by moral agents. If humans value life (as a precondition for flourishing) 
and wellbeing (with the minimum requirement to avoid suffering) for the human species, so should 
these be valued for other species that are sentient (i.e. for those to which/whom wellbeing matters). 
However, as interviewees pointed out, we live in a non-ideal world, in which issues of conflicting 
(fundamental) rights (conceptualised as moral tragedies), and constraints caused by moral 
corruption, threaten equality in treatment. Hence, this thesis proposes taking into account existing 
moral tragedies and moral corruption as part of the ethical discussion. The acknowledgement of 
moral corruption, while usually not accepted within ideal ethical theories, is justified in a non-ideal 
approach. Non-ideal theories accommodate intermediate steps and solutions that might not quite 
align with the ideal state, but could move society closer to it. This rests on the assumption that a 
complete change to the ideal state of any ethical theory is neither feasible nor possible at this point 
in time, and can only be achieved through intermediate steps. Non-ideal theories uphold core 
principles, such as ‘do not kill or inflict suffering on animals,’ but acknowledge that a course of action 
that reduces inflicted death and suffering ought to be taken, if the complete realisation of ethical 
principles cannot be achieved at a certain point in time. Non-ideal theories are based on the 
assumption that the necessary economic, social and human behaviour change needed to fully live up 
to ethical values and principles will, in many cases, occur only incrementally. 
Chapter eight took up the ideas concerning conflicting fundamental claims (i.e. moral tragedies) and 
moral corruption, and proposed using the principle of proportionality as guiding framework for our 




hence might constitute a suitable measure to similarly decide cases of conflicting rights occurring 
between species. The principle encompasses four steps to evaluate the most just course of action: 
legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the narrow sense. A course of action that 
infringes another beings’ fundamental rights is only legitimate if it also serves one’s own crucial 
claims (rather than serving claims other than fundamental ones). The course of action needs to be 
suitable to fulfil that claim, and necessary, in the sense that no other less invasive course of action 
could serve the same purpose. Lastly, the action taken needs to be in proportion to what it aims to 
achieve. 
Such a proportionality assessment of an ethical question concerning animals could favour an 
animal’s right, while putting the human at a disadvantage. It could be concluded, for instance, that in 
certain situations it might be more just to let a human die, rather than another animal. Such a 
scenario could occur with regards to animal experimentation, which might (or might not) save 
human lives. However, in such cases a non-ideal theory might make some anthropocentric 
concessions; while also pushing for a clear restriction to the infringement of other animals’ rights 
(e.g. by asking for stricter regulations of animal experimentation, and for more development of 
alternative methods). Such a concession appears necessary in order to be palatable to the public, 
and in order to acknowledge existing barriers to ending, for example, animal experimentation which 
is legally required to be performed before introducing new drugs to humans.187 
The last chapter of part III (chapter nine) scrutinized practical disagreements and highlighted the 
strategic importance of diversity within the movement. As interview results demonstrated, the main 
opposition towards diverse campaigning strategies and tactics appears to stem from abolitionist 
positions or interpersonal differences. To resolve the latter is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, the former was addressed in chapter nine and influenced the last research question: 
whether one can prescribe how animal activists ought to campaign, concerning both purpose and 
methods. Hence, chapter nine partially rejected abolitionism by arguing that abolitionists cannot 
convincingly demonstrate that (a) the animal protection movement is indeed unsuccessful; (b) that a 
change of the legal property status of animals alone would result in heightened protection; and (c) 
that animal welfare and single-issue campaigns have a hindering effect on the movement. Instead, 
this chapter proposed that animal activism also faces moral tragedies, as helping animals in one way 
(for example by providing immediate relief through welfare reform) might mean not using resources 
to help them in other ways (e.g. by aiming for systemic change through vegan education), and vice-
versa. Welfare reform can reduce some suffering at this point in time, but might have little impact 
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on human behaviour change among the wider public (i.e. greater social change). In contrast, 
focusing on educating the wider public and changing behaviour might eventually cause greater social 
change, but is a long-term project, which might take generations, and could potentially fail. It also 
has little impact on current animal suffering overall, and might only be suited to reducing it in the 
long run. This was illustrated by an interviewee who argued that convincing one human to adopt a 
plant-based diet has less impact on the suffering of the thousands of animals currently used, than a 
well implemented welfare reform, such as banning pig gestation crates. Human behaviour change is 
necessary if animal suffering and deaths are to be reduced sustainably, but, given limited 
campaigning resources, it might come at the expense of reducing current suffering (and vice-versa). 
Lastly, chapter nine argued that the success of the movement will rely on reaching out to a variety of 
audiences, including potential recruits, different stakeholders, and various groups within the wider 
public. Such a task cannot be achieved by one type of strategy alone. Diverse groups within the 
movement are better suited to winning over each of these different audiences. However, the 
movement needs to be wary of negative flank effects associated with polarization, that are already 
occurring because of diversity. Rather than focusing on differences, exclusion, and separate 
identities, the movement could use polarization in a constructive way, by encouraging dialogue and 
scrutiny. 
 
10.2 THE CONTRIBUTION 
The goal of this thesis was to unleash synergistic potentials in order to partially resolve the animal 
welfare versus rights debate. Resolution of the debate should not be understood as aiming to say 
the ‘last word’ and settle the debate once and for all, but to constructively theorise, contribute and 
offer answers to open questions in the debate – with the aim of helping to overcome differences 
between animal advocates, rather than further dividing them. The thesis made three contributions 
in this regard. Firstly, it provided a richer picture of animal activists, their opinions, motivations, and 
the difficulties they perceive with regards to other approaches, philosophies, and organisations. 
While the results might not be generalizable, they provide a more complex image of animal activists 
and their differences, than current literature on the topic offers. Animal welfare campaigners are 
usually described in a particular way (e.g. as believing that the use of animals is morally acceptable; 
as people who do not take the plight of animals seriously; as too moderate), and animal rights 
activists are portrayed as their opposite (e.g. as believing that all use of animals is unacceptable; as 
people who put other animals before humans; as too radical). However, the interviews 
demonstrated that animal welfare advocates can hold more progressive views; and that animal 




interviewees agreed that animal suffering was the major issue to be overcome, although they 
differed in their opinions on how that might be achieved. Those differences in several cases could be 
traced back to either a more pragmatic or more idealistic approach to animal activism and social 
change. Furthermore, the interview results highlighted aspects such as reputational issues that can 
cause advocacy organisations to publicly distance themselves from other groups. Reputation and 
public image are important for groups in order to form collective identities, and also to reach out to 
other audiences, including potential donors. The importance of these issues was demonstrated, both 
through sociological enquiry, and a theoretical contribution and analysis of these aspects, in chapter 
nine. 
Secondly, this thesis introduced a new approach to the debate concerning animals: the principle of 
proportionality. This principle is used to settle human rights conflicts, but does not appear to have 
been applied to interspecies rights conflicts. This is particularly important, as little conceptual work 
exists on resolving conflicting rights between humans and animals.  
The proportionality approach was developed as a non-ideal theory in this thesis to allow for some 
anthropocentric concessions in order to acknowledge (and overcome) current economic, legal, 
social, and psychological barriers to fully ethical behaviour. It therefore follows in the footsteps of 
Garner’s work (2013), which proposes a so-called sentience approach as a non-ideal theory. 
However, this thesis does not restrict itself to protection against suffering, but includes the 
protection of life. This is a crucial aspect as the right to life is considered of utmost importance by 
the interviewed rights activists. Any framework lacking considerations of this right would not be able 
to bridge the realms of welfare and rights. 
The framework can be considered a middle ground between the various approaches as it (1) is a 
deontological/rights approach at its core, but (2) also contains consequentialist elements, as it 
allows for some weighing, at least with regards to conflicting rights. The latter should still be 
palatable to animal rights proponents, such as Regan, given the constraints within which such 
weighing occurs. Consequentialists, like Singer, might reject this approach on the same grounds on 
which they reject deontology. However, the concept of rights is a fundamental part of Western 
human societies, which provide the highest protection, legally and politically. To not use this concept 
for animals means accepting that ethical values and principles relating to animals are unlikely to be 
translated into existing political and legal structures. The concessions to moral corruption as a 
current barrier to fully ethical behaviour (ideally to be overcome) are also unlikely to be palatable to 
most ideal-theory ethicists. However, they were introduced as a middle ground for the welfare 




The third contribution of this thesis lies in theorising animal activism in terms of its methodological 
approach, both ethically and strategically. It introduces the concept of moral tragedy to the ethical 
discussion concerning activism, and argues that no one framework can adequately prescribe how all 
animal activists ought to campaign. One might be able to argue for or against specific campaigns; 
however, a general rule, such as welfare or rights only, cannot reasonably be established. This is 
because a successful movement needs to translate and externalise its messages to a wide array of 
potential recruits, supporters and audiences within society, who will not be attracted by only one 
kind of message. In this sense, the thesis highlights some (though far from all) strategic 
considerations – in particular those pertaining to diversity and polarization, which are crucial to any 
social movement. 
 
10.3 IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis will hopefully further inspire the ongoing discussion concerning our treatment of animals, 
and about how to resolve ethical questions and practical problems. Animal ethicists might further 
develop the proportionality approach; political theorists might take it more strongly into the policy 
realm, making it applicable to politicians and policy makers. Animal activists might use it to guide 
their deliberations with each other, and with stakeholders. 
Additional research could be conducted to establish whether the results in this thesis can be 
generalized to the wider population of animal advocates. Alternatively, future research might seek 
to interview those who support an abolitionist position exclusively, as the image of abolitionists in 
this thesis was only based on the existing literature, and on reports from non-abolitionist 
interviewees. Abolitionists might not be as dogmatic and radical as some participants suggested.  
The resolution of interpersonal differences and conflict, however, should constitute a more 
important and urgent topic for future research. The interviews revealed that those differences often 
cause more difficulties and failures to co-operate, than any other source of disagreement. Those 
who seek to further the cause of the animal protection movement, but also other social change 
movements, would profit from such research. Indeed, this thesis might positively inform other fields 
of social activism as well.  
Lastly, more research is needed to establish the impact of individual campaigns, both in terms of 
succeeding in the aims of the campaign, and in terms of impact on the wider movement. Without 
studies to this effect, strategic discussions remain vague and theoretical. Such research might also 
help to further understand when and how negative or positive flank effects occur, and how to use 





The animal protection movement has a long way to go to fully achieve its goal of reducing the 
suffering and deaths of animals caused by humans. Ethical, strategic, and interpersonal differences 
will remain the topic of heated discussions, that may or may not negatively impact the movement, 
depending on how activists engage in those debates. A bottom-up, welcoming discourse seems 
paramount, in order to win over hearts and minds of other activists, and the wider public. The most 
important insight of this thesis, however, is that uniformity is not necessarily required for a 
successful movement. Instead the movement should seek solidarity in its shared goal to protect 
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APPENDIX 1 ANIMAL WELFARE ORGANISATIONS CONSIDERED 
The welfare organisations, considered in this research, are listed in descending order after their annual 
income in 2014, and after the number of followers on Facebook on the 9th of October 2016. 
Organisations one to eight were considered big charities; nine to 16 medium-sized; and 17 to 24 small 
charities in terms of their income. *As the Humane Society in the UK does not have a dedicated 
Facebook page, the number was taken from the global HSI Facebook page. 
 
No. Income Followers 
1. RSPCA Dogs Trust 
2. PDSA Humane Society International* 
3. Dogs Trust International Fund for Animal Welfare 
4. Cats Protection RSPCA 
5. World Animal Protection (WAP) Battersea Dogs and Cats Home 
6. Blue Cross Cats Protection 
7. Battersea Dogs and Cats Home Born Free Foundation 
8. International Fund for Animal Welfare Blue Cross 
9. The Brooke PDSA 
10. British Horse Society League Against Cruel Sports 
11. Redwings Horse Sanctuary Compassion in World Farming 
12. Wood Green World Animal Protection (WAP) 
13. Compassion in World Farming British Horse Society 
14. Retired Greyhound Trust Redwings Horse Sanctuary 
15. Born Free Foundation The Brooke 
16. League Against Cruel Sports Four Paws UK 
17. The Mayhew Animal Home Wood Green 
18. The Horse Trust Mayhew Animal Home (International) 
19. National Animal Welfare Trust Retired Greyhound Trust 
20. Four Paws UK Thornberry Animal Sanctuary 
21. Humane Society International The Horse Trust 
22. Thornberry Animal Sanctuary Badger Trust 
23. Badger Trust National Animal Welfare Trust 




APPENDIX 2 ANIMAL RIGHTS ORGANISATIONS CONSIDERED 
The animal rights organisations, considered in this research, are listed in descending order after their 
annual income in 2014, and after the number of followers on Facebook on the 9th of October 2016. 
Dark grey cell shading indicates a lack of available information. *As Animal Equality in the UK does not 
have a dedicated Facebook page, the number was taken from the global Animal Equality Facebook 
page. 
No. Income/Cash Followers 
1. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals 
(PETA) 
Animal Equality* 
2. The Vegetarian Society People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals 
(PETA) 
3. Animal Aid The Vegan Society 
4. The Vegan Society The Vegetarian Society 
5. Dr Hadwen Trust VERO 
6. Viva! Animal Defenders International 
7. Cruelty Free International Cruelty Free International 
8. Captive Animals’ Protection Society (CAPS) Animal Aid 
9. Animal Equality Anti-Vivisection Coalition 
10. Animal Defenders International Captive Animals’ Protection Society (CAPS) 
11. National Anti-Vivisection Society (NAVS) Viva! 
12. Veggies Catering Campaign Dr Hadwen Trust 
13. Coalition to Abolish the Fur Trade Hunt Saboteurs Association 
14. Hunt Saboteurs Association National Anti-Vivisection Society (NAVS) 
15. Movement for Compassionate Living Coalition to Abolish the Fur Trade 
16. Animal Rights Groups (Cambridge) Veggies Catering Campaign 
17. VERO Movement for Compassionate Living 
18. Worcestershire Vegans & Veggies Worcestershire Vegans & Veggies 




APPENDIX 3 REVISED TOPIC GUIDES FOR ANIMAL WELFARE AND RIGHTS ORGANISATIONS (AFTER 
PILOTING) 
TOPIC GUIDE for animal rights organisations 
 
Diverging opinions and strategies between different animal protection organisations 
 
OBJECTIVES 
• To explore the ethical opinions of people in animal protection organisations 
• To gather general opinions held on different organisations 
• To examine the opinions on strategies in use by different animal protection organisations 




• Introduce myself and the study (goals); recording and confidentiality (not passed on to others 
etc.); timing (60-120 minutes) 
 
1. Personal details 
 
• For how long have you been active in the movement? 
 
• Why did you decide to engage in movement? 
 
• Why this organisation (reasons for engaging)? 
 
• Activities in other organisations? 
 
2. Opinions on animal treatment 
 
• Initial concern for the treatment of animals? 
 
• Current major concern about how animals are treated?  
o Animals for which there is no concern? 
o Different circumstances? 
o How to overcome the raised issues? 
 
• Concerns about suffering? 
o How to address these issues (e.g. duty of care, providing a good life)? 
 
• What do you think about the killing of animals? 
o Which circumstances (e.g. pests; human benefit)? 
o Are human lives more valuable?  
▪ Are there any examples when this would not be so? 
 
• What does having a right mean to you? 
o Are there any rights you would want for animals? 
▪ For which animals? 




• To what degree is compassion associated with animal protection? 
o To what degree do you see yourself as compassionate (how much; give an 
example)? 
o Creating human behaviour change through compassion? 
 
3. Opinions on strategies 
 
• Which kinds of strategies does the participant think are most important (in general)? 
 
• Are there strategies you do not approve of (in general)? 
 
• Organisational work? 
o Evaluation of their work regarding success? 
 
• Do you think welfare reforms make people feel comfortable about the use and treatment of 
animals in our society? 
 
o Provision of services (e.g. labels, awards, information) 
 
o Seeking legislative changes  
 
o Seeking cultural/behavioural changes  
▪ Educational campaigns (e.g. vegetarian/vegan campaigns) 
 
o Seeking changes in organisational policy, e.g. retailers, schools/hospitals/prisons re 
catering for vegans, etc. 
 
o Single issue campaigns  
 
o Direct actions  
▪ Illegal (non-violent/violent – property destruction vs. threats or harms 
toward people? Verbal vs. physical violence?) 
 
4. Opinions on the participant’s organisation 
 
• How close are your views reflected in the organisation’s official views? 
o E.g. vegetarianism/veganism 
o E.g. welfare/abolition 
 
• Areas of disagreement? 
 
4. Opinions on other organisations 
 
• What do you think is the major difference between your organisation and the others? 
 
• Organisations you would not work for? 
o Because of ethical policies, overall objectives, strategies? 
 
• What do you think is problematic about animal welfare organisations? 
 




5. Opinions on Co-operation 
 
• Organisations with which they successfully co-operated? 
o Factors contributing to the success  
 
• Organisations with which they failed or had difficulties to co-operate? 
o Factors contributing to failure/difficulties (moral baseline, strategies etc.) 
 
• Do we need more co-operation? 
o Why? 
o What needs to change to increase co-operation? 
 
6. If you could change one thing about or in animal protection, what would it be? 
 
7. Anything the participant would like to add? 
 
ENDING 




TOPIC GUIDE for animal welfare organisations 
 
Diverging opinions and strategies between different animal protection organisations 
 
OBJECTIVES 
• To explore the ethical opinions of people in animal protection organisations 
• To gather general opinions held on different organisations 
• To examine the opinions on strategies in use by different animal protection organisations 




• Introduce myself and the study (goals); recording and confidentiality (not passed on to others 
etc.); timing (60-120 minutes) 
 
1. Personal details 
 
• For how long have you been active in the movement? 
 
• Why did you decide to engage in movement? 
 
• Why this organisation (reasons for engaging)? 
 
• Activities in other organisations? 
 
2. Opinions on animal use 
 




• Current major concern about how animals are treated? 
o Animals for which there is no concern? 
o Different circumstances? 
o How to overcome the raised issues (improve conditions vs. stop practice)? 
 
• Concerns about suffering? 
o How to address these issues (e.g. duty of care, providing a good life)? 
 
• What do you think about the killing of animals? 
o Which circumstances (e.g. pests; human benefit)? 
o Are human lives more valuable?  
▪ Are there any examples when this would not be so? 
 
• What does having a right mean to you? 
o Are there any rights you would want for animals? 
▪ For which animals? 
o Are there any rights you feel animals should not have?  
 
• To what degree is compassion associated with animal protection? 
o To what degree do you see yourself as compassionate (how much; give an 
example)? 
o Creating human behaviour change through compassion? 
 
3. Opinions on strategies 
 
• Which kinds of strategies do you think are most important (in general)? 
 
• Are there strategies you do not approve of (in general)? 
 
• Organisational work? 
o Evaluation of their work regarding success? 
 
• Can rights campaigns result in welfare advancements/raise awareness (criticism that they do 
not work within the system and alienation)? 
 
o Provision of services (e.g. labels, awards, information) 
 
o Seeking legislative changes  
 
o Seeking cultural/behavioural changes  
▪ Educational campaigns (e.g. vegetarian/vegan campaigns) 
 
o Seeking changes in organisational policy, e.g. retailers, schools/hospitals/prisons re 
catering for vegans, etc. 
 
o Single issue campaigns  
 
o Direct actions  
▪ Illegal (non-violent/violent – property destruction vs. threats or harms 




4. Opinions on the participant’s organisation 
 
• How close are your views reflected in the organisation’s official views? 
o E.g. vegetarianism/veganism 
o E.g. welfare/abolition 
 
• What kinds of strategies does the organisation use? 
o Does the organisation evaluate their strategies regarding their success? 
 
• Areas of disagreement? 
 
4. Opinions on other organisations 
 
• What do you think is the major difference between your organisation and the others? 
 
• Organisations you would not work for? 
o Because of ethical policies, overall objectives, strategies? 
 
• Is there something problematic about animal rights organisations? 
 
• How much would you agree or disagree that animal rights organisations are radical or 
extreme? 
 
• Is there anything you like about animal rights organisations? 
 
5. Opinions on Co-operation 
 
• Organisations with which they successfully co-operated? 
o Factors contributing to the success  
 
• Organisations with which they failed or had difficulties to co-operate? 
o Factors contributing to failure/difficulties (moral baseline, strategies etc.) 
 
• Do we need more co-operation? 
o Why? 
o What needs to change to increase co-operation? 
 
6. If you could change one thing about or in animal protection, what would it be? 
 
7. Anything the participant would like to add? 
 
ENDING 





APPENDIX 4 ADDITIONAL PILOTING QUESTIONS 
 
Additional piloting questions 
 
Did you feel well informed on the purposes of the study, confidentiality and risks? Was there anything 
missing in your opinion? 
 
Which questions during the interview did you find unclear or difficult? 
 
Which questions would you ask differently? 
 
Was there something you were struggling with in the interview? 
 
Did you have the feeling there was something important missing in the interview which should have 
been addressed? 
 
Was the interview proceeding smoothly in your opinion? 
 




APPENDIX 5 INITIAL TOPIC GUIDES (FOR PILOTING) 
 
TOPIC GUIDE for animal welfare organisations 
 
Diverging opinions and strategies between different animal protection organisations 
 
OBJECTIVES 
• To explore the moral basis of people employed in animal protection organisations 
• To gather general opinions held on different organisations 
• To examine the opinions on strategies in use by different animal protection organisations 




• Introduce myself and the study (goals); recording and confidentiality (not passed on to others 
etc.); timing (60-120 minutes) 
 
1. Personal details 
 
• For how long is participant active in the movement 
 
• Why did participant decide to engage in the movement 
 
• Why this organisation (reasons for engaging) 
 
• Activities in other organisations 
 
2. Opinions on animal use 
 
• Which kind of animal uses do you think are unacceptable? 
o Pets/laboratory animals/farm animals/wild animals (zoos, circuses, hunting…) 
o Different circumstances (e.g. would you rather approve of traditional farming 
methods than intensive farming) 
o To what extents do perceived human benefits alter your positions on animal use? 
o Should we look to improve or end unacceptable practices? 
 
• How far are you concerned about the suffering of animals? 
o Which forms of animal uses, do you think normally or necessarily entail suffering? 
o Are there forms of animal use which do not entail suffering?  
o What contexts are necessary to make various levels of suffering acceptable? 
 
• How far are you concerned about the good life of animals? 
o What does having a good life mean? 
 
• What do you think about the killing of animals? 
o Acceptable or not 
o Which circumstances (e.g. pests; human benefit) 
o Are human lives more valuable?  
▪ Are there any examples when this would not be so? 
 
• What does having a right mean to you? 
 
 
o Are there any rights you would want for animals? 
▪ For which animals? 
o Are there any rights you feel animals should not have?  
o Do we have a duty to care for animals? 
 
• What does humane treatment mean to you? 
o How far is compassion associated with animal protection? 
o How far does participant see him/herself as compassionate (how much; give an 
example)? 
o Should humans be more compassionate and less cruel? 
 
3. Opinions on strategies 
 
• Which kinds of strategies does the participant prefer (in general)? 
 
• Are there strategies the participant does not approve of (in general)? 
 
o Provision of services (e.g. labels, awards, information) 
 
o Seeking legislative changes  
 
o Seeking cultural/behavioural changes  
▪ Educational campaigns (e.g. vegetarian/vegan campaigns) 
 
o Seeking changes in organisational policy, e.g. retailers, schools/hospitals/prisons re 
catering for vegans, etc. 
 
o Single issue campaigns  
 
o Direct actions  
▪ Illegal (non-violent/violent – property destruction vs. threats or harms 
toward people? Verbal vs. physical violence?) 
 
4. Opinions on the participant’s organisation 
 
• How close are your views reflected in the organisation’s official views? 
o E.g. vegetarianism/veganism 
o E.g. welfare/abolition 
 
• What kinds of strategies does the organisation use? 
o Does the organisation evaluate their strategies regarding their success? 
 
• Areas of disagreement? 
 
4. Opinions on other organisations 
 
• What do you think is the major difference between your organisation and the others? 
 
• Organisations the participant would not work for 




• Additional questions for participants of animal welfare organisations: 
 
o What if anything, do you think is problematic about animal rights organisations? 
 
o Can rights campaigns result in welfare advancements? 
 
o Can rights campaigns result in raised awareness of animal welfare? 
 
o How much would you agree or disagree that animal rights organisations are radical 
or extreme? 
 
o Is there anything you like about animal rights organisations? 
 
5. Opinions on Co-operation 
 
• Organisations with which they successfully co-operated 
o Factors contributing to the success  
 
• Organisations with which they failed or had difficulties to co-operate 
o Factors contributing to failure/difficulties (moral baseline, strategies etc.) 
 
6. Anything the participant would like to add? 
 
ENDING 
Reassurance about confidentiality and how data will be used; Possibility of re-contact if necessary 
 
TOPIC GUIDE for animal rights organisations  
 
Diverging opinions and strategies between different animal protection organisations 
 
OBJECTIVES 
• To explore the moral basis of people employed in animal protection organisations 
• To gather general opinions held on different organisations 
• To examine the opinions on strategies in use by different animal protection organisations 




• Introduce myself and the study (goals); recording and confidentiality (not passed on to others 
etc.); timing (60-120 minutes) 
 
1. Personal details 
 
• For how long is participant active in the movement 
 
• Why did participant decide to engage in movement 
 
• Why this organisation (reasons for engaging) 
 




2. Opinions on animal use 
 
• Which kind of animal uses do you think are unacceptable? 
o Pets/laboratory animals/farm animals/wild animals (zoos, circuses, hunting…) 
o Different circumstances (e.g. would you rather approve of traditional farming 
methods than intensive farming) 
o To what extents do perceived human benefits alter your positions on animal use? 
o Should we look to improve or end unacceptable practices? 
 
• How far are you concerned about the suffering of animals? 
o Which forms of animal uses, do you think normally or necessarily entail suffering? 
o Are there forms of animal use which do not entail suffering?  
o What contexts are necessary to make various levels of suffering acceptable? 
 
• How far are you concerned about the good life of animals? 
o What does having a good life mean? 
 
• What do you think about the killing of animals? 
o Acceptable or not 
o Which circumstances (e.g. pests; human benefit) 
o Are human lives more valuable?  
▪ Are there any examples when this would not be so? 
 
• What does having a right mean to you? 
o Are there any rights you would want for animals? 
▪ For which animals? 
o Are there any rights you feel animals should not have?  
o Do we have a duty to care for animals? 
 
• What does humane treatment mean to you? 
o How far is compassion associated with animal protection? 
o How far does participant see him/herself as compassionate (how much; give an 
example)? 
o Should humans be more compassionate and less cruel? 
 
3. Opinions on strategies 
 
• Which kinds of strategies does the participant prefer (in general)? 
 
• Are there strategies the participant does not approve of (in general)? 
 
o Provision of services (e.g. labels, awards, information) 
 
o Seeking legislative changes  
 
o Seeking cultural/behavioural changes  
▪ Educational campaigns (e.g. vegetarian/vegan campaigns) 
 
o Seeking changes in organisational policy, e.g. retailers, schools/hospitals/prisons re 




o Single issue campaigns  
 
o Direct actions  
▪ Illegal (non-violent/violent – property destruction vs. threats or harms 
toward people? Verbal vs. physical violence?) 
 
4. Opinions on the participant’s organisation 
 
• How close are your views reflected in the organisation’s official views? 
o E.g. vegetarianism/veganism 
o E.g. welfare/abolition 
 
• What kinds of strategies does the organisation use? 
o Does the organisation evaluate their strategies regarding their success? 
 
• Areas of disagreement? 
 
4. Opinions on other organisations 
 
• What do you think is the major difference between your organisation and the others? 
 
• Organisations the participant would not work for 
o Because of ethical policies, overall objectives, strategies? 
 
• Additional question for participants of animal rights organisations: 
 
o What do you think is problematic about animal welfare organisations? 
 
o Can welfare reforms eventually lead to the end of animal use? 
 
o Can welfare reforms eventually lead to more respect for animal rights? 
 
o Can welfare campaigns contribute to raising awareness of animal issues? 
 
o How much would you agree/disagree that animal welfare organisations fail to tackle 
the real problems, and create sufficient change? 
 
o Is there anything you appreciate about animal welfare organisations? 
 
5. Opinions on Co-operation 
 
• Organisations with which they successfully co-operated 
o Factors contributing to the success  
 
• Organisations with which they failed or had difficulties to co-operate 
o Factors contributing to failure/difficulties (moral baseline, strategies etc.) 
 
6. Anything the participant would like to add? 
 
ENDING 
Reassurance about confidentiality and how data will be used; Possibility of re-contact if necessary  
 
 
APPENDIX 6 PROJECT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Diverging opinions and strategies between different animal protection organisations 
 
I am a research student at the University of Winchester studying for a doctoral degree in animal ethics 
and welfare. The research study described below, forms part of my thesis on animal ethics and 
welfare. I am investigating the differences in opinions and strategies between animal welfare and 
animal rights organisations. Accordingly, I would like to invite you to participate in this study, entitled 
‘Diverging opinions and strategies between different animal protection organisations.’ Before you 
decide to participate, it is important you understand what the study involves and what you would be 
asked to do. So, please take time to read the following information. And please don’t hesitate to ask 




Participation is completely voluntary and can be withdrawn at any time, without reason or penalty. 
The participant can ask for the recordings and transcripts to be destroyed at any time. Participants 




Participation in the project involves an interview to explore opinions about the use of animals in 
general, about other animal protection organisations, and about the organisation the participant is 
involved with. This includes questions on strategies and campaigns. All the information will be handled 
confidentially (see below).  
The interview will take approximately 90 min. The interview can be interrupted or cancelled by the 
participant at any time without reason or penalty. Interviews will be recorded using a microphone and 
a recording device.  
The results will be used in the doctoral thesis which will be submitted at the latest in March 2018. 
Moreover, I aim to publish the results in a peer reviewed academic journal. Results also might be used 






Confidentiality and anonymity:  
 
The research student will not disclose the participant’s identity. Transcripts, data and results which 
will be discussed within the supervisory team, and within the thesis, journal articles, conferences and 
the like, will be made anonymous. Personal and organisational names and other information which 
might allow identification will be excluded. The organisations which contributed to the project will be 
named but interview data will not be related to specific organisations. Instead, where applicable, 
interview data will be grouped as belonging to an animal rights or an animal welfare perspective. It 
also will be mentioned that the interviews reflect personal opinions and not organisational views.  
 
Although the following factors will not normally be of any concern, I am nevertheless obliged to inform 
all participants that confidentiality and anonymity does not cover disclosure of involvement in any 
criminal activities. Therefore, research data does not enjoy legal privilege, and might be liable to 
subpoena by a court. Moreover, there is a legal obligation to report information on acts of terrorism, 
or suspected financial offences related to terrorism (Terrorism Act 2000), information on money 
laundering (Proceeds of Crime Act 2002), or on the neglect or abuse of a child (Section 115 of the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998). The research student may also seek legal advice or the advice of her 
supervisors about whether to report other involvement in criminal activities, if these activities were 
to constitute serious physical or psychological harm to the participant or others.  
 
Data will be stored in accordance with Data Protection Legislation. The interview transcripts will be 
kept in a secure and locked cabinet and all computer files will be password protected. Only the 
research student will have access to the original data. As per Data Protection Legislation 1998, the 
recordings, transcripts and other data will be kept for no longer than six years.  
 
Contact for Further Information:  
 
For further inquiries, feel free to contact the research student:  
M.Leitsberger.15@unimail.winchester.ac.uk  
If you have inquiries or problems with the study which you do not want to discuss with the research 






Ethics approval:  
 
This study has been approved of by the University RKE Ethics Committee at the University of 
Winchester.  
 
Permission of gatekeepers:  
 
If the interview does not take place at the University of Winchester, the manager of the setting or the 
owner of the premise needs to provide written permission. This person also will be provided with an 
information sheet and be asked to sign a consent form (consenting to the research taking place in the 
setting).  
 





APPENDIX 7 CONSENT FORM 
 




I have read (or had clearly explained to me) and understand the information provided to me about 
the project. I understand that my participation in this project is completely voluntary, and that I may 
withdraw at any time during the project, without penalty. 
 
I understand the arrangements that have been made to ensure my anonymity and privacy. I am aware 
that I have the right to see what has been written about me. 
 
The researcher has made clear to me any risks which may be involved in my participation in the 
project. 
 
The arrangements for secure storage of data, and for its eventual disposal, have been explained to 
me. 
 
On this basis, I consent to taking part in this project. 
 
 
Print name   .......................................................... 
 
Telephone number  .......................................................... 
 
Email address   .......................................................... 
 




APPENDIX 8 CONSENT FORM (FOR THE MANAGER OF THE SETTING) 
 
 
Diverging opinions and strategies between different animal protection organisations 
 
 
Consent Form for the manager of the setting 
 
 
I have read (or had clearly explained to me) and understand the information about the project 
provided to me. 
 




Print name   ..........................................................  
 
Telephone number  ..........................................................  
 
Email address   .......................................................... 
 
Signature   .........................................................  Date........... 
 
